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SUMMARY 
Wage levels and employment are influenced by a number of factors, the individual 
effect of which is difficult to isolate. The influence of institutional factors such as 
labour market policies and legislation is, however, often disregarded or 
underestimated. This study highlights the importance of labour market institutions as 
one of the factors influencing wage levels and employment. 
The study starts off with a review of economic theories posited in order to explain 
wages and employment, and arrives at the conclusion that there is no universally 
applicable theory. Although the theory of supply and demand could perhaps be 
regarded as the most relevant, there are a number of theories that explain wage and 
employment levels by focusing on different aspects of the employment relationship. 
Opposing viewpoints regarding the need for government intervention in the economy 
are then discussed: should the market mechanism be allowed to determine wage levels 
and levels of employment, as seems to be the popular World Bank perception, or does 
government have a social and moral obligation towards its citizens to intervene in the 
labour market, even though such intervention may be regarded as distortionary (the 
view of the International Labour Organisation?). Some common ground does appear 
to exist in that there seems to be agreement on the need for some basic form of 
intervention to ensure "minimum" standards acceptable to society. However, the 
extent, timing and manner in which governments intervene are of considerable 
importance. 
A review of the modem welfare state then provides the basis for the argument that the 
- - labour market institutions of today are not the result of economic impulses only, but 
rather the combined outcome of economic, political and social considerations. 
This is followed by the presentation of country specific evidence regarding collective 
bargaining, the minimum wage and social security structures in both industrialised 
and developing countries. Such discussion puts the development of labour market 
institutions in Namibia into perspective, and serves as basis for comparison. 
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Following the above, detailed evidence regarding the development of ~amibian 
labour market institutions is presented. By addressing labour relations issues such as 
worker exploitation, the protection of workers, and income inequality, government 
has attempted to create an environment it believes is conducive to economic growth 
and, over the medium to longer term,job creation. 
As many of the institutions reviewed in this study were only introduced or adapted 
some years after Independence in 1990, it is difficult to arrive at anything more than a 
general impression regarding their effectiveness in achieving government's 
objectives, and perhaps still too early to judge institutions solely on their economic 
impact. Although labour market institutions have contributed to increasing wages and 
non-wage labour costs, it is extremely difficult to isolate their effect on economic 
growth and employment. Other than addressing historical political and social 
problems in the country, labour market- institutions appear to not yet have had a 
significant impact in terms of encouraging economic growth and job creation in 
Namibia. 
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OPSOMMING 
Loonvlakke en indiensneming word be'invloed deur verskeie faktore waarvan die 
individuele effek moeilik is om te isoleer. Die invloed van institusionele faktore soos 
arbeidsmarkbeleid en arbeidswetgewing word dikwels ge'ignoreer of onderskat. In 
hierdie studie word aangevoer dat arbeidsmarkinstellings weI geag moet word as 
belangrike faktor wat loonvlakke en indiensneming be'invloed. 
Die studie begin met 'n kort oorsig van ekonomiese teoriee ter verduideliking van 
lone en indiensneming. Dit lei tot die gevolgtrekking dat daar nie 'n teorie bestaan wat 
werklik universeel toepaslik is nie. Alhoewel vraag- en aanbodsteorie moontlik die 
relevantste is, is daar reeds verskeie teoriee geformuleer wat op verskillende faktore 
fokus. 
Teenstrydende standpunte rakende die nodigheid vir staatsinmenging in die ekonomie 
word hiema bespreek: behoort die bepaling van loonvlakke en indiensneming slegs 
aan die markmeganisme oorgelaat te word (tot 'n groot mate die Wereldbank se 
standpunt), of het die staat 'n sosiale verpligting om in te meng met die werking van 
die markmeganismse, selfs al bring dit ekonomiese verwringings mee? (die standpunt 
van die Intemasionale Arbeidsorganisasie?). Wat die twee sienings weI in gemeen het, 
is die feit dat daar tog 'n nodigheid bestaan vir inmenging in soverre basiese of 
"minimum" standaarde neergele moet word wat vir die gemeenskap aanvaarbaar is. 
Die omvahg, tydsberekening en instrumente waarmee die staat inmeng is weI ook van 
belang. 
'n Oorsig van die modeme welvaartstaat dien hiema as basis vir. die argument dat 
modeme arbeidsmarkinstellings die gevolg is van rue net ekonomiese oorwegings nie, 
maar onder andere ook politieke en sosiale oorwegings. 
Dit word gevolg deur 'n bespreking van die situasie rakende kollektiewe bedinging, 
minimum lone en sosiale sekuriteit in ontwikkelde en ontwikkelende lande. Die doel 
van hierdie bespreking is om die ontwikkeling van arbeidsmarkinstellings in Namibie 
in perspektief te plaas, en om te dien as basis vir latere vergelykings wanneer die 
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stand van hierdie instellings in Namibie bespreek word. Deur aandag te gee aan 
kwessies soos arbeidseksploitasie, die beskenning van werkers en inkomste-
ongelykheid poog die regering om 'n omgewing te skep wat bevorderlik IS vIr 
ekonomiese groei en werkskepping oor die medium tot langer tertnyn. 
Aangesien die meeste van die huidige Namibiese arbeidsmarkinstellings eers na 
onafhartk1ikheid in 1990 bekendgestel of aangepas is, is dit uiters moeilik om meer as 
s1egs 'n algemene indruk rakende die mate van doeltreffendheid ten opsigte van die 
bereiking van staatsdoe1witte te verkry, en moontlik ook te vroeg om instellings 
uits1uitlik vir hulle ekonomiese impak te probeer beoordeel. Hoewe1 die instellings 
bygedra het tot verhoogde 100nv1akke asook hoer nie-Ioon arbeidskostes, is dit uiters 
moeilik om die effek van instellings op ekonomiese groei en indiensneming te is01eer. 
Beha1we vir hulle r01 in die aanspreek van politieke en sosia1e prob1eme in die land, 
wi1 dit voorkom asof arbeidsmarkinstellings nog nie 'n groot impak gehad het wat 
betref die bevordering van ekonomiese groei en indiensneming in N amibie nie. 
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1. Introduction 
As a developing country in Africa with low GDP growth and a high population 
growth rate, unemployment, poverty, high rural-urban migration, and unequal income 
distribution are common problems in Namibia. Most of these problems have been 
exacerbated by the apartheid policies introduced during the second half of this 
century. 
Given the turbulent political history of Namibia, it was widely expected at the time of 
Independence in 1990 that the newly elected government will do much to address the 
needs o(the formerly disadvantaged groups. This has indeed taken place in a number 
of different ways, but in the field of labour in particular by way of introducing new 
labour market institutions, and adjusting ones already in existence in 1990. Such 
action has formed part of government's attempt to protect workers and improve 
working conditions, to reduce income inequality, and to improve the standard of 
living of all Namibians, all of which reflects government's perception that improved 
working conditions and higher wage levels would prove conducive to economic 
growth. The Namibian government has noted that wages not only form a very 
important part of income, but that they also ' ... act as an allocative device ... " 
(Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development 1995: 5). 
The purpose of study is to look at factors affecting the cost of labour and employment. 
Although market forces normally play an important role in determining wages and 
employment, it will be argued that the effect of institutional factors, and in particular 
labour market institutions, can also be significant. It will be shown that Namibia is a 
good eXa.I!lple o( a developing country where not only economic considerations,but 
also political and social considerations have heavily influenced the development of 
labour standards and labour market institutions. Given the impact of labour market 
institutions and institutional instruments on the labour market, one could argue that 
wage levels and employment in general is not determined purely by economic forces, 
but also to a certain extent reflect the abovementioned political and social 
considerations. 
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In view of the purpose of this study, and the focus on the development of labour 
market institutions in Namibia, changes that have occurred since 1990 with respect to 
collective bargaining, the minimum wage and social security, will be documented. A 
rough assessment will then be made in order to obtain an overall impression of 
whether these institutional instruments have in fact had a significant affect on wage 
levels and employment. Such review is, however, unlikely to produce more than a 
general impression, given the relatively short period that has passed SInce 
implementation of most of these instruments, and the lack of reliable data. 
Nevertheless, it is important to identify at an early stage already whether government 
is on the right track with regard to its approach towards solving the problems targeted 
with these instruments. 
Freeman (1993: 141) has noted that views on intervention in the labour markets of 
developing countries have for a long time been based not so much on economic 
models or econometric evidence, but rather on observations of specific. country 
experiences. Given the lack of statistical data with regard to a number of labour 
related issues in Namibia, and in some cases the particular lack of recent data, the 
approach followed in this study is one that also focuses heavily on the forces that have 
led to the development of labour market regulations in other countries, and the 
economic and social impact of such regulations. This should make it possible to 
identify general trends in the direction of developments with regard to labour market 
regulations. 
Chapter two will review various theoretical approaches to explaining wage levels and 
unemployment. The purpose of this chapter is to point out that there is no single 
theory that provides us with a universally applicable explanation to the above, as 
different . theones cover dlfferenf aspects affecting wage and unemployment 
determination. It will also be argued that wages and (un)employment are not purely 
the result of the workings of the market mechanism, but are also directly and 
indirectly influenced by, among other factors, political and social institutions. The 
impact of such institutional influences are often disregarded or underestimated. 
In chapter three the concept of the modem welfare state will enjoy attention. Looking 
at welfare state principles can enrich our understanding of the political level of 
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society, and how politics relates to the economic system. The latter also forms the 
most fundamental constraint on the manner in which any welfare state develops. 
A review of the modem welfare state will lay the basis for an argument that the labour 
market institutions of today are not purely the result of economic impulses, but rather 
a combination of economic, political and social impulses, all interwoven. On the basis 
of this, it will be argued that Namibia is an excellent example of a country where the 
labour market institutions have developed precisely as a result of such interaction 
between different disciplines. Economic and political systems have to a large extent 
been interwoven not only during the past five decades, but even prior to that. 
In the second part of chapter three the main welfare state regimes will be discussed, as 
well as countries which exemplify the respective regimes. This will be followed by a 
brief overview of general trends as regards the development of labour market. 
institutions in both industrialised and developing countries. 
/ 
Country specific evidence regarding the usage of collective bargaining structures, the 
minimum wage and measures of social security will be presented in chapter four. 
Evidence from both industrialised and developing countries will be assessed in order 
to arrive at a conclusion as to how effective these particular labour market institutions/ 
instruments have been in achieving the initial goals envisaged with their introduction. 
The labour market of Namibia in many ways resembles that of a typical developing 
country: an abundance of unskilled labour, high rural to urban migration, high 
unemployment in urban areas in particular, as well as a small formal "wage 
employment" sector and a large informal sector. Given the level of economic 
development of the country, and in view of Namibia's political history, it could be 
-
asked whether government should in fact actively intervene in the labour market by 
introducing formal institutions which affect labour market outcomes. Are such 
outcomes very different in terms of wage levels and employment levels than what 
would be the case if the market mechanism was allowed to function in an unhindered 
manner, i.e. without any intervention? As the Namibian government is already 
intervening actively in labour market issues, what are the main mechanisms used and 
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IS it possible to determine how effective these mechanisms are m achieving 
government's goals regarding employment and wage levels? 
In chapters five and six the information presented in the preceding chapters will be 
compared and applied to the prevailing situation regarding labour market institutions 
in Namibia. A comprehensive overview of the development of some of the main 
labour market institutions in Namibia will be given, with an emphasis on political and 
social issues that have affected the development of such institutions during the past 
five decades in particular. Current trends with respect to domestic developments will 
we compared to trends in other developing countries in general. 
A discussion of general economic trends and in particular the trends with regard to 
economic growth in the various sectors of the economy will be discussed in chapter 
five. The purpose of such discussion is to highlight the fact that, based on current 
trends, it is not likely that overall economic growth will much exceed the high 
population rate estimated at 3.1 % per annum. This in tum highlights the dire need for 
creating economic, political and social frameworks assisting with income security, 
and being conducive to encouraging and facilitating job creation through socially 
legitimate means. 
Given the prevailing economic conditions and projected future trends, should 
government increase its intervention in the economy? How does government 
reconcile economic and social interests, and how are these interests expressed? What 
would be the most efficient ways to achieve its goals? What can we learn from the 
experiences gained through the implementation of similar institutions in other 
countries, and has the introduction of labour market standards resulted in high wage 
and employment levels, or the contrary? These issues will be addressed in chapter six. 
Chapter seven will be a presentation of a number of case studies to indicate to what 
extent the Namibian government has intervened by way of establishing labour market 
institutions, and how effectively these have been used. Although statistics in Namibia 
are not comprehensive in'terms of coverage, nor recent as regards a number of issues, 
it should be possible to get at least a general impression as regards the extent of 
government's involvement in the economy through such a review. 
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Case studies with regard to the use of collective bargaining, as well as the minimum 
wage, will be presented in chapter eight. 
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2. Different Approaches to Wage and Unemployment 
Determination 
2.1 Introduction 
The International Labour Organisation (1992: 121) defines wages in pure economic 
terms as "the reward for labour, which in tum may be defined as human effort of any 
kind employed to meet an economic demand". Wage income, or lack thereof, is of 
particular importance as it affects the financial ability of a worker to address the basic 
needs of his/her family, and also the level of dependence on assistance from family, 
the market, or the state. However, wages are not only important to workers, but also to 
employers, as both cash wage and non-cash wage benefits affect the labour costs of 
employers. This often puts pressure on the profit margins of companies that are 
normally already under pressure from both local and international competitors. The 
process of determining and fixing wages at what society deems "appropriate" levels is 
consequently not only of great importance, but also very complex, and involves not 
only economic but also social considerations. 
Although in many developing countries such as Namibia most rural families derive an 
income from small scale farming activities, the cash income obtained from "selling" 
labour is becoming more and more important as a source of income to families. 
Unemployment and wages are likely to become even greater issues of relevance as 
financial pressure on government increases: a high incidence of poverty and 
unemployment has severe repercussions for political stability and the future growth of 
the economy. 
This chapter briefly reviews the various approaches and theories that are used to 
explain wage differentials and unemployment. The discussion highlights the main 
differences between the viewpoints of economists and sociologists. The overview will 
provide some guidelines according to which the Namibian economy and the issues of 
unemployment and wage disparities can be put into context in the following chapters. 
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2.2 The Economist's view of unemployment and wage differentials 
2.2.1 Brief history 
The early classical school of thought on wage theory focused on two main ideas, 
namely the principle of population and population growth, and the idea of the wages -
fund. 
In the early nineteenth century David Ricardo's subsistence theory focused on the 
idea that wages would automatically move towards their "natural level", and that the 
normal working of labour market supply and demand, if interfered with, would be 
unnecessary and may even have harmful results (ILO 1982: 110). 
With rising populations, no significant trend in real wages during the nineteenth 
century, and heavy reliance on the agricultural sector for employment, the main 
problem became the issue of distribution. The theory of rent postulates that land use is 
not a factor in the pricing process, and consequently the division between capital and 
labour becomes the focus of the distribution issue. As the assumption is that the 
amount of capital is proportional to the amount of labour, prices of products are 
deemed to be in proportion to the amount of labour used to produce them. Capital was 
no longer considered an independent production factor. Population was seen as being 
given over the short term, and therefore regarded as the only determinant of labour 
supply (Dunlop 1957: 4 - 6). -' 
In the middle nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill presented his wages fund theory. In 
short, this theory supported the idea that, in the short term, every country has a limited 
or set amount of money (a fund) available for wages. If one group of workers were 
paid more than another group, there would simply be less money available to pay to 
the latter group. Thus employers could either employ fewer people or reduce the 
wages of some workers. Unions in such a setup would secure higher wages for 
themselves, but at the expense of other workers. Interesting to note is that the theory 
did recognise that the population adjusted wages to a customary or social standard, 
which over the long run indicated that social convention rather that the economic 
system "determined" wage levels (ILO 1982: 111; Jackson 1970: 8). 
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During the decades leading up to the Great Depression, the issue of distribution 
remained a problem, albeit that the focus changed from centering on distribution 
among classes, to distribution of a national product among different production 
factors. The approach to wage theory changed gradually, with the neoclassical 
concept to marginal productivity coming to the fore during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. It was believed that the marginal productivity of labour 
determined the demand for labour, and that, as marginal productivity declined in 
correspondence to an increase in workers employed, wage increases would lead to a 
reduction in employment. Unions could secure higher wages, but the number of 
people employed would be reduced (Jackson 1970: 10). 
Today there are various approaches and theories aimed at explaining unemployment 
and wage differentials. Although the market forces of supply and demand have 
remained important, many now also acknowledge the influence of non-market / 
institutional forces. Economists are increasingly including some of the features of 
social structures in their theories to explain unemployment and wage differentials. 
2.2.2 Methodology and Assumptions: The equilibrium / disequilibrium argument 
From a pure economic perspective, there are two opposing views with regard to the 
functioning of the labour market. The first view contends that competitive markets 
produce "socially desirable "results, and is based on the neoclassical idea that market 
efficiency is achieved when a state of equilibrium is reached. Classical and 
neoclassical economists in the 19th and 20th centuries focused on the labour market 
(and economy as a whole) as being in a state of "competitive equilibrium", albeit 
under certain specified conditions. Archer (1992: 222) broadly defines these 
conditions as the following: a major market player (monopolist) does not influence 
prices, information is freely available, and there are market opportunities for all 
tradable products. Given these conditions, markets will clear fast by equating supply 
and demand. 
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The most basic assumption of the equilibrium view is that of rationality, i.e. that 
individuals want to maximise or optimise, making decisions which would bring about 
the greatest possible utility (satisfaction) to them. A second important assumption is 
that, given the information available to them, individuals can accurately calculate the 
outcomes of their actions. Information is deemed perfect and costless. Another 
assumption is that markets are like auctions and will always clear as a result of an 
ongoing process of instant price (and wage) adjustment. Unemployment is seen as 
voluntary, and only as a (temporary) function of people being between jobs, workers 
looking full-time for better jobs, workers being retrained, or workers preferring more 
leisure time. Economic fluctuations and corresponding fluctuations in unemployment 
must be reconciled with the idea of the market being in equilibrium (England 1992: 
46; Phelps-Brown 1977: 13). 
Contrary to the equilibrium argument, the disequilibrium argument holds that it is 
impossible to exchange labour in the same way as other commodities are exchanged. 
Transactions involving labour are not impersonal in nature, and competition for 
employment is affected by codes of personal conduct. Labour markets are dualistic 
and segmented in nature. Furthermore, labour is not standardised, and can be 
distinguished from other commodities by the fact that there are standards of fairness 
that should be taken into account when wages and working conditions are determined 
(Archer 1992: 231). 
Disequilibrium theorists contend that workers respond to wage variations by 
supplying more labour, or withdrawing it, thereby continually substituting labour and 
leisure time. These theorists emphasise that one cannot assume rational behaviour 
from economic agents, that cyclical fluctuations cannot be explained by the 
equilibrium mode, that information is in fact not perfect, and that market consumers in 
one market only obtain complete information about the prices in another market if 
they are willing to pay for it (Archer 1992: 226; Granovetter 1981: 22). 
Archer (1992: 231) highlights a number of reasons for disequilibrium. Firstly, job 
competition, and subsequently the "normal" interaction between forces of supply and 
demand, are affected by certain rules of behaviour / social norms. Furthermore, there 
is the issue of labour market "segmentation" (discussed in detail on page 18) which 
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refers to workers and their ability to qualify for certain positions being subject to 
geographical confines, previous work experience, ethnic background, and gender, to 
name but a few factors inhibiting the natural flow of competition. A fourth reason for 
disequilibrium which is very closely related to segmentation refers to the division 
between those workers who are employed (insiders) and those workers who are 
unemployed (outsiders). Insiders are viewed by many as having some monopoly 
power over the working environment. A fifth aspect referred to by Archer is the issue 
of fairness, and of relative wage rates (Archer 1992: 224,225). 
2.2.3 Explanation of Wage Differentials 
The pure market view of wages holds that the impersonal working of the market fixes 
a market wage for every occupation. Wage differentials are considered to be "by-
products" of the fixed rates. 
Rottenberg (1960: 40) noted that the classical theory of economists such as Adam 
Smith explained the choices of workers in terms of "comparative total net advantage", 
and not in terms of "comparative wages". Adam Smith in his time already contended 
that wages would vary in accordance with the ease or hardship, cleanliness or 
dirtiness, etc of a job. He noted three restrictions on the unfettered working of the 
market: barring certain people from entering certain trades, encouraging people to 
take on jobs they would not take under normal circumstances, and obstructing the free 
movement of workers between different jobs. Many years later, the writings of 
economists such as Phelps-Brown (1977: 13) reaffirmed the existence and importance 
of some ofthese restrictions. 
Phelps-Brown- attributes wages and wage differentials to a variety of factors that 
restrict either the number of available positions in an occupation, or the number of 
persons who are in fact able to "qualify" for such positions. Owing to certain 
restrictions, the number of jobs which are available in a certain occupation are usually 
limited. The rationale for placing direct or indirect restrictions on entry is to ensure 
that the income of individuals in such an occupation does not decline significantly 
with the entry of too many people to the same occupation, and/or to maintain certain 
standards. Secondly, "dis equilibrating" pay rates also restrict the number of available 
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jobs. Employers who employ "expensive" workers, normally attempt to change 
methods of production. Also, higher labour costs are normally transferred onto the 
price of the final product, and this may result in a reduction in sales. Employers 
would thus attempt to limit the cost of labour relative to other production factors 
(Phelps-Brown 1977: 14). 
As regards limitations on the number of persons suitable for certain positions, there 
are five factors of importance which distort the "normal" adjustment of supply and 
demand towards equal pay in all occupations. Firstly, the nature of certain 
occupations influences a person's impression of the occupation to such an extent that 
employers need to take into account the amenities and disamenities associated with 
the job when they determine pay rates (England 1992: 47). Geographical immobility 
is another factor which may result in pay differentials, as many people prefer to live in 
certain areas, and need pecuniary compensation as drawcard to other areas. The third 
factor refers to the abilities and temperament of a person. People with "exceptional 
qualities" often receive higher incomes, as the market "reward" them for these 
abilities through what is called "rent of ability". The cost associated with training is 
another factor of importance. Most occupations require some prior training, and 
people differ in their ability to afford time and money for training. The fifth factor 
which contributes to pay differentials is that of a lack of information regarding jobs 
and training courses (Phelps-Brown 1977: 14). 
Standard neoclassical theory of wage formation advocates the VIew that market 
forces will automatically equalise wage differentials for workers who have equal 
skills and similar employment conditions by means of wage (price) adjustments, as 
soon as wages deviate from the equilibrium level (Phelps-Brown 1977: 9). 
~ . . .. -
Neoclassical theorists contend that the explanation for why certain jobs (by persons 
with similar skills) pay better than others can be found in the intersection of the 
supply and demand curves for labour: 
Demand: An employer's demand for labour represents the relationship between the 
number of work hours and the wage rate that the employer chooses. This price of 
labour affects the quantity of labour the employer will be willing to employ. The more 
expensive labour is, the more likely it is that the employer will hire a lesser amount of 
labour. The demand curve for labour is the same as the marginal revenue product 
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(MRP) curve in a competitive labour market. Here the demand of an employer serves 
as indication of what the employer is willing to pay per unit or given quantity of 
labour, or of how many workers will be taken on at a given market wage (Granovetter 
1981:17). 
The marginal product of labour depends on the amount of the production factors 
which are 'jointly" used in the production process, as well as the quality of the labour 
inputs, and the level of technology (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1985: 601). This 
concept of "marginal productivity" can be related to the law of diminishing returns. 
Should other factors used in the production process remain unchanged, an increase in 
the labour force is likely to be associated with a decrease of the marginal productivity 
of labour, and therefore depress wages. If, for some reason, the supply of labour 
decreases, wage rates are likely to move upward. Conversely, should the supply of 
labour increase it is likely that wage rates will decline. (England 1992: 48, 49 ; 
Samuelson and Nordhaus 1985: 601). 
Supply: The market supply curve for a job or particular type of skill in turn represents 
the relationship between the wage rate and the number of working hours that will be 
offered in the job. The higher the wage, the greater the number of persons normally 
willing to do the job (England 1992: 48). 
A competitive market will instantaneously move towards equilibrating wage 
differentials. An employer who wants to maximise profits will not feel the need to pay 
more than the market clearing wage, but at the same time employers will not pay less 
than the market wage,as they have to compete with other employers for the same 
workers. Once the market has reached equilibrium, only exogc:nous forces that affect 
the supply or demand curves will lead to price changes (Bellmann and Moller 1995: 
l32; England 1992: 50; Heath and Kaufman 1989: 6). 
Human capital theory developed mainly as a response to deficiencies in the 
neoclassical theory of labour supply, and became popular in explaining wage 
differentials - economists such as Mazumdar have as recently as 1994 (1994: 198) 
referred to human capital theory as being the "standard model" for explaining earning 
differentials. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
17 
Human capital theory posits that a direct link exists between the education and 
productivity of a worker: the assumption is that a higher level of education will be 
reflected in a higher level of productivity, which will in turn be reflected in higher 
income for the worker. Individuals thus consider the future rate of return on their 
investment in skills to be financially worthwhile (present utility is compared to future 
utility). Investment may be in education, general on-the-job training, or more firm-
specific on-the-job training. A firm will invest in a worker's human capital in order to 
obtain the higher expected marginal value discounted over the expected future period 
during which the worker will work for the firm. (Grano vetter 1981: 18). 
Although it is often seen as a supply side theory of labour markets, human capital 
theory has both a supply and a demand side. On the demand side, only certain 
employers will take on better-trained workers, the reason being that, even though such 
workers may be more productive, the employer must be convinced that the cost of the 
higher wage of such a worker is exceeded by the benefits brought on by employing 
such a person in that particular job (Berry and Sabot 1978: 1208; England 1992: 51, 
69, 71). 
Human capital theory has been criticised for its strong emphasis on the supply side, 
with economists such as Sorensen (in Grannovetter 1981: 18) contending that worker 
characteristics were not sufficient to explain income inequality. Although the theory 
suggests that wages will continue to rise indefinitely as long as individuals continue to 
invest more in themselves, this is unrealistic. Sorensen referred to empirical evidence 
to prove the apparent failure of human capital theory to explain trends in the 
distribution of incomes since World War 2, which did not correlate to changes in the 
distribution of education. Granovetter (1981: 18) in tum contends that the demand for 
the product which one's skills can produce, and whether you will be in a position to 
meet that demand, will determine whether your investment will payoff. At the same 
time, productivity should be seen not only as a matter of individual skills - wages are 
generated not only by skills, but a combination of skills, consumer demand, 
technology and work position. 
Many of the more recent "growth theories" have included human capital as an 
endogenous variable which drives the process of economic growth. In these new 
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theories externalities and increasing returns to scale result in the social rate of return 
on investments and human resources exceeding the private / individual rate of return. 
This causes market failure, which in tum requires more active public policy. 
However, human capital serves as only one example of a growth determinant. 
Although human capital theory and even some of the more recent growth theories 
ascribe a central role to human capital formation as a source of economic growth, 
alternative perspectives suggest that it is in fact not a very central determinant of 
growth (Islam and Chowdhury 1997: 89). 
During the 1960's a number of supply-side theories which focused on the job search 
process were developed by the likes of Stigler. Whereas neoclassical theory regards 
the job search as a rational process, these new theories were based on the idea that 
workers act irrationally and that information seldom results from an active search. 
Rather, it is regarded as a by-product of other activities, such as informal interaction 
with other people at social gatherings, etc. (Granovetter 1981: 24). 
Neoclassical economists view workers as rational individuals attempting to maximise 
their income during their working lives by way of investing in their own productive 
capacity. Incomes, or rather the return on their investment, are seen to differ as there 
are initial differences that simply continue throughout the working lives of such 
workers. Little attention is, however, given to mechanisms through which investments 
in oneself could generate an income stream. As neoclassical theory about wages failed 
to fully explain wage differences, an institutionalist tradition developed during the 
1940's and 50's, rooted to a large extent in sociological theory and law. 
The institutionalist view can be incorporated into the disequilibrium approach. It is 
broadly based on the idea that the labour market does not automatically clear, and that 
the presence of rigidities/constraints result in wages and employment levels adjusting 
to economic changes at a very slow pace. Labour market "failures" as a result of these 
rigidities /constraints may be generated by a variety of factors, among which are 
monopoly power, inadequate communication and non market influences on the 
process of wage determination. Institutionalised employment relationships are thus in 
part the result of inherent problems of information and uncertainty in contemporary 
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economies. As a result of the abovementioned rigidities the labour market remains in 
a state of disequilibrium (Archer 1992: 225,231; Berry and Sabot 1978: 1206). 
It could also be mentioned that the institutional economists of the 1940's and 1950's 
were of the opinion that the wage paid to a person in a certain job depended on where 
that job fit into the greater job structure. They emphasized the idea of a wage 
structure, i.e. a wage rate system within a firm which differentiated by occupation and 
by employee. Some jobs are "key positions", which, should they change, will trigger a 
chain reaction of wage changes in other jobs. Hence they arrived at the concept of a 
job cluster. The idea of ajob cluster in tum in 1971 formed the basis of Doeringer and 
Piore's concept of an "internal labour market", being an administrative unit (for 
example a manufacturing plant), within which the pricing and allocation of labour is 
governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures. This was in contrast to the 
conventional idea that pricing and allocation of labour and training are directly 
controlled by economic variables. Their argument was that, in a closed and controlled 
system, wages would be based mainly on job characteristics with careful attention 
being given to consistency in the hierarchy. They could not, however, explain how 
certain individuals got linked up with high or low paying jobs. Attempts to develop a 
theory that would explain this led firstly to the dual, and later to segmented labour 
market theories (Granovetter 1981: 19). 
Segmentation, the phenomenon which describes the different extent of wage rigidities 
across various segments of the economy, i.e. the reason why there is a difference in 
remuneration for workers with similar skills in various segments of the economy, has 
become a popular explanation for unemployment during recent years, particularly for 
urban unemployment (Agenor 1996: 302). 
The segmentation theories have to a large extent been based on the idea that internal 
labour markets only represent one kind of work setting, and that it offers to their 
incumbents advantages such as opportunities for upward mobilities. Markets such as 
these are viewed as primary, whereas labour markets composed of women, teenagers, 
the urban poor and other groups who are generally viewed as being marginalised, are 
regarded as representing the secondary labour market. Thus an economy is regarded 
as being divided into a small number of separate markets that are semi-impermeable. 
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However, Granovetter (1981: 21) notes that, even if the idea of different segments are 
accepted as being sufficient to explain income inequality, you still get large income 
variations within occupational groups. He goes further by stating that Dunlop's 
original idea, namely that wage structures were interdependent in very complex ways, 
and related to economic complementary networks and social relations within and 
between firms, has been lost track of as this approach focuses mainly on market 
sectors. Also, this approach has assumed wage uniformity within sectors. Thurow, as 
cited in Granovetter (1981: 22), in 1975 also attempted to explain how certain people 
end up in certain positions with predetermined incomes, by stating that the wage is 
determined mainly by the job itself, and not the worker. He ascribes this to the fact 
that marginal products are inherent to jobs and not to individuals. The basic premise 
of his work is that there is a labour queue based on the trainability of workers. Should 
the number of workers at a certain level exceed the demand, some would have little 
choice but to settle for worse jobs with lower wages. One can question, however, how 
trainability should be determined, and, according to Granovetter (1981: 22), the idea 
of a queue does not take the complexity of the matching processes seriously. 
As they narrow the boundaries of who can compete, institutions contribute to the 
segmentation of the labour market and thereby also affect wage rates. In a segmented 
labour market, it is likely that nominal wages in the protected (i.e. formal) sector will 
be less responsive to price changes. Possible outcomes differ: unemployment may 
persist, income of the poorest segment of the labour market may drop even further, 
and employment in protected sectors may actually decline (Mazumdar 1994: 198). 
On the demand side, the 1970's saw the development of the so-called signaling and 
screening theories which focused on the uncertainty of employers when it comes to 
- -
taking on new workers. As employers are not aware beforehand of a person's actual 
productivity, a worker will invest in education / training which will signal to a 
prospective employer what the likely level of productivity would in fact be. 
(Granovetter 1981: 24, 27). 
Since the mid-1970's new "sector-specific" models of unemployment have 
developed, all of which are based on the premise that workers in a segmented labour 
market prefer to wait for a limited number of higher paying jobs, rather than take up 
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lower paying jobs. This resulted in the idea that unemployment is the result of a 
misallocation of labour owing to the decisions of the workers themselves. Workers 
have been found to make bad choices/decisions irrespective of being educated or not 
(Berry and Sabbot 1984: 109). 
2.2.4 Explanations of unemployment 
The neoclassical equilibrium approach states that markets clear instantaneously. 
Efficiency is achieved when markets function like auctions, thereby adjusting wages 
instantly. Unemployment is seen as voluntary, and in order to explain economic 
changes the assumption of full information is relaxed (Archer 1992: 223). 
Disequilibrium explanations for unemployment, based on price and wage rigidities, 
fall into three broad categories: models based on the idea of an efficiency wage, 
models focusing on the idea of so-called "insiders" and "outsiders" in the labour 
market, and thirdly models based on the existence of "implicit contracts". 
2.2.4.1 Efficiency wage models 
The efficiency wage models are based on the view that the higher wages are, the more 
workers will be encouraged to raise their efforts, hence raising productivity which will 
in tum raise profits. The productivity of a worker is thus seen as being directly related 
to the wage of the worker, with wages determining not only labour quantity, but also 
effort (Archer 1992: 228; Bellmann and Moller 1995: l32; England 1992: 86). 
Efficiency wage theory also explains the presence of workers who are willing to work 
for less than the wage of employed workers, but are unable to find employment. 
Orthodox rieod.;issical theory predicts that during- a recession wages will fall to a level 
that would allow the market to clear. However, efficiency wage theory states that the 
same wage cannot clear the market for new workers while at the same time changing 
the behaviour of applicants or working employees in such a way as the employer 
would like. The inability of wages to fall and allow the market to absorb unemployed 
persons is thus attributed to this dual characteristic of the wage (England 1992: 86). 
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The difference between the efficiency wage models and the orthodox neoclassical 
models are that efficiency wage models assert that worker behaviour is endogenous 
rather than exogenous to the wage. In this view, the employer may maximise profits 
by actually paying wages that are higher than the market clearing wage level of the 
supply-demand model. As long as the revenue increase to the firm (brought on by 
higher wages that serve to encourage workers) exceed the cost of the wage increases, 
employers will continue to raise wages (England 1992: 83, 84). 
2.2.4.2 Rent-sharing I Bargaining models 
Complementary to the efficiency wage models in the context of monopolistic 
competition are the rent-sharing or bargaining models which explain the wage 
structure by means of differences in the ability of firms to pay wages, as well as 
differences in the power of workers to extract rents from their employers (Bellmann 
and Moller 1995: 132). The main focus in these theories is on the fact that employers 
and employees bargain to determine the distribution of economic rent between them. 
Workers have a measure of power in that their employer would have to incur costs to 
replace them. By using their power to negotiate outcomes that do not take into 
account the interest of so-called "outsiders" (i.e. unemployed persons wanting· to 
work), workers have a definite advantage over those trying to become employees of 
the firm. By pressing for wages above market-clearing level, firms are mostly hesitant 
to employ additional workers, and subsequently "outsiders" remain involuntarily 
unemployed. 
While covering the topic of workers (insiders) and those wanting to work (outsiders), 
it is perhaps of interest also to refer to the insider-outsider issue in a somewhat 
different context, namely that there are also persons "inside" and "outside" of the 
modern/formal labour market. It should be noted that analysis of the process of wage 
determination in the informal sector has not been developed extensively. Agenor 
(1996: 302) mentions that many recent models based on segmented labour markets 
lack "a fully articulated theory of the channels through which wages in the formal and 
informal sectors interact". In his paper on labour market adjustment (Agenor 1996: 
302) reference is not only made to the recent emphasis of economists on the role of 
efficiency considerations in wage structures in the formal sector, but also to papers 
which focus on wages in the formal segment of the economy in which wages exceed 
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market clearing levels, with the aim of eliciting high levels of worker productivity and 
to discourage shirking (Archer 1992: 224,228; Lachaud 1989: 334, 335, 341). 
2.2.4.3 Implicit contracts 
Implicit contracts represent the third general category of theories explaining wage 
rigidity. Models of implicit contract, firm-specific human capital, agency and 
transaction costs are associated with a situation in which there is not a legal and 
formally binding contract between worker and employer, yet the relationship is 
structured in such a way as to create incentives for both workers and employers to act 
in a way which will interest the other party (Archer 1992: 230; England 1992: 76, 77, 
81). 
2.2.5 The endogenous/ exogenous nature of labour 
Labour supply has been treated as both endogenous and exogenous in research aimed 
at finding an explanation for unemployment. The endogenity of labour supply has 
been treated as a function of conditions that prevail between and within labour 
markets. Urban unemployment in this context is attributed to labour market 
distortions that result from segmentation. This leads to different wage levels for 
economically homogenous labour. Other explanations of the urban unemployment 
phenomenon in particular, based on the exogenous determination of labour supply, 
have taken imperfect information into account, and have focused on unemployment as 
forming part of a job-search process independent of migration (Lachaud 1989: 334). 
2.2.6 Practical implications of the market approach and related theories 
There "is little-question that the combined working of the- forces of supply and demand 
in the labour market plays a central role in the determination of unemployment and 
wage differentials. However, a fair and realistic picture can only be presented if the 
policies and institutions which in particular shape the supply side of the labour market 
are acknowledged and incorporated (Archer 1992: 230, 231). 
Phelps-Brown (1960: 19) notes that "market forces ... work in a social setting ... and 
the supplies of labour to different occupations are therefore variously constituted and 
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conditioned". Conventions, customs and ideas regarding equity all play an important 
part in the market. He also contends that social aspects have kept differentials as high 
as they are - during the 20th century wage differentials changed remarkably as a result 
of changes in supply and in demand. The most notable change has, however, been in 
supply, namely through the extension of social services and education, which have 
given children a better chance of getting jobs they are suited for. Combined with 
certain institutional factors, changes in demand and particularly in supply can account 
for the large wage differentials we see today. 
Archer (1992: 233) notes that notwithstanding the fact that they will be changed by 
new regulations, the market fhechanism and labour market institutions will continue 
to play important roles in determining employment and wages in South Africa. The 
same can be said for Namibia. Given the political background of labour in Namibia 
and the extent of social inequality, it is virtually impossible for the Namibian 
government not to intervene in the normal working of the market mechanism. At the 
same time it is virtually impossible for government to have absolute control over the 
labour market, and highly unadvisable as, by alienating the private sector (supposedly 
the most important generator of new jobs), government would severely hamper future 
economic growth and employment. 
Of particular importance in the Namibian context are the issues of the development of 
human capital and segmentation. Evidence suggests that the high number of informal 
sector workers is not the result of voluntary employment, but rather result from 
involuntary unemployment. Informal economic activities are the only options 
available to persons who are unable to find employment in the formal sector. (The 
great difference between high private sector and public sector formal wages, and the 
extremely low wages obtained though informal sector activities serve as major 
incentive for people to seek formal employment). Unemployment appears to result 
from a lack of education and skills, combined with an economic structure in which the 
private sector is creating virtually no new jobs, rather than from workers exercising 
their right to leisure time, or being temporarily unemployed as a result of undergoing 
training. 
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2.3 The Sociologist's view of the causes of unemployment and wage 
differentials 
Sociologists generally assert that economists underestimate the importance of social 
forces when they look at factors determining unemployment and wage rates: 
individuals do not always behave rationally, but often make decisions or act in a way 
which has been strongly influenced by their social background / circumstances. 
Esping-Anderson (1990: 145) distinguishes between two focus points in sociological 
research. On the one hand, there is a focus on socially inherited traits that affect one's 
chances in the labour market, i.e. upbringing and education. These are regarded as 
"sociologically dividing" factors in the labour market. Economists have criticised this 
for the reason that this does not acknowledge that labour market participants can act 
independently or compete on an equal basis for jobs and rewards. On the other hand 
there are the "structurally dividing" factors in the labour market. This refers mainly to 
the organisational features within and between different industries and companies. 
This approach is a parallel to the economist's segmented theory of labour markets 
(Esping-Anderson 1990: 145). 
2.3.1 Methodology and Assumptions 
In contrast to economists who focus on formalised institutions affecting the labour 
market, sociologists focus on "informal" social structures. Sociologists have in 
particular devoted their attention to the social phenomena of status, class and power, 
and it is these three phenomena to which they ascribe social inequality. The social 
standing of a person is considered to be the number one factor determining his access 
to education, and thereby also his ability to obtain a job, as well as the wage he will be 
paid. 
It is a popular perception that economics focuses on pecuniary gains generated by 
certain behaviour, whereas sociology is thought to focus solely upon the non-
pecuniary aspects of behaviour. This is not entirely true, as workers often trade 
monetary compensation for non-monetary advantages such as that of being able to do 
interesting work, or work allowing them to take more time for leisure. This is 
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included among the explanations for the presence of compensating differentials III 
labour markets (England 1992: 47). 
Another important difference is that economists focus on the notion of Pareto-
optimality with regard to the outcome of the process of exchange. This term is used 
when an exchange results in at least one party increasing his utility while the other 
does not lose any utility, i.e. at least one party is better off, without any of the two 
being worse off than before the actual exchange. Whereas the sociologist will be 
concerned with the issue of who gained most from the exchange and the effect of this 
on equity or equality, Pareto-optimality is sufficient for economists as they assume 
that interpersonal utility comparisons are not possible (England 1992: 47). 
Sociologists such as Rees (in 1973) have attempted to explain the determinants of 
supply by pointing out that economists, in focussing mostly on labour force 
participation and skills or training levels, and neglecting aspects such as the number 
of hours that people are willing to work, and the amount of effort they are willing to 
put into such work, have in fact neglected causal sociological factors. For example, to 
achieve a certain output from workers, it is important not to focus only on the 
economic and technical situation contributing to that output, but also to take into 
account aspects such as informal agreements within groups on what the proper output 
should be. Therefore, decisions of workers are seen by sociologists to be deeply 
imbedded in non-economic aspects of social reality, or rather, individuals are not 
divorced from the social milieu in which they live, and therefore are influenced by 
people around them. Granovetter (1981: 32) contends that, on the demand side, 
economists are content with the marginal productivity argument. As value added can 
be determined by multiplying the number of physical units of the product with the 
.- - .. 
market price for each unit, the marginal productivity of labour is not only the result of 
the efficiency of labour but also the demand for the product the labour produces. A 
higher demand will raise the marginal productivity and wages for those who produce 
it. Hence product demand patterns are important determinants of wage differentials. 
Economists, however, seldom study the factors leading to shifts in product demand, or 
the impact of such shifts on other aspects such as inequality. Patterns of product 
demand should be understood in teims of social structure, mobility etc. as it is the 
result of taste influenced by surroundings. For example, Phelps-Brown (1977: 17) 
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notes that people act in a particular way because it is customary, obligatory or because 
they have been taught that it is "right and proper" . With regard to supply and 
demand, not only economic factors but also sociological considerations such as the 
comparative attractiveness of industries and occupations, the ease with which workers 
can move between these, and the extent to which the commodity being produced can 
be substituted, are crucial. 
Granovetter (1981: 34) expresses the opmIOn that, contrary to the viewpoint of 
economists, who generally consider sociological factors such as information gaps, 
resistance to migration, power differentials, and shifts in the preferences of consumers 
as "frictional drags", these factors are actual important determinants of 
disequilibrium. 
2.3.2 Sociological explanations of Wage Differentials 
Contrary to the economic view that the normal pay rate of an occupation is the result 
of the interaction between the market forces of supply and demand, the sociologist 
believes that non-market ("social") forces are dominant in determining the value of 
labour. Sociologists consider social structures and in particular the inequality 
resulting from this as being inextricably linked to the inequality of pay (Furniss 1925: 
12). 
Sociologists claim that status is an important determinant of a person's pay. Although 
the economist would contend that a (market determined) high income would increase 
the status of a person, the sociological view is that people in general feel that 
occupations of a "higher social standing" (e.g. medicine and law) should be paid more 
~- " -- - -. 
(Phelps-Brown 1977: 19). 
In addition to status, sociologists also consider class to be a factor that ensures certain 
people a higher income than others. Whereas class used to be defined in terms of 
somebody's relationship to ownership ·of capital, access to education and technology 
has recently become more important as an indicator of class, as it provides a person 
with a better chance to gain entry into a certain occupation (Phelps-Brown 1977: 21). 
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The conflict of interest between the capitalist and working classes is the most basic 
assumption in the Marxist view of capitalist societies. The relationship to the means 
of production defines the class, for example those who own capital have power over 
others and also get the profits generated by means of the capital. In contrast to 
capitalists who earn an income even without working, workers only earn an income if 
they sell their labour. Capitalists are seen as exploiters by Marxists as they take profits 
generated by work of others. It is important to note that while neoclassical economic 
theorists contend that each capitalist attempts to maximise individual self-interest, 
sociologists assume collective self-interest by a class (England 1992: 92-96,97). 
Sociologists also attribute inequality to the phenomenon of power. This refers to the 
ability to control and/or possess valued and scarce resources, and consequently the 
ability to create inequality (Phelps-Brown 1977: 21). 
Marx explained wage differentials by usmg the example of labour market 
discrimination and the unequal division of power: The Marxist view of labour market 
discrimination is that it forms part of a capitalist divide-and-conquer strategy, aiming 
at weakening working class solidarity. By discriminating on the grounds of race or 
sex, divisions and hostility is induced, which will in tum lessen the likelihood of 
cohesive action which could threaten the profit levels of the capitalists (England 1992: 
96,97). 
2.3.3 The sociological view of unemployment 
With respect to a sociological approach to explaining unemployment (and to a certain 
extent also wage differentials), one can distinguish between the ideas of orth~<!ox and 
revisionist Marxists, as well as other sociological theories: functionalism, 
institutionalism, structuralism, and conflict theories (England 1992: 100). 
Functionalists contend that societies are forced to give better rewards to occupational 
positions which are functionally important, in order to help the society survive. In 
other words, reward is based on the relative value of the job to the organisation. The 
incentive of such higher rewards is considered necessary to attract the best qualified 
persons to such jobs. Consensus over internal values of a society is the main 
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mechanism in functionalism, whereas the invisible hand of competition that creates 
efficient outcomes is the mechanism supported by neoclassical theorists. In 
functionalist theory, the issue of a job being "functionally important" differs from the 
neoclassical idea of contributing more to the marginal product, as the functionality is 
towards the entire society, whereas marginal productivity only refers to the 
contribution to the revenue of an individual finn. At the same time, there is some 
similarity in that some functionalists contend that the functionalism of each institution 
in a society contributes to the overall level of functionalism as a whole, while 
neoclassical economists are of the opinion that, by means of the invisible hand, 
individual profit maximisers will contribute to growth for all members of society 
(England 1992: 100). 
There are also some similarities between the schools of thought of the institutionalist 
economists, and that of functionalist sociologists. Both place emphasis on cultural 
values, and distinguish between instrumental and expressive/ceremonial behaviour. 
Institutionalists, however, attach greater value to the instrumental (skills, technology 
and knowledge) than the ceremonial aspects of behaviour and institutions (England 
1992: 102). 
Whereas neoclassical economic theory only accounts for rational response and skills, 
sociological views with a structural focus also acknowledge that tastes, habits and 
cognitions affect the responses of an individual. "New" Structuralism has become 
more popular during recent years owing to the inability of other sociological theories 
to explain how structural positions in labour markets affect rewards. Initially these 
theories were to a large extent based on the economic theories of labour market 
segmentation, which focus on the idea of a dual-sector economy where there is a core 
- -
containing large unionised oligopolistic firms with high profits and high wages, and a 
periphery with smaller finns, lower profit rates, low wages, etc. The larger firms were 
considered to have internal labour markets in which wages were likely to rise with 
seniority. Though it became apparent that uni-dimensional dualism does not 
sufficiently represent segmentation, research by the new structuralists has indicated 
that large, profitable, capital intensive firms, even unionised ones, in general pay 
higher wages than other firms (England 1992: 102, 106, 107). 
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2.3.4 Practical implications of analysis 
Institutional analysis of the employment relationship has to a large extent been taken 
over by behavioral sciences. Economists focus on the idea that the behaviour of 
individuals and organisations is clearest when you assume that the most important 
motive is to secure the highest possible wage or profit. Behavioral scientists in tum 
add assumptions such as the desire by individuals to satisfy personal needs, and the 
desire for status. Behavioral scientists furthermore are concerned mainly with the 
impact of labour market institutions on other community issues and institutions, and 
not how they affect wages, prices and profits (Galenson and Lipset 1960: 
introduction). 
Sociological factors have been particularly relevant in the context of Namibia. For 
many decades, politics affected both society in general and the labour market in 
particular to a much greater extent than what would have been the case in an economy 
. where state intervention was kept to a minimum. As a result of the active state 
intervention in society and the labour market, sociological forces such as the three 
phenomena of status, class and power were not allowed to sort themselves out 
"naturally" but came to be largely determined along ethnic lines. 
The strong white middle-class became the leading force in determining society'S 
values. The power over productive resources made it easy to access, among other 
things, education and jobs, and also allowed direct influence over the economy and 
the labour market. By way of controlling entry to the labour market, as well as wages, 
it was possible to establish a very skewed structure in society, divided along ethnic 
lines. 
The high levels of social inequality both in Namibia and in South Africa are one of 
the most important issues of concern today, as it threatens the future political, social 
and even economic future of these two countries. 
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2.4 Summary / Conclusion 
"Economists and sociologists have devoted much thought and research to 
attempting to discover an acceptable general theory of wages that would 
explain in all circumstances how levels of wages and changes in wages are 
determined. No such theory has been generally accepted because the factors 
affecting wages are so complex and are so closely linked with the whole 
economic and industrial system and with social considerations." 
(ILO 1982: 110) 
During recent decades there has been a marked improvement and expansion of 
statistical and quantitative data to measure behaviour on labour markets in both 
advanced and developing economies, and a great number of theories have flowed 
from the improved data. However, although many of these have helped to clarify 
some aspects of unemployment and wage differentials, there is no single theory which 
can in itself fully explain the presence of unemployment and differences on wage 
levels, especially in developing countries where the need for higher levels of 
employment and in some cases a more equal distribution of resources are particularly 
challenging (Dunlop 1957: 11). 
A remarkable number of theories have been posited in order to not only explain wage 
levels, but also differences in wage levels. These include the theory of the subsistence 
wage, that of the wages fund, marginal productivity theory, bargaining theories, and 
the important role played by the forces of supply and demand. None of these theories 
have however proven themselves universally applicable, although, from a practical 
point of view, supply and demand forces may arguably be most relevant in 
influencing wage levels. At the same time it should be noted that these forces in turn 
are influenced and often restricted by social forces, for example when wages are 
artificially regulated by way of fixing a minimum. One cannot ignore the presence of 
certain institutionalised relationships which interfere in the unfettered working of 
supply and demand forces, and, for example, result in significant wage differences for 
people with similar qualifications and/or skills. 
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This chapter has briefly reviewed the economIC and sociological approaches to 
unemployment and wage determination, as well as some of the relevant theories. 
From the discussion it has become evident that a combination of economic and 
sociological forces is acknowledged to influence employment and wage differentials 
(Heath and Kaufman 1989: 6, 8). As these economic and social forces have 
historically been combined in different ways in different countries, the labour market 
institutions that have developed also differ considerably. In the next chapter the focus 
will be on these institutions and the way they have been and still are being shaped in 
both industrialised and developing countries. 
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3. Non-market Institutions in the Labour Market: Outline and 
Comparisons 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to review non-market institutions affecting modern labour markets it is 
imperative to base the discussion on what is today considered to be the key institution 
in the structuring of class and social order: the modern welfare state. Not only does 
the structure of modern welfare state models and employment regimes coincide, but 
the former also have an important and direct impact on the latter: Esping-Anderson 
(1990: 143) argues that the modern welfare state "directly and systematically" shapes-
the labour market. Even the welfare state in itself is considered by many as a machine 
of employment and an agent of labour market clearing (the modern welfare state to a 
certain extent controls both the entry into and exit from employment), and not only a 
system of social provision. Macro-economic issues such as employment and wages 
have become integral components of the welfare state (Esping-Anderson 1990: 145, 
160,221). 
This chapter will give an extensive cover of the concept of the welfare state, various 
welfare state regimes and the way in which they affect the organisation of labour. In 
defining and describing the modern welfare state and the labour market institutions 
associated with it, it is important to note the role of governments and the extent to 
which they intervene in economic and social life. Government involvement in the 
labour market as an agent influencing labour costs, especially by way of establishing a 
framework for collective bargaining, setting minimum standards and wages, and 
ensuring -some form of social insurance,--will be highlighted throughout the ensuing -
discussion. 
As a result of the limited background information available with regard to the 
development of labour market institutions prior to independence, a discussion of the 
past and present developments of labour market institutions in Namibia in chapter six 
will draw on the experience of countries with similar (historical) political-, social and 
economic circumstances. Given that the initial aim with the introduction of the 
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welfare state was to enable European countries to achieve equality, efficiency and full 
employment after World War II, the welfare state framework is particularly relevant 
in the context of Namibia. The country has also been striving to achieve these three 
ideals since independence in 1990. 
The aim with this chapter is therefore to look at trends in both developed and 
developing countries with regard to the establishment and development of labour 
market institutions. This should provide a useful background for the discussion about 
the Namibian situation, and could help to place the development of domestic 
institutions into perspective. 
Section 3.3 of this chapter covers the institutional frameworks affecting the labour 
. markets in the following industrialised economies: Sweden, Germany and the United 
States. For a reflection of developments regarding non-market institutions In 
developing countries, Chile and Malaysia will be reviewed in Section 3.4. 
Following the overview of developments in both industrialised and developing 
countries, the globalisation of the world economy will be discussed in section 3.5. 
Globalisation is of particular relevance as it will increasingly force countries to adjust 
their labour market regulations in such a way that they become more flexible and 
therefore more capable of adjusting to sudden changes in economic conditions and a 
more competitive international environment. 
3.2 Labour market institutions 
3.2.1Wby do governments intervene in tbe labour market? - . 
Government intervention is normally justified when markets do not achieve economic 
efficiency on their own, i.e. when markets fail, and when there is a very obvious need 
for achieving a fair and equitable wage distribution throughout society. Market 
failures may result from non-competitive (power) situations such as the case when 
monopolies are present, from public goods effects such as the public goods aspects of 
working conditions, and from external effects such as strikes which could affect third 
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parties. The equity argument m tum focuses on compensating "unfortunate" 
individuals, normally through the social insurance system (Flanagan et al 1993: 418). 
3.2.2 How does intervention in the labour market take place? 
There are mainly three ways in which societies respond to market failures and equity 
problems: informal arrangements are established, labour movements are given the 
power to present workers at the bargaining table, or government intervenes directly in 
the labour market. Although informal arrangements are popular in less-developed 
countries, informal structures normally break down as companies become larger and 
the communal and social relationships between employer and employee are 
diminished. 
Formal arrangements such as collective bargaining, individual working contracts and 
legislation on which collective and individual contracts are based, all fulfil an 
important role in facilitating the efficient functioning of the labour market. Even when 
informal and formal arrangements such as unions already exist, government's role is 
in setting a framework in which transactions relating to labour may be carried out. For 
example, government may define which rights employers and workers have, under 
which conditions collective bargaining has to take place, and determine the 
boundaries of how disputes should be resolved. Direct interventions such as setting 
workplace health and safety standards, banning child labour and protecting women 
and children workers normally form part of government attempts to address certain 
social issues (World Bank 1995: 70). 
3.2.3 Criteria for judging labour market institutions 
Pareto efficiency is the main criterion by which neoclassical economists evaluate 
efficiency: a Pareto efficient situation is achieved when there is a competitive 
equilibrium, when it would be impossible to improve the welfare situation of one 
individual without reducing the welfare of another. This criterion has been criticised 
for a number of reasons that will not be discussed in detail here: suffice to say that one 
of the main criticisms against this method is that it does not consider institutions 
undergoing change. Alternative criteria that have been used include directly 
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measurable indicators such as wage levels and growth rates, income productivity of 
labour, unemployment, etc. However, no optimum level of these indicators is defined 
by economic theory, and consequently a practical evaluation is difficult. Hartog et al 
(1993: 23) states that in such a case the best possible way to make an evaluation is by 
using and comparing data over a period of time or across different countries. Also 
noteworthy is that preferences need to be taken into account with a number of 
indicators, i.e. voluntary vs. involuntary unemployment. The authors reach the 
conclusion that both Pareto efficiency and performance indicators can be used to 
measure labour market institutions, as they serve different purposes. Whereas the 
former may be more useful in evaluating structures such as regulations and 
institutions, performance indicators are arguably more relevant if one wants to 
measure the actual performance ofan economy (Hartog et a11993: 9,22,24). 
3.3 The Welfare State and Labour Market Institutions in Industrialised 
Countries 
3.3.1 The concept of the modern welfare state 
3.3.1.1 Background 
Up to the nineteenth century many of the industrialised nations of today were still 
mainly concerned with establishing the general framework within which free 
competition could flourish. Economic power rested with the owners of means of 
production, and governments restricted themselves to exercising civil and military 
control. For as long as the economy appeared to flourish the economic and political 
spheres remained separate. Since the tum of the century, however, a combination of 
political, social and economic considerations resulted in governments to a larger 
extent integrating themselves into society. From the mid-1940's onwards, today's 
industrialised countries debated what national social security should entail, rather than 
the issue of whether it should exist. 
Initially, the main aim with welfare state policies was to provide support for the poor 
majority and to raise their standard of living. With the change in the economic 
conditions industrialised nations, however, also became increasingly concerned about 
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labour issues, and in particular education and training as it was believed that this 
could contribute to bringing about a turnaround in economic growth. The process of 
the state integrating itself into all spheres of society eventually climaxed in the 
establishment of welfare states as we know them today (Taylor-Gooby and Dale 
1981: 190; Van de Vall 1970: 2). 
The establishment of welfare states in many of the democratic industrialised nations 
resulted in similar forms of welfare assistance in the different countries, namely a 
steady income for the aged, relief from unemployment, and the improvement of social 
services in general. What differed between the democracies however was that the 
decision to build a welfare state was made under very different political circumstances 
and also had diverse institutional forms, albeit that all had the intention to achieve 
social equality and social protection (Ashford 1986: 297). Esping-Anderson (1990: 
80) reaffirms this view, stating that different -historical forces have shaped the 
institutional frameworks differently, and consequently the policies, reforms and 
decisionmaking of today take place within different policy regimes. The rights and 
claims associated with "social citizenship" today are an extension of the institutional 
parameters that have been fairly stable throughout history. 
3.3.1.2 What is the welfare state? 
Esping-Anderson (1990: 80) defines the concept of a welfare state as something 
which "denotes the institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide 
and shape ... social policy decisions ... ". In Flanagan et al (1993: 415) labour market 
institutions are referred to as being "humanly devised constraints" that affect virtually 
all aspects of society, and which can be informal (customs, traditions) and formal 
rules (constitutions, laws). Taylor-Gooby and Dale (1981: 163) quote Miliband as 
describing the state as a "set of interrelated institutions", and themselves define the 
welfare state simply as "one in which the state intervenes in the market". The latter 
definition, however, leaves open the question of the manner in which the state 
intervenes, something which has important economic, social and political 
implications. Ashford (1986: 295) in tum explains the welfare state as being the 
outcome of a process of institutionalising social rights and social assistance. Sullivan 
(1987: l3) also contends that the welfare state is one in which the foundation exists of 
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an extensive social security system and income maintenance. Taylor-Gooby and Dale 
(1981: 155) also refer to Gough, who, albeit from a Marxist perspective, in 1979 
defined the welfare state as "the use of state power to modify the reproduction of 
labour power together with the maintenance of the non-working population". The 
modification of the reproduction of labour power is considered by Gough to be a form 
of social investment, while maintaining the non-working popUlation is a social 
expense. Although reproduction is still carried out in the family, it is increasingly 
supplemented and modified by the state. 
The criteria according to which welfare states are defined concern the quality of social 
rights, social stratification, the distribution of resources, the nature and extent of the 
relationship between the market, the state and the nuclear family, and working life in 
general. Welfare state regimes are, however, mostly measured on the basis of 
expenditure on social services. This in tum roughly reflects the social wage, or rather 
the share of resources that is channeled on the basis of social rather than market 
criteria. This way of measurement has, however, been criticised, as social expenditure 
does not necessarily reflect worker and group aspirations (Esping-Anderson 1990: 
113). 
Evidence suggests that advanced capitalistic democracies have failed in their attempts 
to ensure full employment and economic growth during recent decades, something 
which has been attributed to limited means with which to transform zero-sum 
conflicts into workable solutions. As a result of this, social policy has become the 
most important arena for finding solutions regarding the distribution problem (Esping-
Anderson 1990: 163). The core idea of social policy evolves around the process in 
which labour has become a commodity, and highly dependent on a regular cash 
income. The commodification of labour thus entails that it can easily be replaced or 
made redundant if a contingency such as illness arise. Esping-Anderson (1990: 104) 
identifies two important principles concerning social policy: the need to de-
commodify labour from the market place, and the need to use social policy to define 
the boundaries of collective identity. Whereas social rights have often been viewed as 
being the essence of social policy, Esping-Anderson (1990: 3) prefers to view it in 
terms of its capacity for de-commodification, with the principal criterion for such 
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rights being the degree to which it allows people to achieve a certain standard of 
living independently of pure market forces (Esping-Anderson 1990: 35,37). 
Although the modem welfare state was designed mainly to take care of persons 
incapable of working, the "modem" phenomenon of jobless economic growth has 
resulted in the traditional responsibilities of the welfare state being extended and 
adjusted. This has led to the respective institutions representing the labour market and 
social policy becoming increasingly interwoven. The initial idea behind the 
establishment of a welfare state was simply to provide a safety net for people who 
were unfit to work. However, the "modem" welfare states of today place considerable 
emphasis on optimising the capacity of people to work, as well as the working 
environment (Flanagan et al 1993: 422). 
During past decades it has become evident that the structure of existing society in 
industrialised countries such as Sweden and the USA has been influenced by the 
welfare policies of these countries. Welfare state "principles" have now been applied 
for several decades and appear to have directly contributed to the creation of new 
social classes (such as state bureaucracies and trade unions) in many industrialised 
nations. With time these classes have developed vested interests in the continuation of 
existing welfare policies. When the welfare state expanded government control from 
the political arena to economic policies, and from economic policies to welfare 
administrations, it came to employ large hierarchical structures of civil servants. 
These structures are not only effectively organised, but have also become very 
powerful (Rose and Shivatari 1986: 204). 
Another important aspect as regards the welfare state is that the effect of welfare state 
policies, combined with sustained economic growth since the end of the second World 
War up to 1973, had contributed to the significant increase in the number of middle 
class people in the industrialised countries. The structure of society has effectively 
been changed from resembling a pyramid structure, representing poor masses and a 
comparatively small number of rich people, to a diamond shape form, representing 
smaller numbers of both the very poor and the very rich, and a large middle class 
(Rose and Shivatari 1986: 204). 
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With the economic changes brought on by the oil crisis in particular during the 
1970's, many people came to experience a sense of job insecurity. These economic 
changes in particular threatened the "new" middle class, the members of which stood 
to lose much. This concern regarding their economic future resulted in a change in 
attitude towards welfare by the middle class in countries such as Japan and Gennany. 
In order not to lose the economic power they had gained, many members of the 
middle class abandoned welfare causes. In countries such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom the general attitude became one of first helping yourself, before 
assisting others by way of supporting welfare causes. Nevertheless, it can be argued 
that the large middle classes that have developed during the past two decades 
represent an increase in the number of people who are now in a position to contribute 
to the cost of welfare state expenses (Rose and Shivatari 1986: 204). 
It should also be noted that, although it is nowadays widely recognised that the state 
can play a major role in providing welfare goods such as health, education, and 
income security, the tenn welfare state is often misleading. The reason for this is that 
welfare activities are not solely the responsibility of the state, but also of the rest of 
society. It is in fact a combination of the state, households and the market which 
contribute in a welfare mix as individually all of them have certain limitations (Rose 
and Shivatari 1986: 13). 
Although the state can playa useful role in providing some measure of income 
security for non-working members of society, often in the fonn of retirement pensions 
and unemployment insurance, social assistance by government does not present the 
full extent of redistribution that occurs in society. Arguably just as important as the 
state is the family, as it also provides a mechanism for distributing income, for caring 
for dependants and for the reproduction of labour power (Taylor-Gooby and Dale 
1981: 160). In practice, all social services provided by the state are also 
complemented by a private sector. During the post World War II decades the idea that 
the state was the main party responsible for the provision of housing, social security, 
etc., and that it had an obligation to adhere to the needs of society, took precedence. 
Since the 1950's there has, however, been a trend in industrialised nations such as the 
United Kingdom for only certain fonus of social assistance to remain largely in state 
hands. The role of the state in other areas such as housing and social security has 
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declined mainly as a result of the development of thriving private sectors (Taylor-
Gooby and Dale 1981: 163). 
Taylor-Gooby and Dale (1981: 156) contend that the needs of people can be satisfied 
in four different ways in contemporary welfare states. These are the following: 
employers organise welfare schemes for their employees; needs can be met within the 
family / by family members; they may directly purchase goods and services on the 
market; or the state may provide goods and services. As regards the state provision of 
goods and services, O'Connor (as cited in Taylor-Gooby and Dale 1981: 155) in 1973 
noted that a distinction can be drawn between social investment (such as training), 
social consumption (health care, housing and social insurance against economic 
insecurity), and general social expenditures, which he defines as being the costs of 
maintaining social harmony, but which, even though it is necessary for social stability, 
does not contribute to profitability. 
The extent of social insurance provided by governments differs vastly among 
industrialised countries. However, as regards privately financed forms of social 
insurance, occupational pension schemes are arguably the main form of financial 
support today, and are recognised as an alternative to the earnings related pensions 
provided by the state. Such schemes, however, often only benefit certain sectors of the 
labour force. For example, approximately 80% of non-manual workers were enrolled 
in occupational pension schemes in the USA by 1970. Of the total number of manual 
workers, only about 50% were, however, covered. Taylor-Gooby and Dale (1981: 160) 
also identified two reasons why employers offer welfare schemes to their workers: to 
attract labour, and to use as a measure of control over the workforce. As example they 
quote from a 1978 study of Hay which focused on social insurance for foremen in the 
engineering industry. This study had concluded that employers' control of means of 
production was their primary means of social control, and that welfare schemes at 
most only served to reinforce incentive schemes and the hierarchy in factories. 
Not all agree on the need for and usefulness of a welfare state and state intervention 
by way of welfare state policies advocating free or even subsidised social services. 
Taylor-Gooby and Dale (1981: 172) note that those who consider the welfare state a 
burden generally focus on distinguishing between productive and unproductive 
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labour. State expenditure is considered as being unproductive and making no 
contribution to the creation of surplus value in the economy, resulting in the full cost 
of creating the latter falling on capital and not on labour. The authors, Taylor-Gooby 
and Dale, also refer to a 1973 study by Yaffe in which he argued that state 
expenditure is required to maintain employment and ease the sale of commodities. 
State expenditure is in turn financed through taxes, which means surplus value is 
taken away from private capital by the state, leaving less surplus value available for 
private accumulation. Hence, although they contribute to the realisation of surplus 
value, it is done at the expense of the production of additional surplus value. Yaffe 
thus builds his argument around the distinction between productive and unproductive 
workers: productive workers labour for capitalists, producing commodities for sale. In 
this way surplus value is created, which eventually leads to the expansion of 
productive forces. In contrast, unproductive workers do not produce surplus value as 
they are paid out of the mass surplus value produced by other workers. In 1978 Bacon 
and Eltis produced a study with a similar viewpoint to that of Yaffe on the issue of the 
welfare state being an unproductive burden. They argued for a similar distinction, 
namely between a marketed and non-marketed sector, with marketed goods and 
services being sold, and non-marketed goods and services (such as social services) 
that are free. The growth of non-marketed sector is seen as directly stunting the 
growth of the marketed sector. Neither the study of Bacon and Eltis, nor that of Yaffe, 
however, focused on the wider issue of whether economic growth should be seen as 
enhancing welfare. Glennerster in 1976 addressed this issue but failed to arrive at a 
clear answer. His argument was based on the social democratic standpoint that the 
United Kingdom should focus less on GNP growth and to a larger extent on whether 
in fact they are producing the goods and services that people actually need (Taylor-
Gooby and Dale 1981: 172). 
3.3.2 National models/ types 
It is possible to discern three dominant models of welfare capitalism: the conservative 
(corporate) type, the liberal type and the social democratic type. The principal issues 
which have led to the development of these different welfare state regimes are a 
combination of the nature of class-mobilisation (and in particular the working class), 
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the structure of class-political coalitions, and the history of regime institutionalism 
(Esping-Anderson 1990: 3,29,221). 
Each of the three regime types involves a different approach regarding government 
intervention. These different approaches involve very distinctive institutional linkages 
among policy actors. Whereas the pure market and regulated market approaches are 
associated with decentralised decisionmaking processes, the social market approach 
employs different degrees of tripartite policy consultations involving government and 
employer and workers representatives. It is important to note that the choice of 
approach to be followed normally reflects ideological and other differences regarding 
socio-economic priorities (Hancock et a11991: 6). 
Good examples of the three welfare state/labour market regimes which have been 
identified in Esping-Anderson are Germany (conservative-corporate), Sweden (social 
democratic) and the United States (liberal), although none of these countries have 
welfare state systems which are purely of one type. Although the Scandinavian 
countries are mostly social democratic, they also have some liberal elements. The 
USA, formerly more social democratic, has become a regime known for its liberal 
redistributive policies, whereas many of the conservative European countries of today 
have become less corporatist, and now contain both social democratic and liberal 
elements (Esping-Anderson 1990: 28, 192). 
3.3 .2.1 The Liberal Regime 
This "pure market" approach advocates minimal government intervention in the 
economy. Private decisions should be taken concerning land use, productive 
enterprises and services, and government is considered to be only a "night-watchman" 
in charge of maintaining both internal and external security, in addition to overseeing 
the enforcement of private contracts (Hancock et a11991: 5). 
Social policy should be laissez-faire "minimalist" policy, and be based on the idea 
that traditional systems are to be replaced by the market mechanism. Liberals harbour 
the belief that markets provide emancipation, and force people to be productive and 
self-reliant in a competitive environment. It is important to mention, though, that they 
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in principle do acknowledge that there is a rationale for social intervention (Esping-
Anderson 1990: 42; 61). 
Stratification is seen as something created by the competitive individualism cultivated 
by the market. In the absence of a state and monopolies, there would be no classes and 
all would be equal before the law (Esping-Anderson 1990: 61). 
The liberal welfare state regime is known for the relative modesty of its state social 
insurance plans. The general view is that social protection would encourage laziness 
and the corruption of morals. A guaranteed social minimum is seen as contributing to 
unemployment (Esping-Anderson 1990: 26). 
Liberals were the first to extend individual insurance to social benefits that were 
determined by way of collective bargaining. Benefits are fairly modest though, and 
mostly provided only to low-income, working class people (Esping-Anderson 1990: 
26). 
3.3.2.2 The Social Democratic Regime 
This so-called regulated market approach refers to a situation where government plays 
an active, although sporadic role in micro and macro economic processes, i.e. 
government only intervenes when it is deemed necessary. Private ownership is 
supreme, hence decisions concerning production, sales, investment, labour and 
services are made privately. Government intervenes in the private sector by way of 
administration and legislation aimed at promoting competition, ensuring fair standards 
and protecting the interests of individuals (Hancock et al 1991: 5). 
In this second type of welfare state regIme, social reform is driven by social 
democracy. Equality on all grounds is of extreme importance, and has to be extended 
to people at all levels. Socialist social policy has become particularly popular among 
the urban working class. By promoting collectivism, they attempted to counter the 
market's tendency to individualise. All social strata were incorporated into one 
universal social system in which there was no difference between the rights of manual 
workers and those of white-collar workers (Esping-Anderson 1990: 27). 
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Notwithstanding the drive for equality, social benefits accrued only according to 
earnings contribution. The main idea was to preemptively address the family's ability 
to provide aid to members in need. The burden on the state in social terms is 
substantial in this model (Esping-Anderson 1990: 27). 
3.3.2.3 The Conservative regime 
The approach represents a strongly systematic form of government intervention. 
Although this approach affirms private ownership of the means of production and 
distribution, it at the same time grants national, regional and local government 
institutions the right and responsibility to provide assistance to those persons who 
would otherwise be severely disadvantaged in a system where unregulated capitalism 
prevails. Conservative governments have been willing to replace the market as the 
main provider of welfare (Esping-Anderson 1990: 26; Hancock et al1991: 5). 
In conservative welfare states it has been important to preserve status differentials, 
hence rights remained attached to class and status. Social rights are granted 
conditionally. l\1orals, loyalty and convention are the most important factors 
determining the social rights accorded to individuals (Esping -Andersen 1990: 38). 
3.3.2.3.1 Corporatism 
Before commencing with a discussion of the three countries which best exemplify the 
three different types of welfare states, some attention should be devoted to a variant of 
the conservative regime: corporatism. Corporatism, with its strong focus on 
centralised wage bargaining, has come to the fore during the eighties following the 
1988 publication of the Calmfors and Driffill paper (in Soskice 1990) which presented 
evidence that not only decentralised wage bargaining institutions, but also highly 
centralised institutions can in fact contribute to reducing unemployment. 
Corporate economIes are distinguished by the nature of their labour market 
institutions. Pekkarinen et al (1992: introduction) claims that there are three features 
which corporatist economies have in common: Central wage bargaining, which 
normally takes place once a year, and which involves well-organised and powerful 
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employee and employer associations; unemployment benefits that run out after a year 
or so; and thirdly, training and retraining programs for the unemployed. (Nelson 1994: 
349). 
Centralised wage bargaining, l.e. wage bargaining which is dominated by a small 
number of powerful agents, is arguably the most important characteristic of a 
corporatist economic system. Bargaining normally takes place between centralised 
labour and centralised capital, and government is always involved, although its role 
may vary. Through this involvement, governments in corporatist economies therefore 
playa significant role in the determination of wages (Rowthom 1992: 82; Schmitter 
1993: 331). 
Corporatist systems mayor may not include economIC and social government 
policies, and are non-exclusive and egalitarian in nature: all social groups are included 
and benefits and economic burdens are shared by all alike. Pohjola (1992: 44) notes 
that the success of efficient wage bargaining institutions in channeling self-interested 
individual behaviour into productive social (group) behaviour is an important 
determinant of, among other things, employment and social welfare. (Rowthom 1992: 
82,87; Pekkarinen et aI1992:3). 
Historical roots of corporatism 
Corporatism was initially developed by occupational groupings that sought to uphold 
status distinctions and use these distinctions as the basis for organising the economy 
and society. Corporatism gained a strong foothold in many European countries 
because the forces of hierarchy and status remained particUlarly strong there, the 
culture of "guilds" was preserved for a long- -time and the Catholic-Church continued 
to play an important role in social reform. Historically, the church has always played 
an important role in shaping corporatist regimes. This has contributed to the fact that 
regimes have remained committed to preserving traditional family values, which in 
tum explains the lack of and underdevelopment of many services (e.g. day care 
centres for working women). The principal idea is that government should only 
become involved once the family's capacity/ or resources have been depleted (Esping-
Anderson 1990: 26, 59; Schmitter 1993: 332). 
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Centralised or decentralised wage bargaining? 
One of the distinct features of decentralised labour markets is the large dispersion of 
earnings: whereas some workers earn high wages and have a high degree of job 
security, others experience exactly the opposite. This is particularly evident in the 
United States and Japan, and is a phenomenon increasingly being identified in 
countries with highly segmented labour markets: high paying formal sectors and 
poorly paid informal sectors (Pekkarinen et a11992: 3). 
Traditionally, it was believed that de centralised wage fixing and pnce setting 
enhances efficiency by promoting competition. Liberals contend that economies 
perform poorly as a result of a lack of competition and that high wages and strong 
unions bring about unemployment. 
Contrary to this, evidence suggests that full employment with wages that are nearly 
equal has best been achieved in social corporatist (i.e. highly centralised) countries. 
Centralised bargaining has, however, been criticised by a number of Scandinavian 
economists who view it as "eroding economic efficiency and competitiveness" and 
who highlight the fact that it contributes to very large public sectors (Pohjola 1992: 
53) 
Pohjola (in Pekkarinen et a11992: 3), Calmfors and Driffill (in Soskicel990: 36) and 
Rowthom (1992: 94) all refer to the U-shaped relation between the degree of 
centralisation and the employment rate: whereas highly centralised and highly 
decentralised economies appear to have high employment rates, this is significantly 
worse for countries with intermediate systems. Assuming a casual link, it therefore 
appears that the easiest way to achieve full employment is to opt for either a fully 
centralised or fully decentralised bargaining structure (Pohjola 1992: 44). 
The 1988 study by Calmfors and Driffill (in Soskice 1990) is but one of several 
empirical studies attributing a large part of the success of the "corporatist" economies 
to centralised wage bargaining. Many of these studies set out from the basis that 
competition in real economies is imperfect, as many organisations are purely rent-
seekers who waste resources and distorts allocations so as to bring about outcomes 
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which favour themselves. Furthennore, in a real economy the number of small 
interest groups is too great, and this results in uncoordinated behaviour. To solve this 
problems there are two options: either centralise more in order to better present macro 
economic interests in the process of bargaining, or decentralise more in order to 
reduce the power oflarger interest groups (Pohjola 1992: 45). 
Have corporatist / centralised systems in fact proved advantageous to economic 
growth? Quantitative studies seem to suggest that the higher the level of corporatism, 
the lower the rate of labour conflict. It is, however, not that clear how growth, 
inflation and productivity are influenced by corporatist structures, as results from 
econometric studies based on DEeD countries were not conclusive. As there is no 
specific evidence that corporatism is either particularly good or bad for economic 
growth, it is difficult to detennine how it affects inequality. It does appear, though, 
that a high degree of corporatism makes a country more governable, though not 
necessarily more democratic (Schmitter 1993: 336). Pohjola (1992: 46) notes that a 
trend towards a higher degree of decentralisation is evident even in countries that have 
strong corporatist structures. 
The future of corporatism 
Since the early 1980's corporatism has declined somewhat in the DEeD countries. 
This decline has been attributed to efforts to attain economic integration and the 
introduction of new and more flexible technology affecting production. Another 
important factor has been the increase in the importance of public sector employees. 
These features have contributed to the weakening of the relationship between capital 
and labour (Pekkarinen et al 1992: 7, 16). 
It is unlikely that corporatism will become more popular in future. As international 
competition increases, it is unlikely that the long tenn capital-labour working 
relationship (which had been a strong feature of corporatism) will endure. Worker 
organisations are also slowly losing their power in many DEeD countries, and it is 
already evident that bargaining is increasingly being perfonned at plant level. 
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Pekkarinen et al (1992: 7, 16) is of the opmIOn that it is very likely that the 
responsibility for keeping all parties together will move away from employers and 
employees, towards government. The result of this could be the replacement or 
supplementation of centralised wage bargaining with other kinds of official 
intervention. 
3.3.3 Examples of the three types of welfare state regimes 
3.3.3.1 A conservative regime: Germany 
Germany is a good example of a country with extensive labour market regulation, a 
highly institutionalised industrial relations system and highly centralised collective 
bargaining agreements (Streek 1992: 31). 
In Germany collective bargaining at industry and at enterprise levels is legally and 
institutionally separated. Collective bargaining is entirely free of government 
intervention as its autonomy is legally guaranteed. The co-determination system of 
decisionmaking is based on two important institutions, both of which represent 
employees at the enterprise level: works councils, as well as the representation of 
employees on supervisory boards. Both the division of labour and employee 
representation have undergone change; while the role of unions has shifted to the 
negotiation of industry wide "framework agreements", works councils have begun to 
play a more important role in that they are now responsible for defining and 
specifying such agreements. This forms part of the increasing emphasis placed on 
flexibility in the labour market. Labour market flexibility in Germany, however, 
continues to be hampered by a variety of regulations, one of which is the elaborate 
labour market regulations protecting workers again dismissal (Esping-Anderson 1990: 
169; Helm 1991: 191; Karlhofer and Ladurner 1993: 204; Paque 1993: 231; Streek 
1992: 64). 
Union power in Germany has remained weak, although labour movements have 
continued to increase their institutional presence since the 1970's. During recent years 
there has been a continuous decline in private sector union membership in Germany 
as in most other industrialised countries. An event of particular significance that 
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markedly reduced union power was government's removal during the 1980's of the 
right of workers to claim unemployment insurance while on strike (Flanagen et al 
1993: 429; Schiller 1991: 117). 
Germany has an extensive state social security system that comprises various formal 
institutions. The system is largely based on the assumption that a person works full 
time during his entire adult life, without experiencing periods of voluntary 
unemployment (Gustafsson and Klevrnarken 1989: 12). 
3.3.3.2 A social-democratic regime: Sweden 
Sweden is considered a prime example of a country where a co-ordinated market 
approach has been successful. The aim has been to promote both economic growth 
and better provision of welfare by means of co-ordinating public and private sector 
initiatives. Distinctive features have been active labour market and employment 
policies as well as a collective influence over the processes of production. Today 
labour market policy in Sweden has four main features: an extensive counselling and 
placement service; provision for the retraining of workers; recruitment subsidies to 
employers for recruiting workers who have been unemployed for at least six months, 
and provision for temporary public employment. (Hancock et al 1991: 6; Martin 
1995: 266; Pekkarinen 1992: introduction). 
Labour has recognised the rights of private industrial ownership, thereby implying 
that neither labour nor the state would mobilise its power in order to interfere with the 
decision-making process of private firms. Distributional differences have been 
managed through sophisticated processes of interchange between firms and labour 
(Esping-Anderson 1990: 165; Martin 1995: 263). 
The Swedish model has been based on the presence of powerful and centralised 
unions, which liased closely with the state labour party: the two most important role 
players in the Swedish labour market are the LO, a workers' union, and the SAF, an 
employer's organisation. While unions in weakly unionised countries such as the 
USA weakened during the 1980's as a result of industrial restructuring, unions in 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
highly unionised countries such as Sweden handled adjustment in such a way that 
union membership and density actually increased (Sengenberger 1991: 238). 
As in other Scandinavian countries, wage bargaining in Sweden is a highly 
institutionalised and centralised wage process. The central bargaining structure is 
believed to have contributed significantly to the good employment performance 
during post war decades. (Norway and Sweden were the only countries that were able 
to actually achieve full employment during the decades immediately after World War 
II). However, during recent years the policy influence of organised labour in Sweden 
has been diminishing. This has been attributed mainly to the increasing fragmentation 
of the labour movement in Sweden: unions in the public sector have become much 
more active than private sector unions. Another important factor has been that the line 
that has always divided workers and management has been blurring. Another very 
important change has also taken place as regards wage negotiating: in 1990 the SAF 
declared that wage negotiations would in future only take place at industry and firm 
levels (Hancock et at 1991: 342; Martin 1995: 284; Rowthorn 1992: 99; Pohjola 
1992: 49). 
When the country started to experience economic problems, the'Swedish state turned 
to incomes policy in order to stall wages. However, the trade unions promoted an 
active labour market policy through which the country could continue to pursue, full 
employment and reasonable wages. These active labour market programmes, coupled 
with across the board wage pressure, proved successful. Redundant workers were 
retrained and again absorbed in the economy. During recent years there has been a 
trend towards more flexibility in the Swedish labour market, as well as a trend of 
increasing privatisation. There appears to be a feeling that instead of emphasising job 
security, attention should be shifted to achieving employment security by means of 
mobility subsidies and active labour market policy. Employment security is thus seen 
as ensuring alternative employment, rather than ensuring that one will be employed by 
a specific firm indefinitely (Esping-Anderson 1990: 168; Martin 1995: 286; Nilsson 
1993: 263). 
Social security offered by the Swedish govemment covers old age pensioners and 
disabled persons. There are various components which make up a person's pension: a 
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basic, universal flat rate pension, a general supplementary pension which is related to 
the earnings of the person, a special pension supplement, e.g. if the person is disabled, 
as well as sickness cash benefits. The Swedish social insurance schemes are in 
principle "pay-as-you-go" schemes (Stahlberg 1989: 53). 
3.3.3.3 A liberal regime: The United States of America 
Traditionally the USA has attached greater importance to achieving economic than 
socio-political goals, and subsequently support for socialist principles has been 
limited. Important characteristics of the USA economy are market regulation and 
political business cycle management, and it is by way of this that they tried to 
encourage post war employment. A large number of businesses in the USA have used 
mass production as a competitive strategy (Bendix 1996: 54, Esping-Anderson 1990: 
180). 
Collective bargaining has been the key post-war labour market institution in the USA. 
However, collectively bargained agreements are not extended by legal rules to reach 
beyond union membership. Collective bargaining and statutory regulation only to a 
limited extent influence the labour market in the USA today, as many aspects of 
employment contracts are determined by the market and not by statute or bargaining 
(Flanagan et al 1993: 32, 72). Whereas workers in many European countries who 
prefer collective presentation have various alternatives or supplements to union 
membership, this is not common in the USA. For instance, while some European 
countries have legal forms of plant-level presentation such as the works councils in 
Germany, such institutions do not exist in the USA (Flanagan et a/1993: 424,426). 
There appears to be an inherent inequality in bargaining power in the US labour 
market, mainly the result of the clearly demarcated division between the powers of 
management and that of workers. Strong emphasis is placed on control in the 
workplace .. In industries with union presentation, wages and profits are normally 
determined at shop floor level. Both the union and non-union sector in the USA are 
characterised by the fact that employment contracts are determined in a decentralised 
way (Flanagan et al. 1993: 427; Schiller 1991 :117). 
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Contrary to the dismal European experience of employment during the 1990's, the 
United States experienced superior job-performance, attributed by many to the greater 
labour market flexibility in this country. Following the economic problems that 
surfaced during the 1970's, labour relations models were changed to allow for more 
flexible work arrangements, and a greater involvement of the workforce in production 
decisions. Since the 1980's, government has weakened its enforcement of labour and 
employment laws. For example: by allowing companies to markedly increase their 
use of temporary labour and by signing people up on short term contracts, flexibility 
has increased but job security has deteriorated. The compensation system has also 
been detached from a specific job and linked to individual characteristics such as 
work performance (Archer 1992: 218, Weinstein and Kochan 1995: 13,27). 
3.4 Labour market institutions in Developing Countries 
3.4.1. Overview of general trends with regard to labour market institutions in 
developing countries 
Social, economic, and political circumstances in developing countries at the turn of 
the century, and in particular after World War II, were vastly different to that 
prevailing in Europe, the USA and the Scandinavian countries. Whereas the USA, the 
UK, continental Europe and the Scandinavian countries turned to rebuilding their 
economies and creating employment after World War II, most third world countries 
were focusing on achieving political independence. Given these different 
circumstances and the historical differences that shaped the development of 
institutions in these countries, labour market institutions did not take shape at the 
same pace and along similar lines as was the case in the industrialised countries (van 
Rooyen 1996: 41). 
Given the above, categorising developing countries is difficult. Few countries in sub-
Saharan countries lean towards the liberal regime type: most appear to follow 
regulated market or socialist market approaches, although regime types in virtually all 
developing countries portray a mix of characteristics which makes it fall somewhere 
between these two types. 
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304.1.1 Labour movements 
In many of the former colonies it did not take long for unionism to emerge as the 
leading institution affecting labour market outcomes. Unions also became symbols of 
political solidarity and protest: in Africa in particular many of the trade unions 
became closely involved in the anti-colonial struggle for independence. In African 
countries, unions, in spite of generally not being very strong, have contributed to the 
fact that the difference between the highest and lowest paid public sector workers has 
shrunk during recent decades (Nelson 1994: 361; van Rooyen 1996: 41). 
It should be noted, however, that unlike in industrialised countries where an average 
of two thirds of the workforce (or even more) are union members, only about one 
third or less of the workforce in developing countries belongs to unions (Nelson 1994: 
354). Furthermore, unions in developing countries have many weaknesses. Owing to 
the small average size of businesses, their power is limited. There are also many rival 
unions and associations, and this division contributes to limiting the power of the 
p 
individual unions.'The co-ordination of labour action is particularly difficult under 
such circumstances. As unions are weak and fragmented, strikes do not have a 
significant effect on wage levels (Nelson 1994: 356). 
304.1.2 Wage bargaining 
There are virtually no developing countries that follow the highly centralised way of 
labour organisation and wage negotiation. This apparent "failure" to build centralised 
structures has been attributed to the fact that economic structures of the developed and 
developing worlds differ significantly, that labour market structures between these 
countries also differ, and that the countries have distinctly different historical features. 
Another important aspect is that most developing countries are simply unable to 
afford the social and employment benefits that ate pivotal to highly centralised 
systems. Attempts at implementing systems modeled on the industrialised world, 
such as providing organised workers in developing countries with benefits associated 
J 
with a corporatist system, have only managed to increase social tensions (Nelson 
1994: 353). 
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304.1.3 Minimum wages 
Statutory minimum wage fixing has proven to be particularly popular in developing 
countries. However, as minimum wages do not affect the informal sector, and as a 
great number of urban dwellers in developing countries who are unable to find formal 
jobs become involved in informal economic activities, it only (directly) improves the 
incomes ofa very limited portion of the population (Benie 1989: 12; Mazumdar 1989: 
42). 
The main objective behind statutory minimum wage legislation has been to ensure 
certain income levels for wage groups, and for specific industries, regions or even age 
groups. In most countries, the minimum wage has been related to workers' needs 
(Mazumdar 1989: 42). However, it has been problematic to distinguish between the 
social needs of various groups, as this differs, among other things, according to region 
and circumstances. Furthermore, problems arose as to how to determine who is 
eligible for minimum wages: individuals or families? In addition to this, questions 
regarding the capacity of the economy to absorb the shock of implementing minimum 
wages, and the different capacities of enterprises to pay, also arose. Benie (1989: 12), 
in his review of wage policy instruments in the Ivory Coast, also refers to the problem 
of non-compliance with minimum wage legislation. It has been difficult to solve this, 
as trade unions, the most appropriate instrument for "monitoring" this, are weak and 
have little bargaining power. 
304.104 Social Security 
Contrary to what is the case in most industrialised countries, few developing countries 
have developed social security "safety nets". In addition to this, those countries that 
have, have only been able to provide social security benefits to the small "formally 
organised" sectors of the economy, and not in the large, un-organised rural and urban 
sectors (Guhan 1994: 35). In most developing countries, and in particular those in 
Africa, coverage of social security schemes has been limited to workers in the small 
.formal sectors of the economies. The emphasis has been mainly on the provision of 
medical care. Plant (1994: 89) notes that the proportion of the economically active 
popUlation protected by non-contributory (government-financed) social security 
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schemes is generally less than 10%, and has tended to decline even in spite of 
governments expressing their commitment to extend coverage to the entire workforce. 
Social policy in most developing countries rests solely on the shoulders of 
government. Social support programmes are mostly operated by government, who 
provides all or most pensions, unemployment benefits, family income support, 
education, health facilities and assistance for the disabled. Unfortunately pensions 
and unemployment benefits only cover a small portion of the population, while health 
care and education are of inferior quality owing to resource constraints. Hence the 
huge difference between the levels and effectiveness of the provision of government 
services in industrialised and developing countries (Burgess and Stem 1991: 41). 
The development of social insurance systems in developing countries has been 
impeded by various shortcomings. Firstly, many countries have government schemes 
covering, for example, work injuries, old age and disabilities, while schemes covering 
sickness or maternity are limited. Private social insurance schemes to which workers 
individually contribute on a regular basis appear to be only available to persons 
working in stable, organised sectors of the economy. Informal workers, as well as 
those in agricultural sectors, are excluded in most countries. Other factors which have 
contributed to the failure of many such schemes have been the tendency of employers 
to evade liabilities, the difficulties pertaining to regular collection of contributions, 
high administrative costs, and delayed disbursements (Guhan 1994: 36). 
3.4.1.5 Public sector employment 
In most developing countries the largest part of the labour force finds themselves in 
public sector jobs. The industrialisation strategies and nationalisation programs of the 
1960's, popular among most African countries, were considered to have been the 
main driving forces behind the expansion of employment in public sectors during the 
1970's. (lLO 1995b: 56). As the bloated public sectors in most Sub-Saharan countries 
have been singled out as one of the main factors contributing to the poor economic 
performance of these countries, many of the international agencies which provide 
financial assistance have made their assistance subject to the reform of the public 
sectors of the respective countries. This formed part of the process of "structural 
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adjustment". Notwithstanding these attempts, privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa has 
been limited. In most of Africa some 60-80% of non-agricultural workers are 
employed in the public sector (Nelson 1994: 357). 
Privatisation, together with retrenchment, have been of considerable importance in 
sensitising donors and African governments to adjustment's social consequences. 
Public sector employment has been adjusted in stages: many countries have, for 
example, followed the sequence of freezing wages, enforcing the legal retirement age 
more strictly, laying off "ghost" workers and temporary workers, freezing 
recruitment, and, lastly, dismissing workers (Standing 1991: 103). 
In many developing countries labour market deregulation and privatisation have led to 
the loss of many public sector jobs that had formerly been well protected. Hale (1996: 
8), although focusing on this issue from a gender perspective, notes that globally there 
has been a trend towards the employment of female labour. This has been 
accompanied by a shift towards lower paid, insecure and less skilled jobs such as 
casual, temporary and part-time jobs. Hale associates this with the desire of 
companies to create cheaper and more flexible work forces. Standing (1991: 37) also 
confirms the growth in "precarious" forms of employment, with contract and 
temporary labour becoming increasingly' popular. He also refers to the fact that 
enterprises will be tempted to bypass protective legislation should they feel a need to 
do so. 
In spite of structural adjustment programs requiring a downsizing of the public sector, 
in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, changes in the size of the public sector have been 
negligible and public enterprises continue to provide a considerable percentage of 
formal wage employment. Although the share of public sector output in the GDP of 
developing countries does not differ markedly from the output in industrialised 
countries, the average for the former is significantly higher when measured as a share 
of capital formation. This serves as a reflection of the capital-intensive nature of 
public enterprises in developing countries (ILO 1995b: 56,57,58). 
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3.4.2 Country specific evidence on labour market institutions in developing 
countries 
In the following paragraphs, the development of labour market institutions in Chile 
and Malaysia are reviewed to reflect trends in non-market institutions in developing 
countries on two different continents. The background on developments in these two 
countries will make it possible to put the current trends regarding the development of 
labour market institutions in Namibia, to be discussed in detail in Section B, into 
perspective. 
3.4.2.1 Chile 
3.4.2.1.1 General political, economic and social environment 
Chile is today considered as one of the best examples of a stable and liberalised 
economy in South America. The country has a market based economic system in 
which the private sector is the main growth sector, with the public sector playing only 
a guiding and supportive role. Privatisation in particular has been encouraged, and this 
has contributed to the development of, among other services, private pension funds 
(World Bank 1996: 102). 
3.4.2.1.2 Labour market institutions 
During the past two decades Chile has undergone major political and economIC 
changes as a result of the different political regimes that came to power. 
During the early 1970's, when a socialist regime held power, serious macroeconomic 
imbalances resulted from misguided attempts towards, among other things, the 
nationalisation of private firms. The new government which took over from the 
socialists brought the country onto the road to a more "liberal" regime, with 
government limiting the extent of its intervention in the labour market, and allowing 
employers and market forces more power. Although not outlawing them, government 
discouraged union activity, and encouraged the decentralisation of the bargaining 
system (Riveros 1994: 173). 
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Union activity in Chile peaked during the socialist regime of 1970-1973. A centralised 
wage fixing system prevailed and the national union federation played a key role in 
the labour market. 
During the mid-1970's a need for a more open and deregulated economy was realised. 
There was a call for higher labour mobility and changes in the composition of the 
demand for labour. Increases in market competition led to increased productivity and 
to dismissals on the labour front. After the socialist regime lost power in 1973, 
collective bargaining and union activity were eliminated. Job security regulations, 
which made dismissals expensive, were also relaxed, thus making it easier for 
employers to cut their work force. Few unions were left, and of these, government 
selected the leaders. Government allowed private business to implement its own 
employment and wage strategies. Minimum wages and non-wage regulations were 
upheld but were not enforced (Riveros 1994: 176). 
During the latter part of the seventies confusion regarding labour law increased. A 
new labour law was implemented in 1979 with new guidelines both for union activity 
and collective bargaining. This law allowed for more than one union per enterprise, 
and determined that bargaining would only be allowed at firm level. The right to 
strike was curtailed by allowing firms to take on temporary help when desired. The 
labour court system of the pre-1973 regime was not restored. During the early eighties 
government changed the labour law so as to make it more difficult for employers to 
dismiss workers, a move which reduced the level of market flexibility. Severance 
compensation was also established. The implementation of the new labour law in the 
early eighties again reduced the level of market flexibility, as it made it more difficult 
to dismiss workers (Riveros 1994: 173, 177). 
Riveros (1994: 169) contends that the (ongoing) decline in real wages since the 
1970's and the fact that unemployment remained high, have been the result of labour 
market rigidities that hindered the mobility of labour. He associates these rigidities 
with the lack of sufficient formal labour market institutional structures in the 
economy. 
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In 1981 the state social security system was changed from a pay-as-you-go system to 
a fully funded one in which benefits depended on contributions. Health care and 
education were also decentralised (Riveros 1994: 177, 178). 
During the late 1980's the Chilean state reduced its supervisory activities and its 
pressure to decentralise bargaining structures, but at the same time took away from 
workers their right to strike. Since the late 1980's Chile has, however, re-established a 
number of protective instruments against dismissals and collective labour 
relationships, and this has again had negative repercussions on the flexibility of the 
Chilean labour market (Plant 194: 88). 
Today the Chilean labour market supports a model of labour market segmentation, 
with a certain degree of protection given (only) to formal sector workers. Various 
expenditure-switching policies have contributed to falling real informal wages relative 
to the formal sector wages. Relative wage rigidity in the formal sector has hindered 
labour market mobility, and unemployment has been exacerbated by the fact that 
-
workers queue for formal sector jobs, as the unskilled wages in the formal sector 
remained high (Riveros 1994: 207). 
3.4.2.2 Malaysia 
3.4.2.2.1 General political, social and economic environment 
Malaysia has an open and highly diversified economy. Although the public sector 
continues to playa very important role in the economy, there has been a strategic shift 
in the economy from the public to the private sector during recent years. This forms 
part of the pursuit of the economic liberalisation agenda that involves a drive to 
implement privatisation programs and reform the capital market (World Bank 1996: 
318). 
Following the 1969 riots against the ethnic Chinese who were seen as the group 
favoured by the laissez faire system, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was drawn up. 
This allowed government to intervene more actively in economic matters. The main 
idea behind this plan was to restructure society and to address the economic 
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imbalances along ethnic lines by redistributing wealth in favour of ethnic Malaysian 
people. Prior to the introduction of redistribution policies, income levels differed 
along ethnic lines: the highest income levels were those of the Chinese and Indian 
populations. The plan presented specific guidelines regarding various measures aimed 
at achieving the above aim: subsidies for small scale farmers, land development and 
resettlement for which government footed the bill, massive expenditure on education 
and the application of racial quotas on employment. These redistribution policies have 
contributed to maintaining social stability in this multi-ethnic society (Islam and 
Chowdhury 1997: 233; World Bank 1996: 319). 
In 1991 the New Development Policy was announced to succeed the NEP. This 
emphasised human resource development, particularly in technical and vocational 
training, and also targeted the development of the small and medium enterprise sector. 
Close cooperation between government and the private sector was encouraged. (Islam 
and Chowdhury 1997: 235). 
3.4.2.2.2 Labour market institutions 
As in Chile, the country also has a complex and segmented labour market. Prominent 
features of the Asian Pacific labour markets, which can also be identified in Malaysia, 
are the tough labour legislation and the rapid growth of human capital. Of all the 
countries in the Pacific Asia region, Malaysia has shown the highest rate of return on 
higher education. 
The fifth long-term development plan for the country (covering 1986 to 1990) 
represented a shift in strategy towards the promotion of the private sector as the 
principal economic growth engine and contained strong guidelines on encouraging 
deregulation (World Bank 1996: 317). 
During the 1970s Malaysia experienced good economiC growth, but in the early 
1980's commodity prices (especially oil) fell substantially. Following a recessionary 
phase during the mid-1980's, growth again picked up during the late 1980s. The 
recession of the mid-1980's was in part the result of a combination of fiscal, 
monetary, exchange rate and labour market policies. However, it proved to be of short 
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duration, because factor markets were flexible downwards (Mazumdar 1994: 459; 
Riveros 1994: 529). 
In general, the Asian labour markets appear much less regulated than those of South 
America. In East Asia a fair amount of success had been achieved by allowing the 
market to determine wages and by discouraging the formation of labour groupings. 
Although trade unions were allowed in Malaysia in 1988, the government continues to 
discourage union activity, albeit not formally. Wage bargaining takes place mostly at 
enterprise level in Malaysia. There is no legislated minimum wage (Islam and 
Chowdhury 1997: 86,222). 
There are two characteristics of wage setting in Malaysia that are of importance in the 
context of this study as both affect the flexible nature of wages. The first is that 
flexibility is reduced by the fact that collective agreements are set for two to three 
year periods, which makes it difficult for employers to adjust wages downward during 
difficult times. Although entry level salaries are adjusted and therefore reduced with 
ease, the wages of senior workers are rigid as they are increased according to 
automatically set increments. Other labour market institutions (most of which are also 
common in East Asia) such as steep wage seniority scales and the strong attachment 
of workers to firms in which they have worked for long periods also reduce flexibility 
(Riveros 1994: 475, 525). 
Education is a very strong determinant of the unemployment rate in Malaysia. 
Government has lent much financial support to upgrading the existing labour force in 
the country; higher education and industrial training have been two aspects singled 
out for financial support. An important aspect of the support for higher education has 
concerned restructuring it to improve the quality of graduates (Riveros 1994: 529). 
It has been found that unemployment is mostly made up of first time job seekers 
between the ages of 15 and 24. Unemployment among those with no or only primary 
education has declined duri~g recent years, while it has risen among those with 
middle and higher secondary education. However, this type of unemployment has to a 
large extent been attributed to a combination of rigidity in occupational preference 
and the low level of wage flexibility. Real formal sector wages have risen during the 
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last two decades: the tight market for skilled workers has boosted wages in the formal 
sector significantly. It should also be noted that one of the results of the economic and 
social restructuring was a widening of the gap between formal and informal sector 
earnings (Islam and Chowdhury 1997: 231; Riveros 1994: 487). 
It appears that although the NEP has appeased the ethnic Malaysians and thus 
contributed to social stability, it has in fact contributed to government enterprises 
posting huge losses, and to major macro-economic problems such as higher budget 
deficits and higher external debt. The educational policy has also been criticised for 
contributing to the increase in the unemployment of graduates. However, following 
years of strong economic growth, many of the Asian economies have overheated by 
the second half of the 1990's. This has in part been attributed to the fact that growth 
has been based on labour and capital mobilisation rather than on productivity (World 
Bank 1996: 317). 
3.5 Globalisation and labour market regulation 
From the preceding discussion it should be clear th~t the development of labour 
market institutions in both industrialised and developing countries has been shaped by 
a great number of different forces, ranging from changes in political regimes to both 
internal and external economic shocks. Arguably one of the most significant 
influences bound to affect the future development of labour market institutions is the 
globalisation of the world economy. 
Globalisation and the drive to become more competitive internationally will have 
certain repercussions for the production of the goods and services and in particular fot: 
labour markets as they would need to adapt to new economic conditions by, for 
example, becoming increasingly flexible. The global changes have led to industrial 
restructuring which has affected both production and consumption patterns (Rodgers 
1991: 19; Koedijk and Kremers 1996: 445). 
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3.5.1 The effect of globalisation on labour market institutions 
During recent years much attention has been devoted to the idea of globalising trade 
and building a so-called "global economy". Globalisation has had, and continues to 
have, an important impact on both the form and contents of national economic policy 
and decisionmaking. It has put a considerable amount of pressure on virtually all 
countries with open economies to adjust their product and labour markets in ways that 
are likely to improve their competitive position in the world economy. 
One of the most important aspects of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) is that it has paved the way for the removal of import barriers and, in doing 
so, has increased the "openness" of economies all over the world. As restrictions on 
the flow of capital (e.g. exchange control) have diminished significantly during recent 
years, capital has become increasingly mobile internationally. This means that 
investors cannot be "forced" to invest or reinvest in a particular country anymore; but 
are free to move their capital to countries that they perceive as having encouraging 
economic conditions (including labour conditions) for production. As producers 
normally attempt to keep production costs as low as possible, this means that one of 
the factors which they look for is cheap labour (Hancock et a11991: 342). 
With the intensification of international competition, the containment of labour costs 
and increased productivity have become key considerations which, to a certain extent, 
are overshadowing the protection of workers and the maintenance of fair incomes for 
workers. This has put pressure on labour relations, and has made it considerably more 
difficult to marry the interests of the workers to that of the employers. Governments 
are increasingly requested to intervene, either by workers who demand compensation 
or better working conditions, or by employers who need more flexibility in respect to 
labour conditions (ILO 1995b: 69). 
With respect to the need to improve their competitive position in the world economy, 
developing countries find themselves in a similar position to industrialised countries. 
Deregulation is cited as being important for any country which needs to adjust to 
changing global conditions in order to improve its competitive position (ILO 1995a: 
82). Therefore, in order to increase their international competitiveness, some African 
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countries have attempted to reduce labour market rigidities during the past decade 
(Lachaud 1989: 333). 
In addition to those changes brought on by the need for deregulation and 
"flexibilisation', distinct changes have also occurred with respect to unions and the 
way in which bargaining takes place. Globalisation has not only "encouraged" 
workplace reform, but has also allegedly contributed to a relative loss in power for 
organised labour in most industrialised countries. (Hancock et a11991: 342). 
Deregulation of the product and labour markets as well as privatisation have in many 
cases been the result of structural adjustment programmes imposed on these countries 
by donors such as the IMF and World Bank. Structural adjustment has been the 
driving force behind many of the more recent economic reforms in some African 
economies. In most African countries there has been a trend during the 1980's for 
structural adjustment programmes to challenge state intervention. The objective 
behind this has been the achievement of a new social order through the market 
(Lachaud 1989: 341). 
3.5.2 Labour market regulation 
Government intervention by means of regulation is an important institutional feature 
that affects the performance of markets. Rules and regulations can differ in terms of 
the objectives behind them: it may serve to force labour costs down by keeping the 
work force fragmented, may aim to protect workers in certain industrial sectors, or 
may reflect the state's social goals. Regulation can thus have either negative or 
positive consequences, depending on whether it disrupts markets or contribute to 
making the market more dynamic. Excessive regulation in partiCUlar is considered an 
important impediment to flexibility in both product markets and labour markets. 
The neoclassical supply-side followers hold that "fewer labour market regulations 
would promote labour market flexibility and higher employment" in developing 
countries. Furthermore, they contend that "rules on job security ... distort the labour 
market in ways that reduce employment..." (Standing 1991: 37). This is the same 
argument that is made for the OEeD countries. It should, however, be kept in mind 
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that Standing writes from an ILO perspective, and that that there are different 
opinions with regard to the role and usefulness of labour market regulations. This 
issue will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter of this study. 
The cost of labour influences the competitive position of a country, as a highly 
regulated labour market makes it difficult for an open economy to adjust to external 
shocks. What many thus consider as "rigidities" in the labour market can slow overall 
economic growth, contribute to price instability, and exacerbate unemployment. 
Flexibility in tum can positively influence the speed at which recovery from economic 
shocks takes place, and is therefore an essential pre-condition for economic reform. 
By changing the way in which workers is organised and mobilised, and the way in 
which wages are adjusted, the degree of flexibility in the labour market can be 
improved (Archer 1992 : 110,218; Hale 1996: 9; World Bank 1995: 110). 
3.5.2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of regulation 
It is difficult to quantify the benefits of regulation in a market economy. It would 
appear that one of the most important benefits of regulation is the improvement of the 
overall functioning of the market (Koedijk and Kremers 1996: 446). Regulations that 
restrict the free variation of wages in different occupations and industries serve as 
disincentives for labour to move to more productive jobs. However, many unions 
consider an increase in labour market flexibility as being tantamount to lower wages 
and less job security for workers, and are therefore opposed to it. 
Sweetman (1996: 2, 3) also contends that research has indicated that flexibilisation 
brings about downward pay adjustments and substandard working conditions, and 
adds that it can also be associated with decreased job security for workers. For 
example, evidence suggests that the economic difficulties of the past two decades 
have compelled parties in industrialised labour markets to trade social protection for 
economic flexibility (ILO 1995a: 144). 
Buchtemann (1991: 252) also notes that owing to the increase in "non-standardised" 
types of work such as self-employment, part-time work, and casual labour, the 
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number of persons who are being excluded from protective regulation and social 
security measures is growing. 
Deregulation, however, can increase competition which will lead to lower prices, and 
also lead to increased efficiency which in tum is likely to result in cost cuts and rising 
productivity. Although it is widely expected that deregulation will contribute to lower 
wages and lead to a reduction in employment, it is possible that new market 
opportunities will generate new jobs and wages (Koedijk and Kremers 1996: 446; 
ILO 1995a: 144). 
There is, however, evidence that seems to suggest some of the recent industrial 
deregulation adjustments have undermined labour market institutions. Trade unions in 
particular, but also employers' organisations, have to a certain extent lost power. In 
addition to this, Sengenberger (1991: 235), from an ILO perspective (i.e. that labour 
market intervention by way of regulations are very necessary), claims that wage 
regulation and terms of employment have been "diluted". Hale (1996: 9) and Standing 
(1991: 36 -38), the latter also from an ILO perspective, confirm that there has been a 
discernible trend of eroding workers' rights and labour legislation internationally. 
This erosion has in many cases been exacerbated by government attempts to 
deregulate protective trade measures, and affempts to restructure employment 
relations in order to achieve "external" labour flexibility. Other factors that have 
contributed to the erosion of labour regulations include the trend by larger enterprises 
to cut costs by sub-contracting, the trend towards privatisation, and the conditions 
attached to structural adjustment programs. 
Although many countries have attempted to improve their competitive positions by 
reducing labour costs through lower wages, greater differentiation in payment, or 
exempting certain categories of enterprises or workers from regulation, there is 
evidence that adjustment has actually strengthened labour institutions in some 
countries. Also, Sengenberger (1991: 235, 248) argues, some countries have in fact 
managed to address the issue of competition without relaxing their labour standards. 
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3.5.2.2 European experience with regulation 
The industrialised countries in Europe experienced serious labour related problems 
during the 1980's, with unions and labour market rigidities imposing high labour costs 
in the service sector in particular. Institutional arrangements such as those of job 
security and wage setting came to be considered as rigidities by many, in spite of 
others being of the opinion that this actually had the exact opposite effect, namely 
having increased flexibility in many cases. However, the fact remains that this to a 
large extent contributed to popularising a combination of institutional deregulation 
and regulation via market mechanisms. As regards standards such as those pertaining 
to employment security, a process of selective suspension or abolition was followed. 
Also, collective bargaining moved towards decentralisation from industry level to the 
enterprise level (Buchtemann 1991: 252). 
It has been shown that regulation in continental Europe has been and remain more 
restrictive than in countries such as the USA, the UK and New Zealand. In Europe, 
there appears to be a negative link between the degree of regulation and the economic 
perfonnance of the countries. Although sufficient empirical evidence is still lacking, 
some economists feels that deregulation can revitalise the European economy and 
improve Europe's position in tenns of unemployment and competitiveness (Koedijk 
and Kremers 1996: 447, 459). 
Koedijk and Kremers (1996: 448, 449) found that the impact of product market 
regulation on economic growth is twice as. strong as the impact of labour market 
regulation on growth. Countries such as Gennany, France, Netherlands, and Belgium 
have limited regulation of their labour markets, but considerably more regulation of 
their product markets. 
It would appear as if labour market perfonnance in most industrialised countries has 
deteriorated since the 1970's, and that this has in fact taken place "irrespective of 
differences in labour market regulation" (lLO 1995a: 156). 
The lLO argues that it is not possible to measure the performance of a labour market 
by considering only the rate of unemployment. Although some evidence confirms 
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that labour market regulation can adversely affect employment, it cannot be stated that 
it does this in a major way. In addition to this, the ILO (ILO 1995a: 157) contends that 
there is sufficient evidence that wage levels are problematic when it comes to labour 
market adjustment, and that reducing wages will necessarily result in increases in 
employment levels. Some countries where labour markets are relatively 
institutionalised, and where wages are determined at higher levels than firm level, 
have experienced good economic growth. Moreover, some of the modem labour 
market theories point to reasons other than mechanisms of rigidity in order to explain 
why wages are unable to clear the labour market. Changes in international trade and 
technology, for instance, have also been cited as having a negative impact on 
employment. The World Employment Report (ILO 1995a: 158) also cites a recent 
study which arrived at the conclusion that although employment creation is impeded 
by anti-competitive regulation in the product markets of Europe, it is in fact mainly 
product market regulation, and not labour market regulation, which inhibits the 
creation of jobs. 
In support of the contention that a negative link exists between deregulation and 
economic growth in Europe, Koedijk and Kremers asserts that the UK, Denmark and 
Ireland, where regulation is limited, have experienced growth twice as high as in the 
more regulated countries of Italy and Greece. However, a study by Davids concluded 
that it is not necessarily deregulation which leads to improved growth performance, 
but the other way round (cited in Koedijk and Kremers 1996: 449,460 - 462). 
3.5.2.3 Future trends: more regulation or deregulation? 
Labour market institutions and labour standards are generally considered as making a 
positive contribution to reducing the occurrence of exploitation and oppression, and, 
by means of setting minimum standards, leading to an improvement of living 
standards (Standing 1991: 37). Both Standing and Sengenberger, whose written work 
has been used extensively as sources of information for the purpose of this study, 
support the ILO's general point of view that labour market intervention by way of 
labour regulations does not distort the economy. (The opposing viewpoints as regards 
the role of labour market intervention will be discussed in detail in the next chapter of 
this study). Although many World Bank papers and followers of the "Eurosclerosis" 
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school of thought have contended that labour regulations have negative economic 
consequences, Standing (1991: 36) refers to the debate pertaining to the effect of 
labour regulations as being "unresolved". Sengenberger (1991: 236) does however 
acknowledge that, in order to increase the ability of the labour market (and the 
economy in general) to respond to economic or political shocks, and to improve their 
competitive positions, many countries are opting for the removal or revision of 
"regulatory rigidities". 
The relationship between labour market regulation and performance is one involving 
trade-offs. Complete deregulation in the modem economies of today is unlikely. It 
would appear that deregulation brings certain economic advantages, while creating 
new problems. As it has not been confirmed that labour market rigidities are the most 
important cause of unemployment, deregulation will not necessarily bring about full 
employment (ILO 1995a: 168). 
Regard for the dignity and the fundamental rights of workers necessitates some form 
of regulation of the conditions under which people work. In spite of a number of 
theoretical arguments stating that the free working of the labour market should not be 
interfered with, interferences such as minimum wages, family allowances, national 
insurance schemes or supplementary pensions are interferences in the market 
mechanism which may be necessary to fulfill the policy objectives which society sets 
for itself (Jackson 1970: 3). 
\ 
3.6 Conclusion 
During the_s.econd half of the twentieth century the welfare state emerged as a leading 
force influencing the organisation of labour in industrialised countries. Tn response to 
changing economic circumstances, in particular after W orId War II, governments in 
these countries stepped up their involvement in their economies. This was mainly to 
ensure adherence to the social rights of individuals and to oversee an equitable 
distribution of the proceeds of economic growth. 
As a result of vast differences between the historical, political, economic and social 
impulses in the various countries, the welfare states developed along different lines, 
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although they all had in common the institutionalisation of social rights. The different 
extent of state involvement and the resulting influence on the structures that have 
since developed are obvious when one looks at the differences between the liberal, 
social democratic and conservative regimes. 
The "official" attitude towards the extent to which governments should intervene in 
aspects such as collective bargaining and wage determination, as well as the extent to 
which the state should shoulder the responsibility for social insurance, differs 
markedly and is a reflection of each nation's individual political and socio-economic 
priorities. These very different labour market institutions which have developed are 
now undergoing transformation in order to adapt to internal political and social 
changes, as well as changing international economic factors such as the globalisation 
and the formation of a "world economy". 
It is also important to keep in mind that welfare state policies have not only 
contributed to shaping the labour market institutions of today, but that the welfare 
state structure has also in itself become a machine of employment. Moreover, it has 
contributed to the establishment of a large middle class with vested interests in the 
perpetuation of welfare state policies. 
Wants are met not only by governments who, through their annual budgets make 
provision for state-funded welfare activities in support of solving the distribution 
problem, but also to a large extent by households / family members themselves, as 
well as the market / private sector. 
In addition to welfare state governments allocating increasing amounts of their annual 
budgets to social expenditure during recent decades, economic growth has also 
resulted in the establishment of private schemes often offering similar benefits. Under 
such private schemes benefits normally accrue on the basis of member contributions, 
contrary to many government schemes which do not require contributions from 
individuals. Whereas the welfare responsibilities of the state were initially limited, the 
jobless economic growth that occurred since the 1960's and 1970's in particular 
necessitated extending welfare services to also incorporate aspects such as 
unemployment insurance. 
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It is very difficult to argue that the presence, or for that matter, absence, of certain 
regulatory labour market institutions is the reason for some countries being successful 
in reaching goals such as high economic growth and high levels of employment, while 
others are not, as the evidence is conflicting. It is, however, possible to discern some 
trends in general with regard to labour market institutions that appear to have had an 
effect on economic growth and employment. 
Evidence from the above case studies of industrialised countries suggests a global 
trend towards reducing state intervention in labour market regulation. There also 
appears to be a trend away from centralised wage fixing towards more decentralised 
collective bargaining, notwithstanding evidence on industrialised countries which 
indicates that both centralised and decentralised bargaining can in fact work well and 
contribute to reducing unemployment. 
In the industrialised countries reviewed in this chapter, umon membership has 
declined during recent decades. This has in part been attributed to the work force 
becoming more diverse and the average size of enterprises being reduced. Secondly, 
flexibility in labour markets in industrialised countries has generally increased as a 
result of the deregulation of, among other things, the labour market. More importance 
is now being attached to the view that a flexible work force actually represents a 
comparative advantage for a country, and that this is important given the challenges 
brought on by globalisation. One of the most noticeable areas deregulated concerns 
the employment of temporary staff: short-term work contracts are becoming 
increasingly popular among employers. 
Also evident is an increase in the polarisation between those persons with jobs and 
those persons without jobs. Locke and Kochan (1995: 378) contends that this 
polarisation may have contributed to the fact that, in spite of attempts at reducing 
inequalities, inequality has in fact been increasing in some industrialised countries. 
It is much more difficult to discern clear trends regarding the development of labour 
market institutions in the two developing countries reviewed here. 
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In developing countries political independence has for decades remained the leading 
force influencing all other aspects of society. Even today politics remain more volatile 
than in industrialised countries, and new regimes that come to power often have very 
different ideas regarding the economic system to be followed than their predecessors 
had. Both Chile and Malaysia are good examples of this, especially Malaysia, with its 
history of ethnic division and separate development for different ethnic groups. Since 
a new political regime with a support base among the disadvantaged groups came to 
power, it has focused on bringing about social and economic equality, contrary to the 
previous political regime. It goes without saying, however, that this is not the case in 
all developing countries. 
In Chile, as in Malaysia, there has been a tendency during recent decades for the state 
to encourage a market based economy with a strong private sector. This has formed 
part of an increasingly liberal stance of reducing state involvement in the economy, 
and is in stark contrast to the drive for nationalisation of the economy, which had been 
popular with previous political regimes. 
Given the history of colonialism and the exploitation of labour, many developing 
countries have tried to "compensate" by developing highly regulated labour markets. 
The removal of privileges accorded to persons under existing systems could therefor 
have serious political repercussions in terms of voter support, hence the hesitation in 
doing so. Be it as it may, the highly regulation labour markets could prove a drawback 
as it considered by many to contribute to rising labour costs. Countries already 
struggling to cope with large pools of unemployed persons are also said to lose their 
competitive advantage. 
Unions in the developing countries reviewed here are not particularly strong, and have 
seen their influence / negotiating power reduced once the political parties they 
supported gained power. In Chile, for example, the state has discouraged union 
activity, although it has not been forbidden completely, and encouraged decentralised 
bargaining. Today neither Chile nor Malaysia has a strong and centralised collective 
bargaining systems, and bargaining seems to take place mostly at enterprise or 
industry level. 
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Although the need for making the labour market more flexible in order to improve 
competitiveness is acknowledged, many developing countries are experiencing 
difficulties in achieving this. There is some evidence that developing countries are 
striving to make their labour markets more flexible, but there is also evidence to the 
contrary. For example, in Malaysia labour market flexibility is seriously restrained by 
the fact that collective bargaining agreements are set for 2-3 year periods. Whereas 
labour market regulations in Chile were relaxed during the 1970's, thereby enhancing 
flexibility, exactly the opposite happened during the 1980's when new job security 
measures were re-introduced by the state. 
It appears that the welfare policies in the developing countries reviewed tend to be 
liberal and social democratic in nature, rather than conservative. What has also 
become clear is the fact that social insurance remains mainly the burden of the state in 
most developing countries. Ironically, such countries are not in a position to afford 
sizeable social and employment benefits. In industrialised countries there are well 
developed private sectors that supplement state social expenditure and social 
insurance schemes, and large numbers of economically active people who are in the 
financial position to contribute to such schemes. Governments of countries with 
developing economies can simply not afford carrying the bulk of the heavy burden of 
social expenditure by themselves, and often the private sector is also not in a position 
to supplement state schemes. 
It should also be mentioned that a great number of persons in developing countries are 
excluded from the advantages provided by formal labour market institutions as they 
are not formally employed. Labour market segmentation is particularly relevant given 
the dualistic nature of developing economies. In both Chile and Malaysia problems 
are still experienced with regard to unemployment. 
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4. Economic Perspectives on Labour Market Interventions 
4.1 Introduction 
Views on how labour market interventions affect social well-being differ 
considerably, with some seeing labour market institutions and policies as facilitating 
economic growth, and other seeing it as a hindrance to economic development. In this 
chapter the opposing views regarding labour market intervention will be discussed. 
The different views regarding labour market intervention can roughly be divided into 
two camps: that of the World Bank and that of the International Labour Organisation. 
The general arguments of these two principal viewpoints regarding labour market 
intervention will be covered in section 4.2. This will be followed by evidence in 
section 4.3 regarding intervention in both industrialised and developing countries. 
Union activity and collective bargaining, social security and the minimum wage have 
been identified as the three focus points for the discussion. An assessment of existing 
evidence should make it possible to arrive at a conclusion as to whether labour market 
intervention can in fact be justified in a developing country, what type of intervention, 
if any, is justifiable, and to what extent such intervention should take place. 
4.2 Opposing views on labour market interventions - broad perspectives 
There is disagreement regarding the need for institutional intervention in labour 
markets. Freeman, in his 1993 paper on the value of institutional interventions in the 
labour markets of developing countries, refers to the W orId Bank and the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) as being representative of the two main schools of thought 
on the subject of institutional intervention (Freeman 1993: 117). 
The "institutionalist" school of thought supported by the ILO is based on the idea that 
intervention can prove beneficial to workers as it is efficiency enhancing. The 
implication is that there is not a trade-off between efficiency and equity. 
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Institutionalists contend that labour market intervention is in the interest of social 
justice, and that the principles of justness and fairness apply. As (for example) health 
and safety standards in a workplace are generally regarded as basic human rights, and 
have been formally declared such by the International Labour Organisation, 
governments are expected to introduce legislation to "protect" workers (Freeman 
1993: .117, Islam and Chowdhury 1997: 82). 
The general view of economists presenting the World Bank is that the regulation of 
the labour market only creates unwelcome "distortions". Labour market interventions 
such as minimum wages, social security contributions, unions, etc. are said to impair 
economic growth as they raise both the wage and non-wage costs of labour: " .. .it 
seems likely that labour market interventions and imperfections push actual labour 
cost well above opportunity cost in some settings, and thereby lead to lower 
employment than would otherwise occur. .. " (Berry 1987: 223). 
Advocates of this VIew against intervention have based their arguments on the 
following claims (Freeman 193: 119): 
1. Intervention leads to the misallocation of labour: "distortionists" claim that, in the 
absence of interventions, wages would be set at opportunity cost levels, and that 
employment, work rules and so forth would be based on Pareto-efficient levels. 
Without intervention, the market meets optimal conditions. 
2. Intervention results in wasting resources through rent-seeking: as intervention 
makes it possible to transfer income between different groups, it is possible that 
resources will be directed towards rent-seeking, rather than to activities which will 
raise national output. 
3. Intervention makes it more difficult for an economy to respond to economic 
changes, such as that brought on by an economic shock: it is believed that 
interventions reduce the flexibility of wages and employment, and that it is 
subsequently difficult for the economy to adjust to shocks. For example, should a 
shock occur in an economy where minimum wages have been implemented, it 
would be extremely difficult to adjust wages in order to encourage labour to enter 
other sectors that could help to meet trade balance problems. 
4. As a result of (3), interventions reduce return on investments: if government sets 
wages, the profitability of investments are reduced. Also, should public 
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employment be funded through taxes and fiscal deficits, funds for private 
investment are crowded out. 
In his 1993 paper on the value of institutional interventions in the labour markets of 
developing countries, Freeman notes that, notwithstanding apparently opposing views 
regarding intervention, some World Bank economists do concede that the ILO is 
correct in assuming that a basic need for state intervention does exist. In spite of the 
disagreement with regard to the general perception of the value of labour market 
interventions, there is some common ground between the two opposing viewpoints: 
"The market system is a powerful tool for economic management [but}. .. there may be 
some side effects on economic security and equity that ... give rise to a need for state 
intervention .. .{toJ moderate income inequality and provide some minimum economic 
security" (World Bank 1991: 41-42, as quoted in Freeman 1993: 121). 
Although there is agreement about the outcome that is desired, disagreement 
regarding the way in which this outcome should be achieved (i.e. the type of labour 
standards and labour market policy which would ideally bring about the best results) 
still persists (Plant 1994: 1 0). 
As a result of the different economic viewpoints on intervention, it is necessary to 
look in more detail at specific types of intervention and the empirical evidence that 
supports these. 
4.3 Economic analysiS of specific interventions: 
4.3.1 Collective Bargaining 
Collective bargaining is one of the most popular ways in which labour market 
intervention occurs in industrialised countries, and even to a lesser extent in 
developing countries. In the former group of countries collective bargaining is 
regarded as one of the core labour standards. The ILO strongly supports the practice 
of collective bargaining as it is regarded as being based on a moral imperative: 
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" ... free collective bargaining .. .is the best method of ,determining terms and 
conditions of employment. Access to such mechanisms is regarded as a basic 
human right." (lLO 1990: 39 as quoted in Freeman 1993: 122). 
Collective bargaining is a union-initiated process. Unions act as agents for labour, 
organising large numbers of workers into a single entity or group. The collective 
bargaining power of such a group is stronger than it would have been for individuals, 
and therefore more commensurate to that of the employer. Unions mostly participate 
in collective bargaining with the purpose of negotiating improved conditions of 
employment for their members. This may range from obtaining greater employment 
security, or achieving income equality for workers doing similar work, to simply cash 
wage increases for its members. It should be kept in mind, however, that collective 
bargaining is a two-way process between unions and employers, and consequently 
there is pressure from both parties. As a result of this, the process of collective 
bargaining can be considered a dynamic, ongoing process of negotiation in which 
both sides pursue their own interests. The main aim is to reach a compromise that 
would suit both parties (Bendix 1996: 175, 249; Flanagan 1994: 416; World Bank 
1995: 80). 
Collective bargaining normally varies according to the bargaining relationship and the 
type of bargaining system (e.g. centralised, intermediate, or decentralised). Bargaining 
structure is important as it affects the process of bargaining, bargaining outcomes and 
the roles of unions and management. With respect to the type of bargaining system, 
there are different views that describe the effect of the collective bargaining on wages. 
These views will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Archer (1992: 213) refers to the hypothesis that the relationship between the level of 
bargaining and wage levels is linear. The idea is that a centralised system of collective 
bargaining results in lower inflation and lower levels of unemployment. This is 
ascribed to three reasons: 
• rivalries within unions which are normally present in decentralised systems are 
eliminated in centralised systems; 
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• negotiators involved in centralised bargaining often take the unemployment effect 
of high wages into account, owing to the fact that they have a broader perspective 
of general economic matters; 
• it is less likely that, at centralised level, workers will insist on wages which exceed 
productivity, as it is more difficult to convert wage gains into real wage increases 
at this level. 
Notwithstanding the advantages of centralised bargaining, Erikson, while testing the 
effect of bargaining structures on wage outcomes, in 1990 found that the positive 
returns from formal centralised bargaining declined after about 20 years (Katz 1993: 
11). 
Decentralised and in particular company level bargaining is believed to hold a number 
of advantages. For example, it is easier to lead negotiations at company or plant 
levels; bargaining at company level can help to mobilise workers to pursue company 
goals and increase worker involvement. Also, at company level bargaining enables a 
company to restructure and tailor systems according to the situations prevailing in the 
particular company (Hartog and Theeuwes 1993: 279). 
Another hypothesis put forward holds that the relationship between bargaining and 
wages is hump-shaped: Calmfors and Driffill identified a hump-shaped relation 
between the degree of centralisation and levels of unemployment. Evidence put 
forward by them suggests that both countries with highly centralised and highly 
decentralised institutions perform better economically than "in-between" systems. In 
countries such as Japan and Switzerland, where there is a high degree of 
decentralisation, and countries such as Austria and Sweden, where there is a high 
.. -
degree of centralisation, unemployment is fairly low. In contrast to this, Calmfors and 
Driffill refer to the examples of Germany, the UK, France and Italy, which have so-
called "in-between" systems, and where unemployment is rife (Archer 1992: 214; 
Soskice 1990: 36). 
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Economic changes that serve to promote decentralisation are normally the result of 
the following processes, all of which have resulted in many unions losing their power 
to withstand decentralised collective bargaining (Archer 1992: 214) : 
• technological change 
• increased competition resulting from the lowering of trade barriers 
• the fact that the de-industrialisation process has moved away from manufacturing, 
and towards service industries 
• in many of the major industrial countries there have been political shifts to the 
right. 
A third possibility is that it is in fact the degree of coordination and not the level of 
bargaining which determines the outcome with respect to inflation and 
unemployment. Coordination on both sides of the labour market is regarded as 
important, i.e. intra- and inter-union and employer federations. The problem with 
coordination is that collective action is still necessary to establish the appropriate 
institutions. In an ideal situation, effective coordination would present the best 
possible outcome, namely that "every group settles low, and so avoids a prisoner's 
dilemma among wage bargainers". In countries such as Japan, Switzerland and 
Germany, bargaining remains highly coordinated in spite of that fact that it has 
become more decentralised: there are strong employer's organisations that act as 
restraining factor (Archer 1992: 218). 
Owing to the fact that both the bargaining power of skilled workers in companies and 
company power (relative to the power of employer's organisations) have increased, it 
has become more difficult to effectively co-ordinate wage setting in many economies. 
Soskict: (199o_: __ 48, 52, 58), in _ a study of the changing r~le _ o~ labour_ market 
institutions in industrialised countries, also points out that coordination has become 
more informal since the 1980's. Economic changes, combined with market-orientated 
policies of government, have contributed to the move towards decentralisation in 
many countries. Unions and governments in industrialised countries have to a greater 
extent fallen back into supporting roles, while employee networks and employer 
organisations have become leading actors. 
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4.3.1.1 Country-specific evidence regarding u?ions and collective bargaining: 
Freeman contends that union activity and the level of collective bargaining has an 
important influence over labour market outcomes, particular during periods of 
economic adjustment. Unions not only represent the interests of their members, but 
also help to lower the costs of obtaining infonnation, as this can be divided among a 
large number of employees. Although unions may impede macro economic 
adjustment in some developing countries, studies have shown that, in general, unions 
do not impede the economic growth or perfonnance of developing economies. With 
the move toward globalisation and international competition, it is likely that union 
power will diminish in time (Freeman 1993: l34; Tokman 1993: 146). 
In Germany, most economIC Issues involving labour are governed by collective 
bargaining. The country has strong unions and employers associations, all of which 
have a fair amount of autonomy in concluding collective agreements. Although 
government does not intervene excessively, elaborate labour legislation and detailed 
bargaining regulations are common. Collective bargaining takes place mostly at plant 
and industry levels, although it is also common practice to draw up master labour 
agreements that are negotiated regionally (Hartog 1993: 219, 221; Katz 1993: 8; 
Paque 1993: 209). 
Sweden's relatively centralised bargaining system has resulted in moderate pay 
settlements and relatively low strike frequency. However, national wage bargaining 
was replaced by industry-level bargaining in 1988. There is also evidence suggesting 
that the intensity and depth of firm-level bargaining has been on the increase. During 
recent years a number of firm-level agreements have started to include pay 
mechanisms such as profit sharing that linked worker pay increases to a form of 
worker performance. During the 1980's it was found that large employers favoured a 
move to decentralised collective bargaining mainly as a result of international 
competitive pressures and the need for lower labour costs (Katz 1993: 4). 
In Japan, wage negotiations normally take place at company level. With respect to 
the formulation of wage demands, national confederations and individual federations 
playa particularly important role. If most workers in a certain region are covered by 
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the same collective agreements, the agreement is extended to the same type of 
workers throughout the region. Labour disputes are solved with the help of labour 
commissions. Two laws, both of which contain the procedures for conciliation, 
arbitration and mediation, govern national and local level negotiations. In Japan, as in 
Germany, the perception is that labour market institutions such as the above have 
contributed to better economic growth than what may have otherwise been the case 
(Hartog 1993: 160, 165). 
In Mexico it was found that real wages declined during a period in which union 
strength remained unchanged. In contrast, real wages in Uruguay remained fairly 
stable in spite of an increase in union strength. Evidence on the Bolivian economy 
and labour market suggests that the weakening of union power does not ensure 
economic recovery (Tokman 1993: 146). 
There is general consensus that unions and collective bargaining structures have 
historically been weak in Asian countries. The right to form unions has been strictly 
controlled by governments. Some have even expressly forbidden the formation of 
unions in certain sectors. During times of strong export growth collective bargaining 
grew but this took place under strict government control. 
Plant (1994: 80) argues that because unions have historically been weak, and this has 
also been the case at the time that colonial powers withdrew from Asia, post colonial 
governments in a number of Asian countries were successful in retaining control of 
the labour movement through corporatist institutions and laws. Plant (1994: 79) also 
notes that the neoclassical view of Asian labour markets holds that export led 
industrialisation prospered because it avoided government regulation of labour 
standards. By keeping wages relatively low, labour intensive exports became more 
competitive. 
In an extreme VIew of labour standards, or rather the lack of this in Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan and China, Gary Fields (as cited in Plant 1994: 79) contends that 
the abuse of labour standards is in the eye of the beholder. Those who judge standards 
by the process through which it is implemented, i.e. the lack of collective bargaining 
and protective legislation, would see it as abuse. However, people who are concerned 
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with the outcome of this, and who prefer to focus on the objectives such as the 
achievement of full employment and the creation of new jobs, will view the lack or 
limited coverage of labour standards in a positive light. 
Country-specific evidence on union activity and collective bargaining in the East 
Asian countries of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, China and Taiwan in the 1980's is 
limited. However, a study conducted on the Korean labour market in 1991 found that 
the suppression of organised labour could be associated with high accident rates and 
produced a disgruntled work force in spite of rising wages (Freeman 1993: 133). In 
Korea, where the power of organised labour is limited and the right to strike was 
banned in 1971, unions need prior permission from government to participate in 
collective bargaining. As a result of these restrictions on organised labour it comes as 
no surprise that various studies conducted during the early 1980's found that unions 
had no significant effect on relative wage levels in the country (Mazumdar 1993: 
551). 
As is the case in Korea, labour unions in Malaysia also have limited power. In some 
sectors of the economy collective action had even been forbidden until recently. In 
Malaysia the overall effect of unionisation is perceived as having been positive, in 
spite of higher wages and slightly lower employment. Mazumdar (1993: 478) found 
that the behaviour of real wages in Malaysia bears very little relation to both cyclical 
upswings and downswings in the economy. 
Plant (1994: 89) contends that many Latin American governments have effectively 
formulated their own development policies, and then created labour relations systems 
which they considered to be most appropriate for their particular development 
policies. This is thought to have contributed to the highly paternalistic and 
protectionist policies still found in many of these countries until recently. For many 
decades unions and workers in Latin American countries therefore accepted and even 
expected state intervention, and subsequently the role of collective bargaining was 
limited. In many of these countries, however, the legal framework for collective 
bargaining has generally remained inadequate as it either provides for bargaining only 
at enterprise level, or for no obligation to negotiate. During more recent decades, 
however, there appears to have been a reduction in the regulatory control exercised by 
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government. This is believed to have been in response to changing economic and 
market conditions, and the fact that new economic conditions demand a more flexible 
approach to regulating labour relations as low as enterprise level. The presence of 
unions and collective bargaining has already had a significant effect on management 
in enterprises, as these institutions act as measures of self-regulation. In a number of 
countries governments have gone as far as to largely withdraw from the process of 
conflict resolution between unions and employers. This should, however, not be 
viewed as an actual withdrawal of the state, but rather as a change in the way it which 
the state exercises its regulatory powers and meets its responsibilities (Plant 1994: 
89). 
In Argentina there are strong labour unions but also strong oligopolistic companies 
producing for the domestic market. One main union per area of activity is normally 
chosen to bargain on behalf of the rest. Wages and working conditions are determined 
centrally through a process of negotiation between national unions and employers, 
although government involvement in this process is considerable. Riveros and 
Sanchez (1994: 80) are of the opinion that it is necessary to decentralise bargaining 
and to drastically reduce the extent of government intervention if the country wants to 
be successful in adjusting its economy by way of reducing public expenditure, 
deregulating, privatising and liberalising trade. 
Brazil is an example of a developing country of which the institutional structures 
appear to be very similar to the corporatist type of welfare state regime identified in 
some of the industrialised countries. During the late 1980's Brazil liberalised its 
collective bargaining relations by decentralising it to enterprise level, following 
political liberalisation brought on by a series of violent strikes. Formal wage 
agreements are bargained once per year and the high inflation rate has a particularly 
strong impact on negotiations. However, as all negotiated settlements remain subject 
to the national wage policy, the process of collective bargaining has had only limited 
value. The fact that bargaining is carried out at a local level, but enforced nationally, 
is believed to have been a major factor contributing to very disappointing 
macroeconomic results during the past decade or so. Fox, Amandeo and Camargo 
(1994: 156) contend that the national enforcement of "decentralised" agreements did 
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not take into account national macroeconomIC concerns, thereby increasing the 
rigidity ofthe labour market. 
During the past 20 years there has also been a trend towards the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining in other South American countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Panama (Plant 1994: 88). 
Evidence from Chile and Uruguay suggests that tripartite collective bargaining 
agreements were important instruments during times of economic and political 
transition, as such agreements helped to legitimise the rules of the game for the 
collective actors involved. This enhanced certainty in the economy and encouraged 
investment and consequently employment (Tokman 1993: 146). 
It appears that the labour standards in place in many of the African countries have 
been heavily influenced by former colonial models. Contrary to what is the case in 
many of the Francophone countries, the greater flexibility in the approach to 
colle'Ctive bargaining of the former British colonies can be traced back to the colonial 
influence of the United Kingdom. 
In countries where opposition parties have been outlawed by ruling regimes, unions 
for many years were often the only organisations that cut across tribal lines. In 
general, unions in African countries represent less than 10% of the economically 
active population (Plant 1994: 91). 
In Africa in general the role and impact of unions and collective bargaining appears to 
be changing. With democratisation becoming popular in a number of countries, the 
level of government involvement in labour issues has declined In a number of 
countries. Although unions have generally become more active as result of the 
somewhat reduced level of government intervention, coupled with the fact that the 
idea of tripartism is becoming more popular, union membership in Africa has fallen 
since the late 1980's. This has been ascribed mainly to the fact that unions have not 
had enough bargaining power to protect the living standards of their members, even 
though retrenchments in the civil service (in many countries the result of structural 
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adjustment programs) and a fall in real incomes as result of inflationary pressures 
were beyond union control (Plant 1994: 91). 
Country-specific evidence on Kenya suggests that collective bargaining forms the 
basis of the industrial relations system in this country. Although the wages of small-
scale agricultural workers are determined by the market forces of supply and demand, 
wages in the public and commercial sectors are determined by Industrial Court wage 
guidelines. Collective agreements cover all workers employed in unionised 
establishments, irrespective of whether they are union members or not. The average 
wage rate increases determined through bargained agreements have been found to be 
below the actual targets stipulated in government policy guidelines (i.e. that wage 
adjustments be attached to the cost of living index, and that wage agreements cover a 
minimum period of two years). In spite of negotiated settlements real wages have 
been declining since 1982 (Milne and Neitzert 1994: 405). 
Tanzania is an example of where government stepped in to stem the growth of union 
bargaining power. The main aim was to stop the high wage trend during the 1960's 
which resulted from the introduction of an income policy after independence. Since 
the 1980's however there have been a dramatic decline in formal sector wage levels in 
Tanzania, and vast numbers of civil servants have lost their jobs through 
retrenchment advised under structural adjustment programs (Plant 1994: 93) 
In Zimbabwe, direct government intervention in wage fixing was replaced by 
collective bargaining for all sectors except farm workers and domestic workers (Plant 
1994: 94). 
-- .-
Closer to home, Archer (1992: 215) looked at the situatIon regarding bargaining 
structures and coordination in South Africa. He found that the level of coordination 
varied between industries, with an apparently fairly high level of coordination in the 
motor industry. He also found that one of the major obstacles in the way of 
synchronised bargaining in the country is the politicised nature of the trade unions that 
could be considered a threat to synchronised bargaining. The position of capital, 
however, is also very politicised. Industry level bargaining has become more popular 
among many of the major sectors in the economy. It appears as if South African 
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employers prefer small bargaining units which only include individual employers and 
plant / company-level representation from the side of the workers. Decentralisation, 
and not coordination, seems to be the ideal. 
4.3.1.2 Summary of evidence on union activity and collective bargaining: 
Evidence on collective bargaining in industrialised countries indicates that there has 
been a discernible trend towards decentralisation, although this has taken place to 
different degrees in different countries. The frequency and importance of plant level 
bargaining in particular has risen considerably. (Hartog and Theeuwes 1993: 427; 
Katz 1993: 4) One of the main forces behind this move towards decentralisation has 
been the pressure of increasing international competition and the resulting need to 
keep labour costs as low as possible. Countries such as Sweden, where centralised 
bargaining had actually resulted in moderate pay increases and few strikes, have 
followed the examples of Germany and Japan, where decentralisation of bargaining is 
believed to have contributed to the increase in general economic growth. The latter 
two countries have extensive collective bargaining procedures that include laws on 
dispute procedures. 
Collective bargaining procedures have also been used extensively in developing 
countries. The introduction of well-defined bargaining channels in countries such as 
Chile and Uruguay appear to have enhanced labour relations by means of increasing 
certainty, stability and synchronisation in the economies with regard to the activities 
of organised labour. This has been one of the factors which have contributed to 
drawing foreign investors. 
In spite of collective bargaining delivering mostly positive results, Kenya is an 
example of a country where negotiated settlements have resulted in wage increases 
lower than formally advocated by government. This might, however, have resulted 
from the fact that worker representatives had not done their homework, that 
government policy guidelines were not in line with actual wage movements in the 
economy and / or that the cost of living index was not a fair reflection of actual 
economic circumstances. 
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Similar to Kenya, collective bargaining in Brazil has had disappointing 
macroeconomic results as it had been subject to a national wage policy and locally 
bargained agreements had been enforced nationally. 
It is difficult to comment on the degree of bargaining coordination in developing 
countries generally due to a lack of evidence. In all likelihood, coordination in most of 
these countries will differ from industry to industry, as it does in South Africa. Given 
the lack of strong employer organisations and in some cases also the lack of strong 
organised labour forces, it seems unlikely that the level of coordination can be high in 
many of these countries. 
Evidence reviewed in this section indicates that union activity does not have such a 
significant influence on wages and economic growth as many think. In Far Eastern 
countries such as Korea, where union activity had been restricted, labour problems 
have arisen in spite of rising wages. In Mexico real wages declined in spite of union 
strength remaining unchanged, while an increase in union strength in Uruguay did not 
result in an increase in wages. 
In spite of the above evidence pointing out that union activity does not necessarily 
have significant negative effects on an economy, it is likely that union power will 
inevitably diminish as the need for companies to become internationally more 
competitive intensifies. 
In summary then, it would appear that collective bargaining in industrialised countries 
has been successful because it has provided workers with an extensive set of rules 
through which they could bargain for better wages and working conditions. It has 
become popular in developing countries for the same reasons, albeit not yet as widely 
nor as successfully implemented as in industrialised countries. In many developing 
countries organised labour is not very strong and therefore perhaps politically unable 
to exert sufficient pressure on government to provide collective bargaining 
procedures. Also, in some countries where it had been implemented the effect had 
been weakened as a result of other non-complementary policies. 
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Based on the above, developing countries could opt for putting III place and 
developing collective bargaining legislation, including legislation on dispute 
procedures. This is arguably the best possible way to ensure that workers and 
employers follow established channels and a coordinised route for negotiations, 
instead of resorting to informal measures which could contribute to economic 
uncertainty. Established procedures will prove advantageous both during periods of 
"normal" economic activity and periods of adjustment. In line with the international 
trend, decentralised bargaining may be preferable to centralised bargaining. 
4.3.2 Minimum Wages 
Minimum wages have not been used extensively in industrialised countries. The 
reasons for this differ, but arguably of most importance is the fact that such countries 
in general appear to have well developed alternative means for ensuring that workers 
receive fair wages, the fact that income inequality in society is much less of a problem 
than in many developing countries, and the fact that most industrialised countries have 
extensive social security nets supplementing income of people in marginalised groups. 
Many authors who have focused on the "negative" side of introducing a minimum 
wage, consider it as the "textbo.ok" case of how government intervention misallocates 
resources, as it is widely perceived to reduce employment (Freeman 1993: 126). 
Efficiency wage theory states that employment could initially decline as a result of the 
introduction of a minimum wage. It may however also imply that an increase in an 
existing minimum wage will not necessarily result in further employment reductions, 
if p~~ductivity i~ related to wage levels. If very low wages are increased, productivity 
may also rise as the willingness and capacity of workers to work may improve in 
correspondence to a decline in industrial disputes and an improvement in the morale 
of workers. Therefore, if wages rise but labour productivity also rises concurrently, 
labour costs in relation to output may decline and employment would not fall (ILO 
1981:157). 
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Minimum wages can also affect regional inequality, as certain regions in which the 
economy performs well normally generate higher wage levels and higher productivity 
than others. This result in industries relocating to regions that are less developed, and 
where wage costs are lower. However, should wage levels in these less developed 
regions be institutionally set at levels which are the same as that in more developed 
regions, there would not be an incentive for employers to relocate, as it would not be 
profitable to do so. It has also been noted that minimum wage legislation which raise 
production costs and thereby exacerbate high unemployment could force more 
workers to take up activities in the informal sector and increase competition in that 
sector. This could result in the wages of the working poor being lowered even further 
(Mazumdar 1989: 99; World Bank 1995: 74). 
Following independence in many former African colonies, governments increasingly 
intervened in the labour market because they felt that the private sector was unable to 
develop stable labour systems and address inequality. The main objective behind the 
minimum wage was " ... to correct the imbalance in the compensation of supervisors 
and workers" that was typical prior to independence from former "colonial" rulers, 
and to "help stabilise work forces and hence make them more productive ... " 
(Mazumdar 1989: 48, 99). As many African governments were of the opinion that 
raising wages was the only way to achieve economic stability, minimum wages were 
implemented in a number of countries. In many developing countries· governments 
have also implemented minimum wages in the formal wage sector in the hope that 
such a move would improve the way in which the urban labour market operates. One 
could however argue that it is not clear exactly how the introduction of this could 
improve the functioning of urban labour markets. 
In any discussion concerning minimum wages in developing countries it is important 
to take into account that most of the poorest workers in developing countries operate 
in informal and rural markets and that they are consequently not covered by minimum 
wage legislation. The earnings of urban formal sector workers, the only ones 
protected by the set wages, already exceed that of the majority. As the formal sectors 
of virtually all the developing countries are comparatively small and the capacity to 
enforce formal labour standards is weak, labour standards only protect the small 
number of formal sector workers. Those outside of the formal labour force usually 
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benefit more from public attempts to improve the working environment m the 
"excluded" sectors. Such attempts normally encompass the improvement of sanitary 
conditions, and the provision of drinking water (World Bank 1995: 75-77). 
Freeman (1993: 129) asserts that minimum wage rates are used for worker protection 
when the cost in terms ofloss of employment is fairly low, but that the enforcement of 
such wage regulation is relaxed during periods when this cost in terms of loss of 
employment is high. 
Enforcement of legislation pertaining to mInImUm labour standards remams a 
particularly serious problem with regard to smaller enterprises. Owing to weak 
enforcement, few enterprises are motivated to comply with the legislated minimum 
wage rate. Enforcement is weak owing to the lack of personnel, the lack of equipment, 
and the high occurrence of bribery. Given the constraints upon the resources and 
capacity of governments in developing countries to enforce labour standards, unions 
and civic organisations can act as watchdogs and thereby fulfil an important role in 
the enforcement of regulations. It has been shown that unions in industrialised 
countries fulfil an important role in ensuring that employers comply with set standards 
However, in many developing countries unions are too weak to fulfill a monitoring 
function, nor are there sufficient government workers to police the implementation. 
Also, it should be noted that adherence to protection of wages to a large extent also 
depends on the goodwill of employers (ILO 1982: 106; World Bank 1995: 77). 
Possible ways to increase the level of compliance entails allocating more manpower 
and financial resources in order to allow for more regular labour inspections and 
reforming the legal administration of the enforcement (ILO 1981: 140). 
Guhan (1994: 45) suggests that, in spite of the disadvantages associated with the 
minimum wage, the following measures that could boost the effective implementation 
of minimum wages could be considered: 
• the wide dissemination of information regarding mInImUm wages, as well as 
penalties for employers who do not comply 
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• emphasis on mimmum wage enforcement for time-bound activities, e.g. 
harvesting 
• the improvement of enforcement measures 
• the establishment of committees (including both male and female workers) which 
can monitor wages 
• encouragement ofNGO's who work on this field 
• public works programs 
Although the criteria for fixing a minimum wage vary enormously among countries, 
the following aspects should be taken into account: the needs of workers and their 
families, the wages and incomes of other groups in the country, the capacity of 
companies to pay a minimum wage, as well as the general requirements of economic 
development (ILO 1981: 95). 
4.3.2.1 Country-specific evidence regarding minimum wages: 
Countries such as Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Switzerland all have 
well-developed systems of collective bargaining and in some cases also collective 
agreement extension procedures which cover a high percentage of all wage and salary 
earners. Given that most workers therefore have had access to an instrument that 
could be used to their advantage in the process of wage determination, there has been 
little need for introducing extensive minimum wages (ILO 1981: 4). 
Even though the mInImUm wage has been implemented in some industrialised 
countries, evidence suggests that its application is limited to a fairly small number of 
wor~ers and therefore its influence has been minimal. Empirical studies in the OECD 
countries, for example, indicate that minimum wages have had only a modest effect 
on overall employment. Instead of using minimum wages to address a problem such 
as poverty, the OECD Ministerial Council suggested the use of wage subsidies for 
low-income families (Sohlman and Turnham 1994: 50). 
In the USA, where extensive evaluations have been made of the impact of minimum 
wages, the evidence has been contradictory. Special surveys have concluded that the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
93 
minimum wage does not significantly reduce employment, but other reports with a 
stronger focus on econometric analysis have concluded that the minimum wage does 
in fact reduce employment (lLO 1981:160). Neumark and Wascher (1992: 55, 80), in 
a reassessment of evidence on the effects of the minimum wage on employment in the 
USA, found that, for example, an increase of 10% in the minimum wage result in a 
1 % to 2% fall in teenage employment, and one of 1.5% to 2% in the employment of 
young adults. The article supported the conventional view of the effects of a minimum 
wage. Neumark and Wascher presented evidence suggesting that the effect of 
minimum wages on employment is particularly clear after approximately two years, 
but already discernible within one year. They also noted that many teenagers are paid 
sub-minimum wages in states where it is legally allowed, and that such sub-minimum 
wages moderate the minimum wage dis-employment effect on working teenagers. In 
response to the findings of Neumark and Wascher, Card, Katz and Krueger (1994: 
487, 496) claim that minimum wages did not have a significant effect on teenage 
employment during the 1970's and 1980's. The authors suggest that aspects such as 
mobility costs, the "match-quality" of firms and workers, and efficiency wages, all of 
which are being researched for "skilled" employees, should also be considered when 
research is carried out on "less-skilled" employees. 
It was found during a household survey in Mexico in 1988 that 16% of male informal 
sector employees and 66% of female employees in various sectors were paid less than 
required by the minimum wage. This was also the case in Morocco, where half of the 
firms approached in a survey during 1986 were paying their workers less than the 
minimum wage (Freeman 1993: 126). 
During the 1940's most Latin American countries introduced minimum wages. In 
most of these countries this move was preceded by the adoption of constitutional 
provisions that recognised the right of workers to earn wages which would ensure 
them of a decent standard of living (ILO 1981: 7). 
Research on minimum wages in 14 Latin American and African countries indicated 
that the relationship between the change in the real minimum wage and the change in 
the real average wage (during the 1970's and the 1980's) were statistically 
insignificant. The authors concluded that the minimum wage appeared to have little to 
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no impact, although it has to be noted that they only had limited time-series data to 
deal with. Also, when economic problems arose during the 1980's, minimum wages 
fell significantly in a large number of the countries reviewed. As wages declined 
substantially, it was also found that institutions did not impair the structural 
adjustment programs that were implemented in many Latin American countries 
during the debt crisis and the world wide economic recession of the 1980's. This 
indicates that even if a minimum wage is considered to be a distortionary regulation, it 
had in fact proved to be flexible enough to adjust to economic change. At the same 
time the fact that the minimum wage does not distort the labour market seriously 
could be interpreted as that it has only a limited effect (Freeman 1993: 128, 132; 
Tokman 1993: 146). 
Tokman (1993: 145, 146) also refers to the example of Latin American countries 
where the average hourly labour cost in the manufacturing sector is some 10 times 
lower than in the USA, and also lower than in countries such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore. As minimum wages in many developing countries are at such low levels 
at present it is unlikely that they will negatively affect the international 
competitiveness of the product. The reasons he cites for the deterioration in the 
minimum wage levels are inflation trends, the fact that the bargaining power of unions 
has become weaker, and the implementation of policies specifically directed at 
stabilisation and adjustment, which at the same time required the abandonment of 
minimum wages. 
Another study on minimum wages in twelve Latin American countries (covering the 
period 1966 to 1977) found that minimum wages in general have become less 
effective than in the past: in real terms minimum wages either remained unchanged or 
even declined (ILO 1981 :7). 
In developing countries such as Puerto Rico, where the minimum wage was adjusted 
upwards on a fairly regular basis, it was found that, relative to output, employment 
was reduced significantly. Minimum wages compelled employers to shift their focus 
to production methods that would save labour. With each minimum wage increase 
there is likely to be new attempts directed at finding labour-saving production 
methods. Thus minimum wage increases, and the consequent move towards labour-
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savmg production methods, reduce employment (Freeman 1993: 126; Mazumdar 
1989: 49). 
Latin American countries are good examples of how minimum wages had been 
implemented in economies with high inflation rates. In many of these countries 
governments have started to turn to wage indexation schemes, as nominal wages had 
to be adjusted regularly to avoid real wages from eroding. Mazumdar (1989: 51, 52) 
also contends that, as wages do not immediately adjust to price changes, real wages 
will not necessarily be kept constant by a full indexation. Average real wages will 
decline when inflation accelerates, as there is a time lag between price increases and 
the corresponding adjustment of labour contracts. The opposite of this also holds true, 
namely that a deceleration of inflation will contribute to increases in the average real 
wage. 
It can be gathered from the previous two paragraphs that inflation is arguably one of 
the most important factors influencing the frequency of adjustments in Latin 
American countries. In countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay 
adjustments are made once to twice 'per annum. However, in most other Latin 
American countries adjustments are very irregular. Evidence on countries such as 
Chile suggests no connection between an upward adjustment of the minimum wage 
and the aggregate level of employment (ILO 1981: 119). 
Minimum wages today still form an important part of the national system of wage 
determination in many Latin American countries, in spite of the fact that their 
implementation appears to have produced mixed results. The disappointing results 
have to a large extent been attributed to the fact that legislation and administration had 
not been in step and that in many cases the machinery which had been formally 
established has not been applied in practice (ILO 1981: 7). 
Minimum wages are not used extensively in Asian countries. In countries such as 
Malaysia and Burma, minimum wages have been introduced but have limited 
coverage. Similarly, only a small portion of the non-agricultural labour force is 
covered by a minimum wage in countries such as India, Fiji, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh (ILO 1981: 11). 
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In Sri Lanka the minimum wage has become the "maximum" wage, although higher 
wages are being paid in companies where strong unions are present, or where labour 
skills are in short supply. In this country the minimum wage is considered an 
"inferior" form of collective bargaining (ILO 1981: 30). 
In Africa the minimum wage has been implemented since the 1950's. Former British 
colonies in particular have followed the example of the United Kingdom's 1945 
Wages Council Act and the 1918 Trade Boards Act. These acts entailed that in cases 
where the relevant Minister was convinced that no adequate machinery existed for 
determining remuneration, wage councils and wage boards were established. This 
system still prevails in countries such as Zimbabwe and Kenya (ILO 1981: 9). 
Zimbabwe and Botswana are two countries in the Southern African region which 
have implemented minimum wages. In Zimbabwe, minimum wages and wage 
ceilings (maximum wages) were some of the ways in which the government 
attempted to address inequalities in the labour market in the early 1980's. There were 
three broad objectives behind the implementation of the minimum wage: "to reverse 
the colonial income disparities, improve the living standards of the working poor and 
finally, narrow wage differentials". It was hoped that the introduction of a minimum 
wage in Zimbabwe would increase the wages of the lowest paid workers in the 
economy, compared to the poverty datum line. In addition to the social advantages of 
a minimum wage, higher wages were also considered as an incentive to raise 
productivity (Fallon 1987: 23). 
The large minimum wage increases implemented in Zimbabwe after independence 
initially had a significant upward impact on wage structures. The minimum wage was 
revised annually during the first ten years following independence, but proved 
unsuccessful in alleviating poverty. This was attributed to the fact that the initial link 
between minimum wages and the poverty datum line was abandoned shortly after its 
implementation, which resulted in the minimum wages lagging behind the poverty 
datum line (Ncube 1993: 6). 
The negative affect of minimum wages on employment of young people in particular 
caused considerable concern in Zimbabwe, as unemployment was already 
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concentrated among the young, particularly those with little education. Since 
minimum wages were introduced, there has been a conspicuous decline in the number 
of apprenticeship positions offered by the private sector in Zimbabwe. In addition to 
this, a minimum wage reduces the incentive for many employers to provide or pay for 
training to an employee (Fallon 1987: 24). 
Minimum wages were set in Botswana in 1974. One important aim was that it would 
not be much higher than the average income of farmers in the rural areas, thereby 
reducing the incentive for rural-urban migration, a particularly acute problem in 
Botswana. 
Scoville and Nyamadzabo (1988: introduction) tried to assess the impact of minimum 
wages in Botswana, but noted that, since the appropriate wage and employment series 
data were not available, they were unable to estimate the loss of employment 
opportunities associated with every increase in the minimum wage. Furthermore they 
advised that instead of basing the minimum wage level on the income levels of rural 
farmers, the Poverty Datum Line should be emphasised. The problem with using rural 
incomes was that real and nominal incomes in· agriculture were falling. This, and the 
presence of price inflation, made it extremely difficult to adjust formaVurban wages. 
They also concluded that a gap had arisen between the minimum wage level and the 
target value for those wages, and that this, in turn, partly eroded the Incomes Policy's 
foundation. 
Owners of larger enterprises in Botswana gave the following reasons for not reducing 
employment as a result of the introduction of a minimum wage (Scoville and 
Nyamadzabo 1988: 41, 42): 
• government increased the money available for construction projects, hence profit 
margins of construction companies were not reduced by the introduction of the 
minimum wage; 
• the labour costs of many of the larger firms were subsidised by way of receiving 
"Financial Assistance Policy" payments from government, which to a significant 
extent offset wage costs; 
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• as most employees in the larger firms were skilled people, virtually all of them 
were already being paid wages well above the newly introduced minimum levels; 
• notwithstanding the costly impact of minimum wages, many employers felt they 
had a social responsibility to help create employment. 
Scoville and Nyamadzabo also found that employers considered other problems such 
as that pertaining to transport, regulations and supply problems to be greater obstacles 
to increasing employment in the country, than the minimum wage. 
It was also found that smaller enterprises seldom complied with the minimum wage as 
they were financially simply unable to do so. Botswana also has a problem with 
enforcement of minimum wage regulation, as is evident from the fall in the number of 
inspections being carried out (Scoville and Nyamadzabo 1988: 41). 
In 1996 a controversial ILO country review of the South African labour market was 
published. Herein the authors, Standing and Sender, among other things strongly 
advocate a drastic reduction of wage and consequently income differentials in South 
Africa. In a discussion of the minimum and social wage, they list a number of 
arguments which had previously been made in favour of a national minimum wage. 
These include the following: economic growth will not be encouraged if a large 
percentage of workers earn "poverty" wages, nor will it be encouraged by a 
segmented labour force. Huge wage differentials will stand in the way of restructuring 
production; and a national minimum wage could raise the labour productivity of the 
lowest wage earners by way of discouraging absenteeism, illness and labour turnover. 
The authors further refer to an earlier report on the desirability of a national minimum 
wage done by Levy and Associates, and confirm the latter's argument that 
"international evidence on the impact of minimum wages on employment, 
unemployment and poverty was inconclusive". They go further by expressing their 
expectation that, notwithstanding certain criticism against the introduction of 
mInImUm wages, sectoral minimum wages were likely to be introduced in more 
sectors of the economy, and suggested that vulnerable groups "excluded" from these 
sectors be incorporated in unions and non-governmental organisations that have active 
roles in both national and regional bargaining institutions. Furthermore they agree 
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with the conclusion of the Levy study that the monitoring and enforcement of a 
minimum wage would in fact result in the ineffective spending of public money. Also, 
although the minimum wage does have standard setting potential, it is unlikely that it 
will have a significant effect on real wages. Rather than focusing too much on the 
minimum wage, Standing and Sender suggest focusing on the issue of a social wage, 
which entails ensuring a minimum income that will satisfy the "socially determined 
subsistence level of living". They argue that the concept of a social wage will become 
increasingly relevant as labour relations adjust to the globalisation of the world 
economy (Standing and Sender 1996: 211). 
In many former French colonies in West Africa, the minimum wage has either been 
abandoned or applied irregularly during recent decades. In Nigeria (where the 
minimum wage was formally abolished) and Ghana the lowest wage set for 
government employees has served as a de facto minimum wage. The private sector 
has based its wages on this wage (ILO 1981: 9). 
In Tanzania a national minimum wage was implemented in 1963. However, in order 
to avoid a decline in employment, it was not adjusted until 1969, and then only 
modestly. Since the onset of inflationary pressures in the 1970's it has been adjusted 
more or less every two years, but this does not appear to have been adequate to 
maintain the real value of the wage (ILO 1981: 52). 
Other countries such as Zaire, the Sudan and Kenya have also introduced minimum 
wages, even though the levels and the coverage have differed vastly. For example, in 
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) a general minimum wage is fixed 
for each of the different geographical zones in the country, where the wage level has 
been in line with the average cost of living in the respective zones. In the Sudan the 
minimum wage is enforced only on companies in major urban areas that employ ten 
or more workers, while in Kenya there are minimum wages in thirteen different 
industries (ILO 1981: 10, 30). 
In Mauritius the experience with minimum wages for male workers in the Export 
Processing Zone has indicated that the enforcement of the minimum wage led to a 
distinct fall in male employment, and a corresponding rise in the employment of 
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females. Once the government eliminated the male minimum wage, the recruitment of 
males increased sharply, and some 95% of the "newly" employed males were paid 
less than the former minimum wage level (World Bank 1995: 75). 
As is evident from the earlier discussion, one of the important issues that have 
contributed to the failure of minimum wages in many developing countries concerns 
the enforcement of such legislation. In spite of having been formally established in 
many countries, minimum wages have not been enforced successfully in a great 
number of these countries - as most developing nations lack the financial and 
administrative capacity to enforce minimum wage regulation. When the set wage 
level is particularly high, the incentive for non-compliance is very strong (World 
Bank 1995: 75; Kouadio Benie 1989: 13). In the World Development Report (World 
Bank 1995: 74, 75) it is also suggested that a rise in the minimum wage in developing 
countries only serves as increased incentive to employers and employees to avoid it. 
Consequently it does not have a significant effect on employment or on wages. 
A study of Latin American countries in general concluded that about 25% or more of 
urban workers earned less than the legislated minimum wage. However, about 80% of 
workers who receive less than the minimum wage belong to the informal sector (ILO 
1981: 138-140). 
In Colombia a study using data from 1970-1974 indicated that about 10% of the 
workforce in urban areas earned less than the minimum wage. Another study in 1983 
found that 4.7% of large manufacturing companies did not comply with minimum 
wage legislation. 
In Sub-Saharan African countries non-compliance is also a problem. For example, 
in Niger a study conducted among 300 informal sector enterprises found that 293 did 
not comply with a minimum wage, while a similar study in Swaziland concluded that 
242 out of290 enterprises were non-compliant (Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput 1997: 
119). 
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4.3.2.2. Summary of evidence on minimum wages: 
Although minimum wages may under some circumstances be useful in industrialised 
countries, they are not popular in these countries as extensive collective bargaining 
procedures already exist for use in wage negotiations. 
The minimum wage debate in transitional economies has focused on restructuring 
the economy, and reallocating labour from sectors which are not performing well to 
more dynamic sectors. It has been found that minimum wages can in fact slow relative 
wage adjustments during transitional periods (World Bank 1995: 76). 
In developing countries in both Africa and Latin America collective bargaining 
procedures are still lacking or have not yet been fully developed. Collective 
bargaining structures and unions are sometimes too weak to provide a satisfactory 
system for fixing wages, hence the reliance on the minimum wage. If one assumes 
that collective bargaining is normally practiced by strong unions with well informed 
members, a minimum wage could serve to protect lower skilled workers with limited 
knowledge. This could contribute to avoiding worker exploitation and to ensuring fair 
wages. 
It is very difficult to isolate the effect of the minimum wages as other economic 
factors do not remain constant. The effect of a minimum wage depends on the 
structure of the market, the actual level of the minimum wage and the enforcement of 
the wage level (World Bank 1995: 74). 
In developing countries the basic role and purpose of minimum wage differ markedly, 
as does the level of the minimum wage rates fixed, the frequency of adjustments and 
the way in which the minimum wage is administered. 
Studies on a number of Latin American and African countries have suggested that real 
minimum wage changes in general have had little or no impact on real average wage 
levels. Even during times of economic adjustment in Latin America the minimum 
wages had adjusted easily, thereby creating an impression of flexibility under 
economic pressure. It also showed that it is not the ideal instrument to ensure that real 
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wages for the lowest wage workers do not decline during times of economic 
difficulty. 
The extensive use of the minimum wage in Latin American countries in particular 
points to the slow growth of labour unions and collective bargaining, as well as the 
relatively high number of people earning formal wages compared to the case in a 
great number of other developing countries. In countries where collective bargaining 
either does not exist or is only in the first stages of development, the minimum wage 
can serve as substitute for the collective bargaining process. However, minimum 
wages are likely to become less important as collective bargaining agreements 
develop and their coverage becomes broader in scope. 
Whereas the mmlmum wage to a large extent appears to have been a political 
response to income inequalities brought on by colonialism in African countries, many 
Latin American countries appear to have favoured the minimum wage for the 
important role it can play in protecting incomes eroded by the high inflation common 
to most Latin American countries. 
To administer and enforce a national minimum wage is virtually impossible in any 
developing country, mainly because of the lack of financial resources to finance it. If 
a country wants to introduce a minimum wage it should be restricted to sectors 
representing the very lowest wage workers such as those in the agricultural sector. 
However, even this would be very difficult to monitor given the large number of 
people working in this sector and the fact that many such workers also receive fringe 
benefits such as housing, food, etc. which are difficultto quantify. 
If a government is convinced of the need for a minimum wage, the costs and benefits 
related to the implementation of minimum wages should be thoroughly assessed 
before the minimum wage is introduced. It has also been noted that minimum wage 
legislation which raises production costs and thereby exacerbates high unemployment 
could force more workers to take up activities in the informal sector and increase 
competition in that sector. This could result in the wages of the working poor being 
lowered even further (Mazumdar 1989: 99; World Bank 1995: 74). There appears to 
be a need to strike a balance between social gains achieved through increasing the 
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wage of the lowest paid workers, and the costs relating to a decline in employment, 
slower economic growth and/or rising inflation. 
4.3.3 Social Security 
In industrialised nations the growmgemphasis on social welfare after the Great 
Depression of the 1930's contributed a great deal to the development of social 
protection schemes. Today, social security is not only viewed as a source of income 
security, particularly during times of economic difficulty, but also as a means of 
reducing inequalities and integrating societies (Mazumdar 1989: 54, 56). 
Different countries implement different strategies to ensure income security because 
family support mechanisms, the size of the infonnal sector as well as the expectations 
of the general population regarding the extent of government support are all factors 
which differs significantly among countries (World Bank 1995: 113). 
High money wages plus extensive state transfers and increasing company and private 
insurance benefits have been characteristic of industrialised economies (while income 
transfers from family and community has shrunk to a very small proportion of average 
income). 
Income security comes from five main sources: direct money wage plus indirect / 
fringe benefits from the employer; provision by employer for contingency risks such 
as illness; state transfers; transfers from relatives; and transfers from community 
members (Standing and Sender 1996: 213). Income security is high if workers have 
their wage income protected from fluctuating too wildly by way of the indexation of 
wage levels, collective bargaining or other institutional protection measures (Standing 
1991: 29). 
Losing an existing source of income is arguably one of the greatest risks faced by any 
worker. However, such risk is difficult to ensure against even in countries with well-
developed and strong economies. The role of social security as a hedge against 
unemployment is twofold: not only must it provide protection during times in which 
the labour market functions "nonnally", but it must also provide an income to persons 
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affected by unemployment during periods of economIC reform. However, as 
unemployment is constantly present in the labour markets of virtually all 
industrialised and developing countries, permanent and efficient systems need to be 
developed and implemented (ILO newsletter 1993: 11). 
Unemployment and family status are the two characteristics most likely to be linked 
to poverty and therefore targeted extensively in many industrial countries. Some 
countries advocate forms of self-targeting, for example attaching benefits 
conditionally to public sector employment. This may be useful during transitional 
times albeit not something that will improve long term job prospects. Evidence from 
the formerly centrally planned industrial economies suggests that old age pensioners 
are a more influential group than the unemployed. In Central and Eastern Europe most 
reform strategies had to strike a balance between short term poverty alleviation 
objectives during times of transition, which entailed unemployment benefits and 
severance pay, and longer term objectives such as pensions (World Bank 1995: 113). 
Most large enterprises provide non-wage social benefits such as housing, health care 
and education. Evidence suggests that in some cases non-wage benefits and services 
can amount to as much as 35% of the total labour costs of an enterprise. The pressure 
brought on by globalisation has resulted in these benefits being considered by many as 
non-wage labour costs which, through their rigid nature, present an unnecessary 
burden on the economy (Standing and Sender 1996: 213; World Bank 1995: 110). 
Private insurance schemes are particularly difficult to sustain during times of 
economic difficulty as the demand for labour declines throughout the economy and 
the risk of losing employment rises concurrently. This makes a stronger case for 
public intervention in providing some form of income security and insurance. Political 
support for government may wane as a result of its inability to ensure that incomes do 
not fall too far (World Bank 1995: 113). 
Guhan (1994: 37) contends that, given the economic structure in many developing 
countries and the level of development in these countries, it is inappropriate for 
developing countries to rely on so-called "formal" social security schemes modeled 
on the schemes of industrialised countries. In developing countries poverty is much 
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more widespread than in the industrialised world, and usually results from structural 
problems in the economies. Other reasons why the "conventional" social security 
model is not appropriate in developing countries: 
• as insurance and credit markets are normally not well-developed, the scope for 
private insurance is limited 
• owing to the high level of self-employment, as well as the high level of 
unemployment, and the consequent irregularity and instability of income, there is 
also limited scope for social insurance 
• though governments can provide social assistance by means of budget allocations, 
the income from taxes is also limited in most developing countries 
• owing to limited financial resources, funds which could have been used for social 
security schemes are often rather allocated to infrastructure development and 
education and health care 
• people living in rural areas are often difficult to reach from an administrative point 
of view 
• employment instability results In inconsistent Incomes even In formal urban 
sectors 
• developing countries often have to deal with underemployment, which means that 
that many people have irregular or part time jobs only, and are hence not in a 
position to contribute regularly towards some form of social insurance. 
As is the case with the minimum wage, social security is a form of labour market 
regulation that does not normally extend to the informal sector in developing 
countries (Guhan 1994: 35, 36). There are many key parameters that determine the 
feasibility of extending social security benefits to all sectors of the economy: the 
coyerage of the existing system, the size of the sectors not included, the type of 
benefits, and the financial situation / capacity to deal with extended benefits. 
Generally the pressure for extending public benefits is greatest in industrialised 
countries, where resources are available and an alternative informal mechanism is 
limited (Tokman 1991: 152). 
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4.3.3.1 Country-specific evidence regarding social security: 
The ILO observes that during recent years financial imbalances have become 
characteristic of most existing social security schemes, even those in industrialised 
countries, and that this implies a reduction in the quality and quantity of benefits 
provided (ILO newsletter 1993: 11) 
In the transitional economies of Poland and Czechoslovakia it was found that the 
extensive social security net established during communist rule is succumbing to 
financial pressures. Unemployment benefits provided by the state have drastically 
declined as a result of deteriorating financial circumstances and it is becoming more 
and more difficult to sustain the existing level of service provision (Svejnar 1992: 
164). 
The Mexican state's social security system provides protection against occupational 
accidents, illness, maternity, old age, incapacitation and retirement as well as survivor 
pensions, and day care for children. There are, however, no unemployment benefits. 
In Mexico social security contributions are compulsory for all formal workers and are 
financed jointly by government, employers and employees. By 1993 about 12 million 
workers (and about 56 million family members) out of a total population of some 84 
million people were registered for social security. There are two main agencies in 
Mexico that deal with social security: the Mexican Institute for Social Security and 
the Institute of Social Security and Services for state workers (government 
employees). Private schemes also exist. 
In 1989 the contribution of government, employer and worker for sickness and 
--
maternity leave was about 12% of the worker's basic salary. Of the amount to be paid 
the employer contributed 70%, the employee 25% and the government 5%. 
Contributions depend on salary levels, and only workers receiving "minimum" 
salaries are exempt from having to contribute themselves (Plant 1993: 10, 13). 
Social security schemes in some developing countries such as the middle-income, 
urbanised countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are fairly well developed 
and extensive in coverage. In Jamaica, for example, government has determined that 
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social security contributions are compulsory for all workers, even self-employed 
people and domestic workers (Guhan 1994: 35,36; Tokman 1991: 152). 
The formal state-funded security system m Jamaica only makes provIsIon for 
pensions. However, the average pension is only one fifth of the normal per capita 
income and that is not considered sufficient to ensure a decent level of living. In spite 
of the pensions being considered low, labour costs in general have been considered 
high as a result of the high ratio of fringe benefits to money wages. Health care is also 
provided by government but falls outside the formal scope of social security 
(Standing 1991: 25; Tokman 1991: 152). 
Evidence from Brazil indicates that all formal sector workers are given extensive 
health and social security benefits such as unemployment protection and paid leave by 
their employers. For these benefits the employer pays 50-70% of the direct wage. 
Employers also pay a 20% payroll tax on the earnings of workers. Those persons 
involved in the informal sector receive none of the social security benefits (Fox, 
Amadeo and Camargo 1994: 156). 
Costa Rica also has a comprehensive social security system that includes government 
financed heath care and pensions. The existing state social security system guarantees 
the entire population maternity care as well as medical and hospital care (Gindling 
and Berry 1994: 218; Tokman 1991: 152). 
Social security schemes in India are based on means testing. According to Guhan 
(1994: 42) these schemes have proven to be particularly successful owing to the 
following reasons: 
• financial benefits are small enough to ensure that the non-poor are not tempted to 
infiltrate the groups of assistance-seekers; 
• no ceiling has been placed on the number of eligible beneficiaries per family, 
hence all family members who qualify can claim assistance; 
• the income status of those who seek assistance is regularly verified through visits / 
enquiries; 
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• overheads are low as it is not necessary to employ additional people to administer 
the process: claims' are verified by staff who had already been employed by 
government before the program was launched. 
It has been found that, save for Nigeria, non-wage labour costs in most African 
countries are high given their stage of development (Mazumdar 1989: 54). 
In the South East Asian countries income security systems consists of fairly low 
money wages, complemented to a large extent by personal transfers from relatives in 
rural areas. Firms offer inexpensive non-wage mechanisms and state transfers are 
small. As the rural kinship support system has provided workers with a "socially 
acceptable" degree of income security, firms had not been under much pressure to 
offer higher social wages. The money wage of the individual is a fairly small portion 
of income security, as in virtually all families more than one family member work, 
and as transfers are still being made from rural areas to urban ones. The large 
contribution (from rural family members) to the income of an urban worker has 
contributed to lowering the efficiency wage, i.e. the wage level necessary to ensure 
optimum work effort (Standing and Sender 1996: 213). 
Social security protection in Latin America has been more advanced than in most 
other developing regions. Virtually all Latin American countries have state social 
security systems covering the workers in the industrial sector. The character of labour 
legislation in Latin American countries has, however, been highly protectionist and 
regulates all aspects of individual and collective labour relationships. The state is 
deeply involved in social matters, as is evident from the comprehensive social 
legislation that exists, as well as economic matters such as union recognition, wage 
fixing and dispute resolution (Plant 1994: 89). 
Government measures towards social protection in Latin American countries are not 
universal, nor is it acceptable in terms of coverage, as it fails to finance and correct 
the imbalance between those who received the benefits and the few who contribute. 
Much diversity between the countries with regard to this remain though, with some 
countries having more or less universal coverage under systems similar to that of the 
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industrialised countries in Europe, and others having coverage of less than 20%. Since 
the 1930's compulsory insurance schemes were never changed in order to include the 
marginal sectors. Although this has been attempted more recently, coverage of the 
informal sector does not yet appear to be very successful. Furthermore, owing to 
financial pressure, governments in most of the Latin American countries have been 
forced to reduce state expenditure at precisely a time when emergency and 
compensatory assistance schemes are needed (Plant 1994: 89). 
In South Africa apartheid has influenced the social wage level, which for a long time 
has consisted mainly of payments by enterprises to their workers. Standing and 
Sender (1996: 214), in their (controversial) 1996 ILO country review of South Africa 
have argued that, given the relatively small contribution of the state and the fact that 
transfers are not flowing from rural to urban areas (e.g. as is the case in most Asian 
countries) but rather from urban to rural areas, companies have been under 
considerable pressure to pay higher money wages than has been the case in many 
other countries, in order to meet equivalent levels of social wage. This strong opinion 
could, however, be questioned as it is difficult to believe that the money wages paid to 
black workers by South African firms have in fact been much higher than in other 
developing countries. In fact, many have argued that evidence suggests black people 
have been paid much less than they should have received, compared to what have 
been paid to white workers. Also, although the contribution from the state may have 
been small, household, family and community structures have played a more 
important role in supplementing income than the authors may acknowledge. 
Enterprise payments have taken on the form of fairly high money wages and non-
wage forms of payment such as enterprise based benefits, e.g. medical aid. Standing 
- -
and Sender (1996: 214) drew criticism by arguing that transfers provided by the 
apartheid state have been few and racially selected, and have contributed little to 
income security. 
Although many South African workers had been provided with accident insurance 
through the Workmen's Compensation Act, those in casual or temporary jobs do not 
have access to such insurance. Persons in jobs of this nature have however received 
disability cover, which depends directly on the salary of the person. 
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Most firms investigated in the ILO study on South Africa offered retirement benefits 
such as pension fund contributions, paid leave and also paid maternity leave, with 
some even offering paid paternity leave. Firms in general also provide paid sick leave, 
with the benefit also determined by the salary of the person. On average firms pay 
about 12% of wage levels for retirement benefits. Other private benefits offered 
included transport allowances, housing assistance, or subsidised housing loans, all 
dependent on salary levels. Non-wage forms of remuneration in South Africa are 
extensive and represent a high proportion of the social wage as well as having been a 
source of inequality, given that virtually all benefits depend on salary level of the 
worker (Standing and Sender 1996: 215). 
Standing and Sender (1996: 216) also suggested that polices aimed at addressing the 
extent of income inequality and lowering the social wage could be structured to 
include the employment of more women and the transfer of a large percentage of 
fringe benefits from the company to the state. In their opinion, it would also be 
advisable to raise the incomes and self-sufficiency of rural areas as this would 
contribute to lowering the social wage of urban workers. 
Guhan (1994: 36) identified several characteristics with respect to formal social 
security systems in developing countries. Firstly, it is common that some of the 
above-mentioned contingencies, such as benefits for work injuries, are available in 
most developing countries. Although disability and old age benefits are also fairly 
common, schemes for sickness or maternity leave are considerably less common, and 
those covering unemployment even less so. 
Non-compliance with social security legislation is an important problem. Another is 
that collection of contributions from both workers and employers does not take place 
on a regular or timely basis. Procedures are slow and cumbersome, and workers often 
wait long periods to receive their money. In many cases the benefits are inadequate. 
Also, many schemes are faced with high administrative costs, and experience fiscal or 
actuarial problems (Guhan 1994: 36). 
Another factor of importance is the fact that in most developing countries only formal 
sector workers are covered by the benefit schemes. To include the informal sector is 
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extremely difficult. Contribution costs among self-employed persons are two to four 
times higher than that of wage-workers. Administrative problems regarding 
identification and registration of informal workers are further drawbacks. Also, as 
pensions have often deteriorated in real terms, some informal workers have stated that 
their incentive to join voluntarily has been reduced. Another important reason noted 
by Tokman is that political pressure to force government to include informal workers 
may be lacking. In many developing countries political pressure from potential 
beneficiaries has been an important factor behind an increase in social security 
coverage (Guhan 1994: 36; Tokman 1991: 152). 
Guhan (1994: 38, 39) suggests that government financed social security in developing 
countries should form part of anti-poverty policies, and that there are three important 
instruments for such poverty alleviation: promotional, preventive and protective 
measures. By addressing the poverty issue, the burden on the social security systems 
can to a certain extent be lifted. A multiple approach should be followed with regards 
to the provision of social security in developing countries. It has been proposed that 
the focus should be shifted to land reform / redistribution, to the provision of credit, to 
programs such as those targeting rural unemployment, food subsidies, and so forth. 
Institutional arrangements should be decentralised and participatory in nature, and 
programs should be combined in such as way as to focus not only on needs, but also 
on cost-efficiency. 
Unemployment, family support and sickness can be addressed by way of promotional 
measures such as employment schemes, child nutrition and heath care. However, 
other risks such as old age, widowhood, maternity, disability or injuries, must be 
addressed though social assistance (Guhan 1994: 42). 
4.3.3.2 Summary of evidence on social security: 
Most industrialised countries seem to have well-developed social safety nets. This 
is, however, not the case in most developing countries. Developing countries also do 
not cover as many aspects of income security as industrialised countries, and normally 
only provide for pension, health and / or education benefits, and not situations such as 
unemp loyment. 
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It has been found that even though some countries offer apparently extensive 
coverage, the individual coverage is sometimes totally insufficient and does not even 
cover the basic minimum requirements. A good example of this is the case of 
Jamaica, where the pension coverage falls far short of what had been calculated would 
be required for maintaining living standards on the level it had been while the person 
was still employed. 
In most developing countries, state coverage of social insurance appears to be limited 
to workers in the formal sectors of the respective economies. Unemployment security, 
arguably the most relevant in the context of developing nations, would be extremely 
costly to provide in these countries, as in most only a relatively small percentage of 
the population is formally employed. The number of persons who would be able to 
contribute is too small to sustain such schemes, and the financial burden on the state 
would be immense should this be funded from the budget. Also, as most of the 
economIes are based on primary sector activities, unemployment fluctuates 
continuously as a result of climatic influences and commodity shocks. It seems 
unlikely that unemployment insurance schemes will ever become common in 
developing countries and it is therefore important to look at alternative policy options, 
including subsidising food and services for certain low income groups, or perhaps 
encouraging employment by way of public works programs that are labour intensive. 
4.4 General conclusion on intervention 
From the above it is evident that there are different opinions as to the need for state 
intervention in the labour market by way of regulations. In spite of these conflicting 
views, as represented quite clearly by two of the most influential economic bodies in 
the world, the World Bank and the International Labour Organisation, there is still 
some common ground in that the World Bank, in spite of considering regulations as 
"distortionary", does agree to the need for some "basic" intervention to ensure 
minimum standards. According to the ILO, labour market regulations to a large extent 
reflect society'S view on human rights, as they are based not only on economic, but 
also on moral considerations. Any government is morally obliged to attempt to 
improve the basic standard of living of its citizens, and in particular the poorest 
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groups of society who do not have the skills or access to the financial sources to 
enable them to do so. As Guhan (1994: 37) stated, the "nature and magnitude of 
deprivation in the poor countries indicate a massive need for intervention of some 
sort". Although one may argue about the extent of intervention, intervention of some 
sort does seem justifiable. 
Up to the present, popular ways of intervening in the labour markets of developing 
countries have included setting minimum wages, establishing a regulatory framework 
for collective bargaining, and establishing social safety nets. However, it appears that 
virtually none of these attempts have been universally successful when measured 
against the objective of increasing employment, alleviating poverty and improving 
standards of living for the general population. 
Evidence regarding government intervention in developing countries by way of 
collective bargaining, minimum wages and social security provision varies markedly: 
Virtually all industrialised nations have elaborate labour legislation and detailed 
collective bargaining regulations. During recent years a trend towards 
decentralisation of bargaining structures has been identified in industrialised 
countries, although it has taken place to different degrees in different countries. This 
trend has largely been attributed to the international pressures resulting from 
increasing international competition and the resulting need to keep labour costs as low 
as possible. 
Collective bargaining procedures have also been used extensively in developing 
countries, particularly in Latin America, where they have been credited with 
increasing certainty, stability and coordination in the economies with regard to the 
activities of organised labour. 
In Latin American countries government intervention in the economy has historically 
been high. In spite of the existence of well organised unions, the bargaining power of 
these unions, and consequently the role of collective bargaining has always been 
limited. The legal framework for collective bargaining in some of these countries has, 
however, been criticised for being inadequate as it does not specify that negotiation is 
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obligatory. Although government intervention in a number of these countries has been 
declining, the bargaining power of unions has also declined as a result of government 
support for raising labour market flexibility. This reduction in union power has 
generally not resulted in boosting the economies of Latin American countries. 
In Asian countries organised labour has historically been heavily controlled by the 
state. Even during times of economic growth, government has retained its stronghold 
over unions and their bargaining power. It therefore comes as no surprise that the 
evidence points to unions and collective bargaining having had very little impact on 
wage levels. 
In Africa, the high degree of government intervention has during recent decades 
declined somewhat in a number of countries that now are following democratic 
principles. Historically, the role of unions in the former colonies has been more 
political than economic, as it has provided members with an instrument with which to 
cross the divide created by tribal differences and in doing so project a united front 
against colonial regimes. Generally, unions in Africa have never been exceptionally 
strong, nor has union membership been very high. Moreover, the combined effect of 
limited bargaining power, and the apparent inability to ensure job and income security 
(albeit also to a large degree the result of external factors) have not resulted in union 
membership figures rising, but rather the contrary. Coverage of collective agreements 
has, however, been criticised for the fact that union bargaining power is so limited 
that wages that are agreed to are sometimes even lower than what the official 
government policy suggests, as has been the case in Kenya. 
No labour market instrument will prove successful unless the overall policy 
environment in which it is applied is conducive. In some cases policies that override 
the labour market regulations, or contradictory polices, have rendered the regulations 
ineffective. A fine example of this would be the impact of structural adjustment 
programs in Africa, where the "normal" functioning of labour market institutions such 
as collective bargaining in a number of coun~ries has been impaired by structural 
adjustment programs and the conditions attached to such programs. 
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All in all, collective bargaining appears to have been relatively successful in creating 
certainty and a greater extent of continuity with regard to the bargaining process in 
developing countries. Through extension procedures, it has provided a large number 
of workers with access to an instrument through which they could improve their 
wages and negotiate for better working conditions. Decentralised bargaining with a 
certain degree of coordination is arguably one of the best options, as this would ensure 
that problems as low down as the plant level can be discussed, while wider economic 
issues are still taken into account. 
Industrialised countries in general appear to have well developed collective 
bargaining structures that provides extensive coverage, hence there appears to have 
been little need for introducing minimum wages to set a minimum standard with 
regard to wage levels. The few OECD countries that have, however, felt a need for 
intervening in wage levels, have opted for the use of wage subsidies to companies to 
raise employment rather than wage levels. One could, however, argue that wage 
subsidising also has drawbacks, as evidence from OECD countries suggests that 
people are often retrenched once the government ceases to provide subsidies. 
Evidence from industrialised countries as regards the impact of minimum wages on 
wage levels and employment appears inconclusive. Rather, some are of the opinion 
that, as labour relations adjust to globalisation, more attention could be given to the 
idea of a social wage. 
In Latin America the minimum wage has proven itself downwards flexible during 
times of economic difficulty. This, however, only highlights the fact that, other than 
providing a basic guideline to employers, the use of this instrument has had a very 
limited effect on achieving income security for the lowest income group. Furthermore, 
the minimum wages that have been implemented in many Latin American countries 
have been so low, and have therefore had such a limited impact on raising labour 
costs, that it does not seem to have had a significant effect on the international 
competitiveness of the products being produced. 
In Latin American countries where inflation is very high in general,~inimum wage 
legislation and administration with regard to adjustments in particular appear out of 
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step. This is regarded as having contributed to the ineffectiveness of the minimum 
wage. 
In Africa, minimum wages have been one of the ways in which governments have 
attempted to address post-colonial wage inequalities. In many countries it has 
therefore served as a political signal to supporters, rather than a labour market 
instrument with economic merits. An increase in wage levels in general has been 
viewed by many African governments as the only way to increases economic stability 
and to stabilise the workforce. Notwithstanding the above, the introduction of, and 
even raising of minimum wage levels have not been a miracle cure for solving the 
poverty problems on the continent. This has been attributed to a number of factors, 
including the fact that structural adjustment programs have rendered the effect of 
minimum wages irrelevant, and that minimum wages have not been enforced properly 
or adjusted regularly. 
One of the reasons for the minimum wage in developing countries not appearing very 
successful in providing income security to low income workers is the fact that cash 
wages of such workers are often supplemented by payments in kind. For example, 
farm workers may only be paid small cash wages, but may also receive free food, 
housing,etc. as part of their payment. As no direct monetary value is placed on these 
payments in kind, it is not always acknowledged, and this results in cash wages 
sometimes being looked at in isolation, which does not give a fair reflection of the 
compensation the worker receives. 
It is difficult to clearly identify the effect of minimum wages, as time series data for 
many developing countries have been limited, and as there have been some problems 
regarding enforcement, etc. Taking into account these problems, the evidence seems 
to suggest that minimum wages have generally not had a significant effect on real 
wage levels in developing countries. This may have resulted from the fact that in 
several countries they have not been adjusted regularly or enforced correctly. 
Provided that it is adjusted regularly, it could prove useful in countries such as those 
in Latin America where high inflation erodes cash wages. At the same time it should 
be noted that in the limited number of countries where the minimum wage has in fact 
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been adjusted regularly, it has had a slightly negative effect on employment (i.e. in 
Puerto Rico). 
The evidence on minimum wages in developing countries seems to suggest that it is 
not the ideal instrument to ensure equitable wages, but that, in some countries where 
collective bargaining procedures are lacking or still limited in terms of coverage, it 
may be one of the better alternatives available. 
As there are vast constraints upon the successful national implementation of a 
minimum wage, it should ideally only be used to target sectors with the lowest income 
workers. At the same time, however, in countries such as those in Latin America 
where the minimum wage has been popular as an instrument to reduce the impact of 
high inflation, it would not have much use if it is not introduced widely. 
Given the contradictory information available, one could perhaps conclude that the 
minimum wage should be appreciated for its standard setting value rather than for its 
potential to ensure income security. 
The evidence on social safety nets indicates that, in spite of the presence of informal 
networks, governments in both industrialised and developing countries have realised a 
need to contribute to social protection, and have acted upon this during the last 
century in particular by way of welfare policies. Although it differs considerably 
between countries, significant portions of annual state budgets are nowadays set aside 
for social expenditure. 
The need for social security protection is particularly acute during times of economic 
transition / structural adjustment, as this often results in a loss of formal income to 
families. It is imperative that governments have measures in place to assist people 
during such periods. 
Not only the state, but also the market (in the form of the employer) and the 
household contribute to meeting the needs of the individual. In the industrialised 
world, where cash wages are generally high and extensive state transfers take place, 
the role and monetary contributions of family and community has been reduced 
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significantly. Private benefits offered by companies are high and still on the rise. The 
high contribution by employers is clearly evident from the fact that non-wage social 
benefits constitute approximately one third of the overall labour costs of a firm in 
industrialised countries. 
Although it seems fairly common for governments in developing countries to 
provide social insurance coverage against contingencies, the provision of pension and 
disability benefits is somewhat less common, with provision for sickness, maternity 
and particularly unemployment being the least common. It should be noted though 
that in many countries the extent of benefits (for example old age pensions) has been 
found to be so low that it will not enable a person to survive solely on that income. 
In developing countries the scope for extending private sector insurance is limited. 
Credit and insurance markets have not been developed to the same extent as in the 
industrialised world. Also, with a large portion of the economically active popUlation 
unemployed in developing countries, or only able to obtain part time / temporary 
employment, the number of persons able to contribute a regular income to private 
funds remains limited. This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, as most 
developing countries are struggling to adjust their economies from being heavily 
based on primary sector agricultural activities, to industrialised economies with a 
strong emphasis on manufacturing and service provision. 
In Asia cash wages are generally much lower than in Africa, with transfers from 
family / community still accounting for a large portion of income. The rural kinship 
support system still remains in place in many Asian countries, contrary to what has 
been the case in a number of African countries, and in particular South Africa, where 
colonial rule has played an important part in the decline of such support systems. 
Non-wage labour costs in Africa are considered high when one looks at the high ratio 
of fringe benefits and payment in kind to cash wages. Provision for the social needs of 
society appears to have put upward pressure on wages in a country such as South 
Africa. The level of provision required has to a large extent been determined by other 
contributors to the social wage, i.e. family, community and the state, and not only the 
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enterprise (employer). An enterprise is normally pressurised to increase its cash wage 
and fringe benefits if these other groups lend little financial support. 
Given the relatively small SIze of the formal wage income sectors in developing 
economies, most workers are excluded from formal protective labour market 
measures. More needs to be done to allow them access to benefits such as those 
pertaining to pension, health, disability and education. It is particularly important that 
the coverage of labour market regulations is extended to include informal sector 
workers, though it may need to be adjusted to suit their specific needs and the 
circumstances prevailing in the informal market place. 
As regards the introduction of labour market institutions, it is very important to decide 
on the instruments to be applied, the timing of introducing these instruments, the time 
frame for which such instruments are deemed necessary, as well as the sequence for 
introducing certain instruments. It should also be kept in mind that any rules or 
regulations implemented should have at least some measure of social legitimacy. 
Although intervention in the labour markets of developing countries is therefore not 
uncalled for, the timing of the intervention as well as the extent and manner in which 
the intervention takes place is of extreme importance. 
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5. The Namibian economy and labour market imperatives 
5.1 Introduction 
The Namibian economy can be considered a small, open economy, dualistic in nature, 
and based on four primary sector activities, namely mining, agriculture, fishing and 
tourism. As in many other developing countries, the economy is heavily reliant on 
these primary sectors not only to generate foreign exchange income, but also to 
provide employment. 
Since Independence in 1990 the Namibian economy has grown steadily in terms of 
output. At the same time growth had been restrained by poor environmental 
conditions, drought and significant declines in commodity prices, all of which have 
negatively affected sectors such as mining, agriculture and fisheries which are 
important in respect of their contribution to GDP growth, employment and exports 
(United Nations Development Programme - UNDP 1996: 51). 
This chapter reviews the prevailing situation regarding un- and underemployment in 
the country, as well as the important effect this has on the large part of the population 
living in poverty. This will be followed by an overview of economic growth trends in 
the so-called "pillars" of the economy, as well future prospects regarding growth and 
employment in these sectors. A discussion of these issues is of relevance in the 
context of this study as it provides a general background on the economic 
circumstances in which the labour market institutions in Namibia currently function. 
It will also lay the foundation for the final conclusion as to how important and 
necessary certain labour market institutions in Namibia are, and how, if at all, they 
impact on employment creation, while at the same time ensuring the rights of 
workers. 
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5.2 Overview of the Namibian labour market and current employment 
situation 
The most recent statistics available on un- and underemployment, based on a 
199311994 household survey in the country, as compiled by the Central Statistics 
Office, indicates that some 19% of the population is unemployed, another 41% 
underemployed, giving a combined figure of approximately 60% as being un- and 
under employed. The "unofficial" public consensus is, however, that unemployment is 
much closer to 30% than to 20%. 
The implications of such high levels of un- and underemployment is grave, even 
though the country has a relatively small population of approximately 1.5 million 
people. Given the scope of the problem, programs aimed at creating employment 
would have to be far ranging and continue for a protracted period of time. Community 
.labour based works seem to be particularly relevant, given the existence of 
underemployment, the vast number of people still involved in communal farming 
activities, and the concentration of poverty in certain parts of the country. Programs 
that address the abovementioned problem of underemployment can use as foundation 
the fact that many people do in fact already have some sort of livelihood, albeit not 
sufficient (Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications 1996: 10, 11, 12). 
Table 1: Employment, unemployment and underemployment in Namibia -
1993/1994 
Employed Unemployed Underemployed Labour Combined Un-
Force employment and 
Under-employment 
350280 I (40%) 84398 I (19%) 178129 1(41%) 434678 262527 I (60%) 
.. . . .. Source: Central StatIstIcs Office 1996, LIvmg CondItIons m NamIbIa (Based on 
1993/94 Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Survey). 
The mam problem regarding the labour market in Namibia is that a general 
oversupply of labour exists in the market. This is the case mainly at the unskilled 
level, but also at the semi-skilled and skilled levels, although the extent of the 
problem is much less severe at the latter two levels. 
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Table 2: Unemployment by educational level in urban / rural areas - 1991 
Urban Rural Total Total in % 
No schooling 6948 17655 24603 24.79 
Primary 15702 22134 37836 38.13 
Secondary 22042 14230 36272 36.54 
Technical/ 80 105 185 0.19 
Vocational 
Teacher 174 63 237 0.24 
Training 
University (incl. 
Post Graduate) 40 66 106 0.11 
Not stated 0 0 0 -
Total 44986 54253 99239 100 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development 1995b: 24. 
Table 3: Unemployment.by language spoken - 1991 
Urban Rural Total Total in % 
Herero 4175 3714 7889 7.9 
Kavango 1423 4931 6354 6.4 
Nama / Damara 9823 11076 20899 21.1 
Ovambo 20997 26924 47921 48.3 
Afrikaans 5812 2383 8195 8.3 
Other European 766 239 1005 1.0 
Other African 1970 4971 6941 7.0 
Other 19 15 34 0 
Total 44985 54253 99238 100 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development 1995b: 28. 
Table 4: Unemployment (in %) by age, and urban / rural areas -1991 
Age Group Urban Rural Total 
10-14 75.8 52.2 54.2 
15-19 64.8 38.7 45.3 
20-24 43.5 28.5 34.5 
25-29 28.7 17.5 22.3 
30-34 18.7 10.3 13.9 
35-39 14.8 8.5 11.0 
40-44 12.2 6.6 8.6 
45-49 11.5 6.4 8.0 
50-54 10.5 5.8 7.1 
55-59 10.7 6.1 7.1 
60-64 9.4 7.6 7.8 
65+ 13.0 8.0 8.4 
Not stated 14.7 10.3 11.5 
Total 26.3 16.8 20.1 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development 1995b: 28. 
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The following table shows past and projected figures with regard to the need for 
manpower, as compiled by the Ministry of Labour and Human Resources 
Development. It is obvious that the availability of manpower by far exceeds the 
projected requirement, with the gap even widening towards the tum of the century, 
despite the fact that even the projected growth of the labour requirement, i.e. 
employment, at well above 2% per annum, is relatively optimistic. 
Table 5: Actual and projected manpower requirements and availability - 1994 to 
2000 (in thousands) 
1991 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Actual Actual 
Availability 493.6 546.0* 564.7 584.5 603.1 623.1 643.4 664.4 
Requirement 394.3 430.0 438.4 450.4 463.2 476.5 489.6 502.5 
Unemploy- 99.3 116.0 126.3 134.1 139.9 146.6 153.8 161.9 
ment 
Unemploy- 20.1 21.2 22.4 22.9 23.2 23.5 23.9 24.4 
ment Rate 
(%) 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development, 1994. Manpower 
Availability and Requirement for Namibia 1995- 2000: A preliminary estimate. 
(* Note: The total available labour force of 546 000 in 1994 noted here by the 
Ministry of Labour contradicts the total labour force figure of 434 678 in Table 1, 
measured at approximately the same time. The latter' figure was published by the 
Central Statistics Office). 
5.3 POVERTY 
5.3.1 Who are the poor? 
Namibia has been categorised a middle-income country, and one of the richest in Sub-
Saharan Africa by the World Banle However, as is the case in South Africa, there is 
. an extremely skew distribution of income, with the richest 10% of the population 
receiving an average per capita Income of N$ 83 000 per annum in the early 1990's 
(note: Rl=N$I). This amounted to about 65% of national income. The remaining 90% 
of the population share in the other 35% of national income. It had been calculated by 
the UNDP in the early 1990's that the poorest 25% of the population had an average 
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income ofN$ 460 per annum. Based on the figures obtained in the 1993/94 National 
Household Income Expenditure Survey (NHIES), the UNDP calculated that Namibia 
had a Gini coefficient of 0.70. Although it is likely that this figure has improved 
somewhat since 1994, it proves the scope of the problem, and hence makes 
Government intervention in the economy in order to address the high level of 
inequality perhaps more understandable. (The table below is a comparison of the Gini 
coefficient to that of a number of other developing countries). Notwithstanding 
positive GDP growth during most of the past eight years, it has on average not 
exceeded the annual population growth rate of 3.1 %. Per capita incomes have 
therefore not experienced real growth and a large proportion of the population is still 
living in poverty. Relative to national income, the level of human development in the 
country remains low (Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications 1997: 4; 
Piitz 1997: 74; UNDP 1996: 7, 35). 
Table 6: Comparative Gini Coefficients - 1975 to 1988 (averages) 
Country Gini Coefficient 
Indonesia 0.31 
Peru 0.31 
Bangladesh 0.34 
Ivory Coast 0.55 
Brazil 0.57 
Namibia 0.70 
Source: UNDP 1996: 7. 
Those Namibians particularly vulnerable to poverty are the young, the elderly and 
women in general. There are also marked differences with regard to the geographical 
distribution of poverty, particularly between the north (where large parts ofthe former 
communal areas are located, and where about 70% of the country's population live) 
and the rest of-the-country, and between urban and rural areas in general (Ministry of 
Works, Transport and Communications 1996 : 10-12; Piitz 1997: 74). 
Although the incidence of poverty among commercial farmers is virtually non-
existent, this is an extensive problem among farm labourers and their families, nearly 
all of whom lack education, and a substantial number of whom lack the means to pay 
for their children to be educated. Other problems include the vast distances to schools 
and the high costs of hostel fees. 
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As the largest number of persons considered to be poor can be found in the rural areas 
of the country, Government considers the issue of land refonn as being imperative in 
the fight against poverty. Although a land refonn act was already gazetted in 1995, it 
has still not become fully operational. Many questions have arisen: how to deal with 
the issue of land dispossession, and can the country afford the perceived trade-off 
between land refonn and productivity? In most parts of the country, land, even land 
owned by commercial farmers, remains marginal at best, with very low rainfall and 
not very productive soil. Hence it is unlikely that dispossession of land will in fact 
bring about a significant improvement in poverty levels (Hansohm and Mupotola-
Sibongo 1998: 6, 7). 
5.3.2 What is the extent of poverty in Namibia? 
In 1990 the World Bank estimated tqat 5% of the Namibian popUlation received more 
than 70% of Gross Domestic Product while only 3% of the GDP were controlled by 
the poorest 55%. Internationally, households for which food consumption take up 
more than 60% of the total household income are classified as "poor". "Absolutely 
poor" are those for which this percentage exceeds 80%. In the official Green Paper on 
Labour Based Works (Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications 1997: 4), it 
is noted that the World Bank in the early 1990's had indicated that "based on an urban 
poverty line and rural vulnerability to food insecurity, ... at least two-thirds of the 
(Namibian) population are absolutely poor and ... as many as three-quarters of 
all blacks are poor". Other sources have reported that in 1993, given the above scale 
of measurement, some 47% of households in the country could be classified as poor, 
with 13% of households being absolutely poor. Yet again other studies have indicated 
that over 50% of the total population in the· country can be classified as living below 
the poverty line. (Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications 1996: 12; Piitz 
1997: 170). 
Table seven reflects the annual private household income in Namibia as measured in 
the 199311994 National Household Income and Expenditure Survey. Particularly 
interesting are the marked differen.ces between the average household income in rural 
areas and that in urban areas, as well as that between the average per capita rural and 
urban income levels. Although not shown on this particular table, this survey also 
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indicated that only 1 % of the top households (in tenns of average income) in the 
country was responsible for about 13% of private consumption expenditure, with the 
share of the lowest 48% of households at only 13%. It was found that expenditure by 
the households with the highest incomes was approximately N$ 36 310 per annum, 
and that of the lowest N$ 389. Average household expenditure was calculated as 
being N$ 11 951 at the time (Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development 
1995b: 5). 
Table 7: Annual private household income in Namibia 
NAMIBIA Population Total Total Average Average Average 
-reglOns (%) Income Income HH Size HH Income Per Capita 
(N$ (%) Income 
millions) 
Rural 71.1 1531 36.4 6.1 9453 1550 
Urban 28.9 2679 63.6 4.8 32335 6676 
TOTAL 100 4210 100 5.7 17198 3031 
Source: Central Statistics Office 1996, Living Conditions in Namibia (Based on 93/94 
Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Survey). 
The following table gives a good indication of the spread with regard to average 
monthly income: 
Table 8: Average monthly male / female wage rates in Namibia -1992/1993 
Monthly Wage Male Female Total Average 
inN$ Employment Employment Employment Monthly 
(1N$ = 1R) Wage 
c 
< 100 1023 865 1888 51 
101-200 1755 1080 2855 154 
201-300 2441 976 3417 251 
301- 400 2090 586 2676 353 
401- 500 3350 1127 4477 471 
501-750 3582 1334 4916 620 
751-1000 4326 1765 6091 885 
1000 -1500 10917 3162 14079 1266 
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Monthly Wage Male Female Total Average 
in N$ (lN$ = lR) Employment Employment Employment Monthly Wage 
1501- 2000 8357 2241 10598 1768 
2001- 3000 8769 2874 11643 2483 
3001- 5000 10519 2076 12595 3360 
>5000 2025 618 2643 6223 
TOTAL 59154 18704 77858 1761 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Development 1994b: 96 
*[Although a fairly extensive survey of the informal sector in Namibia (covering 
some 1 000 households) was reportedly conducted during 1994/1995 with the help of 
the ILO, the available data is said never to have been processed. The ILO advisor 
apparently left the country before completion of the survey, and since then no 
information regarding the survey has officially been made public]. 
5.3.3. Why such a high incidence of poverty? 
As stated in the preceding paragraphs, the incidence of poverty appears to be 
particularly acute in the northern part of the country, where approximately 70% of the 
population lives, mainly in the communal areas. The poverty found in virtually all of 
the communal areas has been ascribed to a mixture of reasons; the fact that decades of 
apartheid rule has directed policies at denying the majority of the population access to 
many of the basic services, education and land, and resulted in a general state of 
neglect during pre-independence time~, the ongoing war situation during the seventies 
and eighties, quarantine restrictions upon the movement of animals and plants when 
crossing the red line (the artificial "border" that divides the commercial farms and the 
communal areas of the former communal areas such as Ovamboland, initially 
introduced to prevent cattle diseases from spreading from the northern communal area 
into the commercial farming areas further south) and the limited size of small 
holdings. More recently, the (illegal) fencing off of land within the jointly owned 
communal areas has resulted in a limited number of farmers keeping good grazing 
areas and water resources to themselves, and the effect of years of overgrazing and 
ecological damage have become apparent. Furthermore, the communal areas suffer 
from a lack of development, and lack of investment (Ministry of Works, Transport 
and Communications 1996: 10, 11, 12; Putz 1997: 74; UNDP 1996: 25). 
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Another contributing factor to the high incidence of poverty, and arguably the greatest 
factor at present, is the high population growth rate of 3.1 % per annum. This even 
exceeds the average population growth rate of 2.9% for Africa (Piitz 1997: 74). A 
growing population, coupled with an economy in which few new job opportunities are 
being created, results in a perpetuation and even increase in the extent of 
unemployment, which in tum gives rise to a variety of social problems. 
5.3.4. Ways of alleviating poverty 
Given its potential economIC and social impact on poverty alleviation and 
employment, Government's recent budgets have been geared to accommodate the 
emerging sectors of fishing and tourism (and to a lesser extent agriculture). Similarly, 
the job creating potential of the manufacturing industry has been recognised, and 
much is being done to attract foreign investment in manufacturing activities. 
Most notably, and perhaps more directly, Government has increased expenditure on 
social services in an attempt to address the high incidence of poverty in Namibia. The 
allocation of the budget to social services has risen considerably during recent years. 
However, although investment in human capital has increased significantly since 
independence, government has expressed concern over this financial burden, given 
the fact that the average annual GDP growth rate has been lower than the annual 
population growth rate of 3.1 %. This concern is exacerbated by the fact that some 
42% of the Namibian population is younger than 14 years of age (Piitz 1997: 76). 
One of the most important ways to reduce poverty is thought the creation of job 
opportunities. Government has done much to achieve this, for example: large amounts 
--
of money is being spent on providing vocational training and to encourage people to 
opt for self-employment instead of waiting for jobs in Government; small businesses 
are being provided with financial assistance, stalls, as well as basic management and 
financial skills; the Export Processing Zone regime has been initiated to attract 
investors and so encourage trade, which in tum will create jobs. 
In spite of this unemployment remains a major economic problem in the country, and 
until this improves, efforts to reduce poverty are likely to meet with little success. 
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5.4 ECONOMIC GROWTH: PAST TRENDS, FUTURE PROSPECTS 
5.4.1. Management of the economy 
Since Independence in 1990, the Namibian Government has done its best to ensure 
the best possible mix of policies aimed at stimulating economic growth while at the 
same time addressing inequalities. 
In order to encourage growth over the medium term and to attract investment to the 
country, a stable macro economic environment is imperative. Macroeconomic policy 
has to a large extent been aimed at keeping the budget deficit at manageable levels, 
stabilising the exchange rate, keeping the balance of payments situation healthy, and 
keeping inflation and public debt as low as possible. Not all of these attempts have, 
however, been successful on an ongoing basis. The contradiction between 
government's stated objectives and the actual trends as regards the state finances are, 
for example, reflected in the continuous fluctuations experienced with regard to the 
budget deficit, as well as the large increases in foreign and domestic debt, as indicated 
in table 6. 
There is still cause for concern over the general level of economic growth, given the 
fact that 42% of the population is younger than 14 years of age and will soon demand 
jobs from an economy in which GDP and exports appears to be growing only slowly 
while no or very little employment opportunities are generated by the private sector 
(1999/2000 Budget Speech, April 1999: 3). 
The already heavy burden not only on natural and financial resources, but also on 
investment required for the creation of jobs is intensifying: even a level of investment 
which averaged roughly 21 % of GDP between 1990 and 1997 does not yet seem 
sufficient (Piitz 1997: 84). 
Important to note is that investment has been less than anticipated after Independence, 
in spite of vigorous and still ongoing attempts by government to stimulate this. The 
slow growth of investment can be seen partly as a result of the lack of business 
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opportunities and lack of business confidence, but also because of inadequate national 
savings and a disappointingly low level of foreign investment (Putz 1997: 76). 
5.4.1.1 Government income and expenditure 
The following table shows the trends with regard to some of the main economic 
indicators in the country since 1990: 
Table 9 : Economic and fiscal indicators and projections 
Unit 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
(Prelim.) (Prelim.) (Projected) 
GDP: N$ 10641 11 778 13 537 14987 16917 18578 
Cur. million 
Market 
prices 
Real GDP %pa 6.5 3.6 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.4 
Growth 
Real GDP N$ 4779 4801 4754 4721 4697 4666 
per capita 
Change in %pa 3.3 0.4 -1.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 
real GDP 
per capita 
Inflation %pa 10.8 10.0 8.0 8.8 9.0 6.5 
(CPI) 
Prime %pa 16.50 19.00 20.70 20.00 23.75 17.25 
overdraft 
rate (year-
end) 
Overall % 1.8 3.9 6.4 2.8 4.3 4.2 
budget 
deficit as 
% ofGDP 
Central % < 18.8 21.9 23.9 21.6 22.6 23.5 , 
govt. debt 
in % of 
GDP 
Foreign N$'m 86 195 243 368 448 537 
debt 
Domestic N$'m 938 1420 1923 2979 3467 3927 
debt 
Source: Ministry of Finance; 1999/2000 Budget speech, April 1999. 
At present there is great concern about the effect which the lowering of tariffs in the 
Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) will have on the share of the revenue pool 
which is allocated to Namibia. The share that Namibia has in the SACU revenue pool 
normally accounts for one third of the total revenue of the Namibian Government. 
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Negotiations on restructuring the fonnula which divides the SACU revenue pool have 
not yet been finalised, as noted in April 1999 by the Minister of Finance in his 19991 
2000 budget speech. Although the impact on Namibia's portion of the revenue under 
the revenue sharing agreement has not yet been determined, it still appears possible 
that it could result in a reduction of revenue for Namibia. This could put pressure on 
government to find alternative sources of income for the country. At the same time 
government needs to ensure that an enabling environment is maintained to attract 
foreign investment, for example by keeping company and personal taxes low. 
(Government has on purpose set company tax at 35%, lower than that of South Africa, 
in order to encourage foreign finns to invest in Namibia). 
One of the most striking features of government's economic management of financial 
resources is the high level of government expenditure. The overall wage bill of 
government in particular has been criticised by the press and opposition parties. 
Notwithstanding efforts to the contrary, the number of civil servants has risen sharply 
since Independence. This increase in the number of civil servants has put further 
pressure on limited government financial resources. With an already high wage bill, 
the implementation of the 1995 Wages and Salary Commission's (WASCOM) 
recommendations, advising a drastic reduction in the number of civil servants and a 
general wage rise in order to make packages compatible with that offered in the 
private sector, has had a disastrous effect in that the salaries were increased 
accordingly, but the number of civil servants was not reduced. This has in part been 
attributed to the affinnative action policy. Civil servants attached to Government prior 
to 1990 were assured of keeping their jobs, while new people had to be taken on to 
reflect the new social order. As percentage of government expenditure, the annual 
wage bill has increased from 24% in the 1989/1990 budget to over 46% in the 
1996/1997 budget, at which level it has remained since (UNDP 1996: 37; 1999/2000 
Budget Speech: April 1999: 8). As a percentage of GDP, government's personnel 
expenditure has risen from 17.9% to 19% from the 1998/1999 to the 1999/2000 
financial year. In his April 1999 budget speech (1999: 8) for the 1999/2000 financial 
year, the Minister of Finance made specific mention of the WASCOM 
recommendations, and the apparent inability of government to comply with the 
original recommendations. He called for a drastic reassessment of policies and 
measured aimed at downsizing the civil service. 
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The following table depicts budgeted government expenditure per ministry for the 
98/99 and 99/2000 financial years. Those ministries with the highest allocations are 
highlighted. 
Table 10: Budgeted expenditure as per 98/99 and 99/2000 financial years 
Allocation of annual budget (%) 98/99 99/2000 
Fisheries & Marine Resources 1.31 0.99 
Prisons & Correctional Services 0.95 1.15 
Agriculture, Water & Rural Development 5.97 5.57 
Trade & Industry 1.35 0.88 
Health & Social Services 13.50 14.15 
Environment & Tourism 1.39 1.54 
Re~ional & Local Government & Housing 3.72 3.37 
Justice 1.23 1.30 
Mines & Energy 0.98 0.92 
Labour & Human Resources 0.47 0.50 
Information & Broadcasting 1.42 1.54 
Youth & Sport 0.60 0.61 
Basic Education & Culture 21.63 20.67 
Finance 4.35 6.36 
Defense 6.52 7.21 
Foreign Affairs 1.84 1.92 
Police 4.52 6.36 
Hi~her Education, Vocational Training 3.87 3.71 
National Planning 0.50 0.34 
Lands, Resettlement & Rehabilitation 0.96 0.81 
Transport 5.20 5.98 
Works 4.44 3.52 
Civic Affairs 0.56 0.53 
Auditor General 0.13 0.12 
Parliament 0.85 0.65 
Prime Minister 0.74 0.82 
President 0.80 0.73 
Statutory 6.51 6.39 
Contingencies 1.62 1.34 
Source: Budget speeches by Minister of Finance, March 1998 and April 1999 
There are increasing signs that financial prudence has become somewhat slack within 
the various government ministries: requests for additional budgets have become a 
common occurrence used to finance the shortfall resulting from overspending by a 
significant number of the government ministries during recent years. 
Borrowing both locally and offshore is creating a future burden of debt repayment. By 
global as well as African standards Namibia is a low-debt country. Total central 
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government debt by 1998 amounted to 22.6% of GDP, or N$ 3916 million 
(preliminary figure), and is projected to increase to 23.5% ofGDP during 1999, or N$ 
4 464 million .. Although it appears that the budget deficit, which peaked at 6.4% of 
GDP in 1993, has been restrained, pressure now again seems to be slowly building as 
a result of the abovementioned overspending. (1999/2000 Budget Speech, April 1999: 
Attachment A; National Planning Commission: 1996: 33; Piitz 199774; UNDP 1996: 
37). 
5.4.1.2 Monetary and Fiscal policy 
As regards the general trends in monetary and fiscal policy, it is important to note that 
Namibia is a member of the Common Monetary Area (CMA) and that room for 
independent monetary policy decisionmaking is limited as South Africa is the 
economic leader in the CMA. The Namibian dollar remains pegged to the South 
African Rand at par, and as interest and exchange rates fluctuate in correspondence to 
the movement in the South African rates, the main instrument available to government 
is fiscal policy. Since Independence, tax has been used extensively as an instrument to 
encourage and attract foreign investment, for example by means of reducing company 
tax to 35% and by granting Export Processing Zone companies special tax 
concessions (UNDP 1996: 32). 
5.4.1.3 Trade and Regional integration 
One of the main features of the Namibian economy is that it is very closely integrated 
with the economy of South Africa. As a percentage of the country's total imports, 
imports from South Africa have for the past eight years remained between 85 and 
. 90%, while only-27% of the total exports of Namibia has gone to South Africa. At 
present the manufacturing industry is still in a developmental stage, and 
approximately 89% of manufactured exports are composed of meat and fish products 
generated by two of the main primary sector industries. Over 50% of total exports are 
bound for Europe. From this it is obvious that much more could be done to explore 
regional markets (UNDP 1996: 32). 
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Given the country's small population and the low purchasing power of the population, 
export-led growth seems the option which hold the most potential for stimulating 
economic growth and job creation. 
Namibia subscribed to the Lome Convention in 1990 when it joined the African-
Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group of states which have been granted special access to 
the markets of the European Union. The ACP countries are not only granted duty-
and/or quota-free access for the products they export to the European Union (in the 
case of Namibia the prime example is beef), but it is also to the advantage of Namibia 
in that it has opened up opportunities for banks such as the European Investment Bank 
and various insurance schemes and has made the process of finding both trading 
partners and markets abroad easier. 
In addition to the Lome Convention, Namibia also has the advantages brought on by 
having been granted Most Favoured Nation status by countries such as the USA and 
countries in Europe, Scandinavia and Australasia alike through the General System of 
Preferences (GSP). This status allows Namibia to access the markets of these 
countries on a non-reciprocal basis and on preferential terms which entails the country 
having to pay either zero or reduced duties. This makes the products which are locally 
produced and exported more competitive than they would otherwise have been (Piitz 
1997: 165). 
Concerning Namibia's involvement in trade alliances in Africa and particularly 
Southern Africa, the country's membership of the following regional trade 
organisations are of particular importance: SACU, the Southern African Customs 
Union, given its important contribution to Government revenue; SADC, the Southern 
.. - ~. 
African Development Community; and COMESA, the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa, formerly known as the Preferential Trade Area (PTA). The last 
mentioned is of importance as Namibia shares in joint development projects, e.g. 
upgrading of roads, projects pertaining to the provision of water and electricity, etc. 
Also of importance is membership of the Common Monetary Area, or CMA, which 
has a guiding influence upon Namibia's monetary policy (Piitz 1997: 62; UNDP 
1996: 32). 
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5.5 Sectoral overview: recent trends and future prospects for growth and 
employment. 
In the National Development Plan (NDP1) for the country, covering the years 1995 -
2000, growth prospects for the country are considered on the basis of its contribution 
to employment growth, contribution to GDP, contribution to Government revenue, 
and contribution to growth in exports (Piitz 1997: 97). 
At present the main sources of employment in Namibia are government, commercial 
farming, and mining, but since 1990 the sectors which have contributed most to the 
creation of new employment opportunities have been fishing, construction and 
domestic trade. 
Table 11: Sectoral contribution to GDP - mid 1990's 
% ofGDP % of Employment % of Exports 
Agriculture 10.5 46.8 9.3 
- subsistence 7.5 35.9 0.0 
- commercial 3.0 10.9 9.3 
Fishing 3.4 0.7 3.3 
Mining 10.2 3.8 42.4 
Primary Industries 24.1 51.3 55.0 
Manufacturing 8.1 5.9 27.8 
Construction; etc. 5.0 5.6 0.1 
Secondary 13.0 11.5 27.8 
Industries 
Trade 7.7 8.7 0.0 
Tourism 1.9 1.0 16.0 
Transport and 5.2 2.4 0.0 
Communication 
Financial services 19.2 2.2 0.0 
and real estate 
Government 25.0 15.6 0.0 
Other social services 1.3 1.5 0.0 
Other services 2.5 5.7 1.2 
- .Tertiary Industries 62.9 37.1 ·17.2 -
Source: UNDP 1996: 84. 
Table 11 shows the contribution to the Gross Domestic Product by each of the 
different sectors of the economy, as well as contribution to employment and exports. 
(The UNDP who compiled these figures noted that the figures relating to employment 
contribution do not entirely correspond with figures presented by the Ministry of 
Labour and Human Resources). 
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5.5.1 The Primary Sector 
5.5.1.1 Mining and Energy 
Since the tum of the twentieth century mining had been the mainstay of the Namibian 
economy. In the 1990's Namibia's mining sector was estimated as having been the 
fifth largest in Africa. The income derived from the sales of diamonds, uranium, base 
metals and other industrial minerals during the last decades of the century on average 
provided some 70-80% of the country's annual export earnings, with the largest 
portion of the minerals exported raw or in semi-processed form, and little value being 
added prior to export. Nevertheless, data gathered through the 1993/1994 National 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey suggested that value added per person 
employed had been highest in the mining sector (N$ 87 000), and lowest in the sector 
of agriculture - only N$ 2415 (Ministry of Labour and Human Resources 
Development 1995b: 5). Significant portions of mining earnings are also repatriated 
abroad (Hansohm and Mupotola-Sibongo 1998: 7). 
The mining sector contributes approximately 20-30% of the gross national product of 
the country. Notwithstanding its solid performance for many years, the contribution of 
the mining sector to GDP took a downward tum in 1984 from which it has not been 
able to recover. This general slowdown in the mining industry which started during 
the 1980's was to a large extent due to the depletion of high grade diamond deposits 
and the decline in the real price of diamonds. Also, sanctions against South Africa 
reduced the demand for uranium during the 1980's by 20%, while the real price for 
uranium also fell after the end of the Cold War. (Hansohm and Mupotola-Sibongo 
1998: 7; Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications 1996: 5; Piitz 1997: 75). 
Of the 40 mines currently operating in the country, seven produce more than 95% of 
the entire output value of this industry. NAMDEB Diamond Corporation (formerly 
know as CDM - Consolidated Diamond Mining) and Rossing Uranium Limited are 
two of the largest companies in the country in terms of output and number of persons 
employed, and jointly produce approximately 12% of the Gross Domestic Product. 
Following extensive negotiations after independence, the Namibian Government 
acquired a 50~ stake in Consolidated Diamond Mines Limited together with De 
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Beers, and renamed the company NAMDEB Diamond Corporation. NAMDEB, 
which employs 6300 employees, produced more than a million carats of diamonds per 
annum during 1995 and 1996, with both its marine and offshore diamond production 
output increasing markedly (Piitz 1997: 79). 
Next to diamonds, uranium, mined by Rossing Uranium Limited, has for many years 
been a major generator of foreign exchange. During recent years, however, the 
decreasing demand and significant oversupply from Eastern Europe for the world 
market for uranium has resulted in heavy production losses for this industry. In spite 
of this, industry officials are expecting an upturn in the uranium market by the end of 
this century (Piitz 1997: 101). 
It was estimated in 1993 that the mining sector employed less than 4% of the total 
number of people employed in the formal sector in the country. This was a significant 
reduction from what is had been during the early 1980's (nearly twice as much). From 
table 11 it is evident that the mining industry in its entirety only employs 3.1% of total 
employment in the country, although the UNDP puts this percentage at 3.7%. The 
number of persons employed in the mining industry fell from about 20 000 in 1980 to 
about 12 000 in 1994, and is still declining. Still, in spite of this substantial reduction, 
mining companies remain the largest employers in the formal sector (Hansohrn and 
Mupotola-Sibongo 1998: 7; Ministry of Works, Communication and Communications 
1996: 5, 7; UNDP 1996: 30,45). 
Notwithstanding some doubts as to the future of the diamond and uranium industries, 
there is increasing speculation that offshore oil and gas reserves hold promise. Owing 
to political uncertainty, the hydrocarbon potential of the offshore areas of Namibia, 
Angola, Zaire, Congo and Gabon have remained virtually unexplored for many 
decades. However, following independence in 1990, the Namibian government has 
encouraged private companies to become involved in petroleum exploration. This has 
led to the identification of four large basins off the Namibian coast. Although 
investigations of these basins are still underway, early indications seem positive 
(Murray 1998: 37; Piitz 1997: 106). 
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The possibility of constructing a new hydropower project in the Kunene river in the 
far north of the country has been investigated, but owing to a number of factors, 
including the staggeringly high estimated cost of N$ 3 billion, and significant 
resistance from environmentalists, these plans have temporarily been frozen. 
With respect to the current slump in the mining industry and the immediate future 
prospects for growth and employment creation in this sector, opinions differ. There 
are a number of factors which could over the longer term count in favour of the 
development of the local mining industry. Namibia boasts an exceptional physical 
infrastructure relative to most other countries in the region, and substantial parts of the 
country have not been geologically explored. This is particularly relevant for the 
offshore areas that have only during recent years begun to attract interest with regard 
to the potential for mining oil, gas and diamonds. Given that Namibia is considered 
under-explored by many, there is always the possibility of discovering new deposits 
(Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications 1996: 20). 
In spite of the abovementioned factors, the short to medium term outlook for the 
mining industry in general is not very positive. Long term structural adjustment with 
respect to the price of diamonds and uranium in particular, and the fact that demand 
for Namibian raw materials fluctuates according to recessionary periods or booms in 
the industrialised economies, makes Namibia particularly vulnerable. 
Attempts to encourage foreign investment by means of appropriate government 
. 
policies concerning foreign investment in the mining industry remain relatively 
unsuccessful. For example, attempts by the Government to promote small scale 
mining have been made more difficult by a lack of access to finance, as well as a lack 
of technical knowledge and managerial skills among possible small scale miners. In 
addition to these problems, the rising costs associated with mining, and fluctuations in 
the international commodity markets have led to a significant reduction in local 
prospecting activities. The current trend appears to be towards capital-i~tensive 
offshore diamond mining. 
Another factor of importance is that there is a reasonably long interval between 
exploration and excavation. Hence, although oil and gas reserves may appear 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
139 
promIsmg, it can take as long as two or three decades to exploit them. Also, the 
expected closure of a number of mines within the next decade or so, and the expected 
increases in the degree of mechanisation and offshore mining, have led to the UNDP 
in 1996 predicting a continuing decline in employment in this industry (Piitz 1997: 
101). 
Although there is some scope for processing minerals, this is also capital intensive 
and not likely to create employment. Taking everything into account, employment 
prospects in the mining industry do not look very favourable (Piitz 1997: 98). 
5.5.1.2 Marine Resources 
Fishing is the second largest export earner for the country, and the contribution of this 
sector to GDP has continued to rise. The fishing industry as a whole now provides 
employment to approximately 3.5% of the formal labour force. (Ministry of Works, 
Transport and Communications 1996: 5; UNDP 1996: 46). 
Over fishing and poor management of the fish resources during the 1970's and 1980's 
in particular have done much damage to the development of the industry since 
independence. Since 1990, Government has declared a 200 nautical mile exclusive 
economic zone and has passed legislation aimed at protecting the resource. The most 
important of these is the new quota levy system that is being strictly enforced. In spite 
of attempts to encourage conservation and the sustainable utilisation of the resource, 
natural conditions also play an important role, as became particularly evident during 
the 1993/94 fishing season when unfavourable oceanic conditions. i.e. warmer water 
and lower oxygen levels in the water, led to fish leaving the Namibian waters, thus 
resulting in a (temporary) near collapse of the industry. Although oceanic conditions 
have normalised during subsequent fishing seasons, research has suggested some 
harm to the biomass, thus motivating government to cut back on quotas dramatically 
in order to allow stock to rebuild itself (Hansohm and Mupotola-Sibongo 1998: 7, 
UNDP 1996: 46). 
The fishing industry is deemed as holding potential not only in terms of employment, 
but also for GDP contribution, revenue and exports. The World Bank suggested in the 
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early 1990's that the value of local fish catches could rise from N$ 600 million in 
1990 to more than N$ 1 billion by the turn of the century. This prediction was, 
however, made prior to the 1993/94 slump. With regard to employment in this 
industry, the National Planning Commission, in its plan for the development of the 
economy from 1995 to 2000, the National Development Plan (NDP1), had projected 
that fishing would contribute some 12% to GDP by the tum of the century, and 
employ approximately 20 000 people by that time (Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communications 1996: 5). Unfortunately no figures are available at present to 
confirm to what extent this has been achieved. 
Taking into account the combined effects of adverse oceanic conditions and damage 
to the biomass during the past 3 decades, the extent of which had only been realised 
during recent years, it seems unlikely that either the production or employment target 
will be reached. There are, however, some positive factors in favour of the recovery 
and future development of the fishing industry: the fact that a solid foundation for 
effective fisheries management has already been laid, strong support for the 
development of commercial fishing from Government, the presence of vessels 
equipped for fishing, the availability of people with the necessary skills, and a shift in 
focus towards encouraging the onshore processing of fish. In spite of the above, it still 
remains unlikely that this industry will in the immediate future bring about an 
employment boom. The expectation is that fishing of most species will reach a stable 
sustainable level by the end of this century, and that employment in this industry 
should also stabilise by then. According to some sources, the best one could hope for 
in terms of employment is total employment of approximately 14 000 persons in this 
industry by the year 2000, if that much. (Financial Mail 1997: 22; Hansohm and 
Mupotola-Sibongo 1998: 7; Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications 1996: 
22). 
Ultimately one should keep in mind that fishing and fish processing is in fact a fairly 
capital intensive industry, and that, even in the event of a "full" recovery, this industry 
will never be one which has the ability to absorb great numbers of unemployed 
persons. 
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5.5.1.3 Agriculture 
The agricultural sector contributes approximately 10% to the country's Gross 
Domestic Product. This sector is of particular importance as more than half of the 
Namibian population depends on agriculture for a livelihood; directly or indirectly, 
this sector supports approximately 70% of the total Namibian population (Hans ohm 
and Mupotola-Sibongo 1998: 6; UNDP 1996: 30). 
Important to note, however, is that Namibia's agricultural sector constitutes two very 
different segments: a commercial farming sector and a sector where communal 
(subsistence) farming prevails. Whereas the former is known for market related, high 
technology production, the latter group of farmers is still battling with constraints 
such as limited access to finance, a lack of knowledge of marketing and technical 
know-how, as well as a lack of management skills (UNDP 1996: 41). 
There are approximately 4 000 farmers in the country involved in commercial farming 
activities, employing a total of approximately 37 000 farm workers, most of whom 
live on the farms with their families. The main commercial farming activities involve 
cattle or sheep farming, although a limited number of farmers also produce sunflowers 
and maize (Piltz 1997: 76; UNDP 1996: 30). 
Communal farming, mostly in areas formerly known as the "reservations", supports 
an estimated 150 000 families, or 900 000 people, on 43% of the land. As the largest 
communal areas are in the northern part of the country where the rainfall is somewhat 
better than in the southern areas, farmers produce maize, millet, goat and beef, mostly 
for own consumption. Lately efforts aimed at encouraging communal farmers to 
market their cattle through formal channels have started to payoff. Land is allocated 
through custom, and there are still no ownership rights in these areas. This has 
impacted negatively on the ability of these farmers to raise capital, as they have no 
collateral to offer lending institutions (as most financial institutions do not consider 
livestock as collateral). 
The income derived from communal farming activities falls far short of the 
subsistence needs. Moreover, overgrazing, bush encroachment, soil erosion and 
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desertification have impacted heavily on the ability of the land to sustain a population 
which is on average growing by 3.3% per annum. Other problems include the ongoing 
issue of land reform, and access to credit, training and agricultural extension services. 
However, even if communal farmers are provided with access to finance, marketing 
and technical assistance, it remains unlikely that the overall growth for the agricultural 
sector will exceed 2.4% per annum within the next few years (Hansohm and 
Mupotola-Sibongo 1998: 6; Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications 1996: 
21, UNDP 1996: 41). 
Although communal agriculture is expected to show slight improvement in respect of 
output growth, it seems unlikely that many new employment opportunities will be 
created. Should the current high popUlation growth rate persist, existing pressure on 
available land will intensify further. This will add pressure on urban centers as 
migration will increase with pressure on land (Piitz 1997: 97). 
5.5.1.4 Tourism 
Since independence, concerted efforts have been made to market Namibia's 
spectacular landscapes, canyons and varied wildlife abroad, and this has contributed 
to the tourism industry experiencing solid growth during recent years. Iri 1995 this 
sector contributed 6% to the country's Gross Domestic Product, and dunng recent 
years it has provided direct employment to an estimated 10 000 people (Hansohm and 
Mupotola-Sibongo 1998: 9). 
In its drive to support the development of tourism, government has increasingly 
focused on encouraging the attraction of up-market, high-value, low-volume tourists. 
Since the- early nineties; tourists to the country have comprised approximately 60% -
South African tourists, 16% tourists from other African countries, 12% Germans, and 
8% from other European countries. From arrival statistics, it is already evident that the 
proportion of regional to international tourists is shifting in favour of international 
tourists. Up to the present, extensive marketing has been done mainly in the United 
Kingdom and Germany, the main routes serviced by the local airline, Air Namibia. In 
1996 some 138 000 Europeans visited Namibia, a quarter of the total number of 
visitors to the country during that year (including those coming for non-vacation 
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purposes). Although Gennan tourists account for the largest number of foreign 
tourists (70 000 visited during 1996), tourist arrivals from the United Kingdom have 
increased five-fold to 24 000 (Murray 1998: 42). 
In spite ofa growing tourism industry, there are some problems that need to be 
addressed. Problems include the high costs associated with marketing abroad, a 
general lack of a servIce orientation among workers in this industry, the 
environmental danger to sensitive ecological areas brought on by too high density of 
tourists, the limited extent to which tourism is linked to other sectors, high initial costs 
to establish infrastructure, lack of tourism facilities in remote areas, and poor 
competitiveness with, for example, South Africa's more SOphisticated tourism 
industry. 
In spite of government efforts to encourage the development of the sector and to 
address some of the abovementioned problems, many of these constraints are out of 
the hands of the authorities. Malaria remains a problem in the northern areas of the 
country, and many tourists regard Namibia as part of a package, rather than a final 
destination. As many stop over in Namibia only as part of a visit to the Southern 
African region, any kind of political uncertainty in South Africa which scares off 
visitors also affects the Namibian tourism industry negatively (Ministry of Works, 
Transport and Communications 1996: 23). 
Perhaps interesting to note, and owing to its growing importance in generating an 
income for the communities involved, is the development of the idea of community-
based conservancies during the past three years. In the northern areas where many 
communal farmers still struggle to survive, local communities are now being 
encouraged to look into the concept of eco-tourism. Many of the local people are also 
being trained as game wardens to patrol their own land. However, this will not bring 
about the employment of vast numbers of people (UNDP 1996: 49). 
Growth in the tourism industry is expected to create not only employment, but also 
generate foreign exchange. The tourism industry is one of the few industries in the 
country which could generate growing employment opportunities in future, given that 
it is a service industry and labour intensive. 
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5.5.2 The Secondary Sector 
5.5.2.1 Manufacturing 
The manufacturing industry in Namibia, after getting off to a slow start, is still in its 
infancy stage. Until recent years most of the minerals, fish and meat produced in the 
primary sectors of the economy have been exportedih its most basic form. As a result 
of this, the contribution of manufacturing to the Gross Domestic Product of Namibia 
has been nearly insignificant. This is now changing, with the annual contribution to 
GDP having risen to approximately 8%. This sector now employs some 6% of the 
labour force in the formal sector (Hansohrn and Mupotola-Sibongo 1998: 7,8). 
In Namibia, two thirds of employees working in manufacturing are employed by 
companies who have at least 50 employees. Of the total number of manufacturing 
workers, only 12% work in companies with fewer than ten employees. Government 
has identified the small business/informal sector, which for a long time received little 
attention, as a target for growth and promotion (Hansohrn and Mupotola-Sibongo 
1998: 8). 
As fish processing accounts for more or less a third of total manufacturing value 
added (the remaining large contributors are mainly meat processing, and the 
production of beverages and furniture), manufacturing is highly reliant on climatic 
and other changes in the primary sector. This makes it extremely difficult to predict 
future trends with regard to growth in this industry. Further cause for concern is the 
limited backward and forward linkages that currently seem to exist, as well as the 
geographic concentration of certain industries in the central and coastal part of the 
country. Another very important problem concerns the obvious lack of diversification-
in the local manufacturing sector, although it is hoped that the EPZ regime will boost 
diversification, employment and development of the manufacturing sector in general 
(Putz 1997: 80; UNDP 1996: 39). 
In spite of efforts to develop manufacturing in order to create employment 
opportunities, the level of competitiveness remains extremely low. There is also little 
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diversification, with fish and meat being the main products processed. Other problems 
include low income levels for a substantial portion of the population, a local 
manufacturing sector which produces mostly for the small domestic market, 
transportation costs which are often disproportionately high, a general shortage of 
skills, relatively high wages paid to skilled labour, a lack of resources to which one 
could easily add value, and lastly, but perhaps most importantly, membership of the 
South African Customs Union. Economies of scale have made it extremely difficult 
for local companies to compete with South African producers, and the tariffs placed 
by SACU on imports have made it difficult to make use of more competitively priced 
sources of inputs (Hansohm and Mupotola-Sibongo 1998: 8; Ministry of Works, 
Transport and Communications 1996: 22; UNDP 1996: 40). 
One of the principal incentives offered to encourage manufacturing is the 
establishment of an Export Processing Zone regime (EPZ) in Walvis Bay. One of the 
main aims with this EPZ is the provision of training to local workers. Provided that a 
company produces for export purposes, it may operate anywhere in the country and 
qualify under this regime, and not necessarily in the specialised area of Walvis Bay. 
By June 1999, some 58 companies nationally had been granted EPZ status. Of these, 
13 were in the Walvis Bay area, although only 3 of the 13 were fully operational at 
the time (refer Annexure A: Mrs. Philander). The EPZ is believed to hold 
considerable potential for job creation over the medium to longer term. 
The overall outlook for the manufacturing sector could perhaps be seen as one of 
guarded optimism, although wrong policy decisions may change the prospect into one 
considerably less promising. Without active and extensive marketing efforts abroad to 
find new markets, the manufacturing sector is likely to continue producing only for 
the local market, which means that the demand from local consumers will determine 
the future growth of this sector. This also means that the growth of the sector will be 
highly dependent on local economic trends, thus making it very vulnerable to 
economic shocks. 
Should the focus on manufacturing for the purpose of exporting abroad or into Africa 
gain momentum (which is indeed now the case), and lucrative markets be found even 
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against stiff competition, the contribution of the manufacturing industry to GDP is 
expected to mcrease steadily (Ministry of Works, Communication and 
Communications 1996: 7, 8). Piitz (1997: 80) notes that, taking into account the 
stimulating effect of tax and non-tax benefits for businesses which manufacture for 
export, and in particular the incentives offered through the EPZ regime, 
manufacturing could grow to such an extent that it could contribute up to 20% of GDP 
in 10 to 15 years time. 
5.5.3 The Tertiary Sector 
5.5.3.1 General Government 
It is possible to discern a long term trend away from primary industries, towards 
secondary and tertiary ones. This is evident from the decline in growth in mining and 
agriculture, and the growth in manufacturing and general government services. 
From·the statistics it is evident that the Namibian economy is still a developing one -
in 1990, by far the largest number of persons formally employed were working in the 
primary sector. During recent years, however, this has also started to change, with 
government now playing a greater role as leading employer in the country than was 
previously the case (Piitz 1997: 74). 
The Namibian economy is heavily service orientated: services (including tourism) 
constitute some 60% of the GDP, with general government contributing the greatest 
share of this. In terms of employment, government had a total number of 63 000 
people in its employ by 1996/97, at the time more than twice the number employed by 
the trade sector. This means government employment at the time accounted for 64% 
of the formal sector workforce employed in service industries (UNDP 1996: 29). 
It should be emphasised, though, and government itself has even acknowledged, that 
over the medium to longer term economic growth needs to be generated by the private 
sector and not by government. Government should be restricted to providing certain 
basic services, and redistributing wealth and income as it in itself is not a productive 
sector that adds value. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
The dire need for job creation In a country with an already high incidence of 
unemployment and under- employment, a population growth rate of 3.1 %, and 
uncertain short to medium term economic growth prospects given the heavy 
dependence on primary sector activities which are vulnerable to various shocks, 
speaks for itself. 
Although there is an urgent need for an increase in living standards and income for the 
previously disadvantaged groups in Namibia, the prevalence of poverty is so 
widespread that a redistribution of existing assets is not likely to have a substantial 
impact on the problem (Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications 1996: 17). 
In spite of the fact that the tourism and fishing sectors in particular have experienced 
good growth with regard to output and employment creation since 1990, this growth 
has occurred from a small base and will not be enough to accommodate the increasing 
number of young persons entering the labour market. Unemployment and 
underemployment are likely to become a problem of rising proportions in the country. 
There is a dire need for labour intensive manufacturing and for stimulating the 
informal sector to create jobs. There have been encouraging signs that government is 
on the right track with regard to policies creating an enabling environment for 
achieving this, but it is difficult to measure the effect of these policies, as statistics on 
the labour market in particular are sti11lacking. 
In~addi!ion tQ ~I!cQuragLng the development of service )n<;tus!ries in Namibia, it is 
imperative that the Namibian economy becomes more focused on export-led 
(outward-looking) growth, as the domestic market is too small to absorb increases in 
production, and local people in general do not have the disposable incomes to 
stimulate much growth in the manufacturing sector. Most of the primary sectors are 
already export orientated, though little value is added before exporting. Furthermore, 
the country needs the foreign exchange generated by exports. Not only is it needed to 
pay for the approximately 85% of all products imported from outside Namibia (most 
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of this from South Africa), but the foreign exchange also helps to finance expansion 
of local production. Borrowing money from abroad is considerably more expensive 
than earning it through the sale of locally produced goods (Ministry of Works, 
Transport and Communications 1996: 19). 
The reliance on the primary sectors and the limited measure of diversification in the 
value adding industries have made the local economy extremely vulnerable to factors 
over which little control can be exercised. External conditions such as economic 
fluctuations abroad, and local conditions, in particular those pertaining to the climate, 
have made it extremely difficult to predict future trends with regards to economic 
growth and the employment growth associated with that. 
It is in view of the current high level of unemployment and the apparent limited 
opportunities for future job creation that one should look at the next chapter on 
selected government interventions in the Namibian economy, and should keep in 
mind when jUdging ultimately whether the labour market institutions introduced in 
Namibia have contributed to raising income levels and living standards in general, 
without having a detrimental effect on employment creation. 
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6. Intervention in the Namibian economy 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter four the conclusion was reached that intervention in the labour markets of 
developing countries is not uncalled for, but, at the same time, that the type of 
instrument used to intervene (e.g. a minimum wage), the timing of the intervention, as 
well as the extent and manner in which the intervention takes place are of extreme 
importance. 
In this chapter the development of the labour market institutions of collective 
bargaining, minimum standards and minimum wages and social security in Namibia 
will be discussed in detail. The first part of the chapter will be devoted to a description 
of the historical developments regarding labour market institutions, with particular 
emphasis on the developments with regard to legislation. This will be followed by an 
in-depth discussion of the current position of collective bargaining, the minimum 
wage and social security in Namibia. 
As stated in the conclusion of the previous chapter, one should keep in mind the 
prevailing and expected situation regarding economic growth and job creation in the 
country when assessing the effect of labour market regulations on wages and 
employment 
6.2 Brief overview of current situation regarding intervention 
6.2.1 The prevailing political, social and economic environment 
Compared to most developing nations, the political, economic and social environment 
in Namibia has developed along unique lines, although there are certain similarities 
with other countries formerly ruled by colonial powers. Given the political 
background of the country, and similar to what the Malaysian government has been 
doing, the Namibian government is attempting to reduce inequality between ethnic 
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groups, and to promote economic development by way of actively intervening in 
labour market outcomes. (Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Development 
1997: introduction). 
6.2.2 Government intervention 
Post-independence labour market institutions in Namibia have been shaped by a 
combination of market forces, as well as the political and social factors brought on by 
the apartheid era. 
Since independence in 1990 the Namibian government has become actively involved 
in almost every aspect of the economy. The reasons given for intervening in the 
labour market in particular included that many institutions necessary for ensuring the 
rights of workers were simply non-existent before 1990, and that even those which 
had existed were structured to favour whites. The intervention has formed part of 
government's undertaking towards its voters to achieve a democracy in which 
equality is extended to persons of all ethnic groups. 
Based on what has transpired during the past mne years, government's attitude 
towards intervention could over the medium to longer term to a large extent conform 
to the social democratic welfare state regime discussed in the second chapter of this 
study. In a social democratic / regulated market approach government actively 
intervenes, but only sporadically when it is deemed necessary. Social reform is driven 
by the focus on achieving equality; the social system does not distinguish between the 
rights of manual and white collar workers, but treats all of them equally. Much 
importance is attached to different degrees of tripartite consultation. 
Since 1990 government intervention has been consistently high. Intervention has 
taken place mainly by way of administration and through new legislation aimed at 
increasing competition, ensuring fair standards and protecting the interest of 
individuals, also in the working environment. 
Although government has actively intervened in the economy during the first years 
after independence, it could be argued that this high degree of intervention was only 
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of a temporary nature. At the time of Independence, the idea was for government to 
establish democratic institutions (e.g. the Labour Act of 1992) which would ensure 
that the needs of all groups in society, especially marginalised groups, were 
addressed. It could be assumed that intervention was likely to decline accordingly 
once government has achieved this goal. The Minister of Finance, in, his budget 
speech for the 1999/ 2000 financial year, noted the need for intervening to establish 
democratic frameworks: " ... at independence, we devoted our efforts to institution and 
nation building and social upliftment. .. ". In his budget speech for 1998/ 1999, he had 
noted that government " ... should not carryon justifying more .. .intervention and 
involvement", but again in the 1999/ 2000 budget speech said that " ... government 
will ... address the plight of the poor through selected intervention programs 
... "(1999: 13). Given these statements, one could perhaps speculate that, although 
government appears to acknowledge the fact that intervention in the economy and 
hence the labour market in general should be limited, there appears to be a 
commitment to intervene selectively and sporadically when the need arises. 
6.2.2.1 Labour market policy 
The objectives of the government's labour market policies in Namibia is twofold, 
namely to create enough jobs to absorb the annual entrants to the labour market, and 
to promote the protection of the working popUlation. The latter issue is being 
addressed by way of ratifying relevant ILO conventions, by strengthening the capacity 
of the Labour Ministry, and by encouraging employer and employee movements to 
build their capacity and organisational structures. In addition to this, new regulations 
on the health and safety of employees at work are also being drawn up. Solving the 
unemployment problem has, however, proven most difficult to achieve, and up to the 
present these attempts have not proved very successful. Indirect attempts to generate 
employment have included encouraging regional and international trade, and tourism, 
which could positively affect employment. 
A large portion of total government expenditure is directed towards education and 
training. Government has also launched extensive training initiatives, and in particular 
vocational training programs, with an emphasis on work-related skills and 
entrepreneurial values. In order to promote apprenticeship programs, the private 
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sector has been offered tax incentives (Ministry of Labour and Human Resources 
Development 1997: 54). 
Furthermore, government has committed itself to an initiative named "labour based 
work schemes", which entails building and upgrading the country's physical 
infrastructure mainly by way of employing manual labour (Ministry of Labour and 
Human Resources Development 1997: introduction). 
6.2.2.2 Affirmative Action 
The Namibian constitution prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, status, 
etc. In addition to this an affirmative action policy aimed at correcting market 
disparities in the fields of education, employment and occupation, as well as income 
and social benefits was also approved by parliament towards the end of 1997 
(Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development 1997: 54, 67). 
6.2.2.3 Public sector employment 
The 1992 implementation of a freeze on new employment and the drive for 
rasionalisation has had limited effect. This rapid increase in the number of civil 
servants reflected the urgent need after independence to re-organise state institutions 
according to constitutional obligations, but also reflected the inability of the private 
sector to generate new jobs. In his 1999/200 budget speech (1999: 15) the Minister of 
Finance announced that no provision had been made for civil service wage increases 
during this particular financial year. Although admitting that this could be interpreted 
as a temporary wage freeze, he also acknowledged that wage negotiations with unions 
were still ongoing and that the outcome of such negotiations could affect this decision 
(Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development 1997: 48). 
Public service employment in Namibia rose from 55 313 in 1988 to peak at 73 000 in 
1995, and has since declined to 70 895, as announced in the 1999/2000 budget speech 
(1999: 15). At the same time it was announced that some 7 354 more ex-combatants 
will be given employment in the civil service, thus bringing the final number of civil 
\ 
service employees on the pay-roll for the 1999/2000 financial year to 78 249. 
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Given the above numbers, and the fact that the formal sector economy is so small, it is 
no surprise that the Namibian government remains by far the largest employer in the 
country. In 1997 there were more employees in the public sector than in the combined 
(commercial) agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors. Given the disappointing 
levels of economic growth and the fact that the economy is not generating significant 
numbers of new jobs, this in all likelihood could still be the case (Ministry of Labour 
and Human Resources Development 1997: 48). 
In spite of the civil service being exceptionally large relative to the country's small 
population, it does not really represent a closed, internal labour market. All positions 
are advertised publicly before appointments are made. Except for the large mining 
companies such as Central Diamond Mining (CDM), there are very few large 
companies in Namibia that can be considered as examples of internal labour markets. 
6.3 Historical overview of the development of labour market institutions 
in Namibia 
Van Rooyen (1996: 275 - 277) distinguishes five periods in the development oflabour 
relations in Namibia: 
6.3.1 The pre-1800 period 
During the pre-1800 era, Namibia was inhabited by pastoral, mixed farming and 
hunter-gatherer societies (Hishongwa 1992: 5). Notwithstanding considerable 
differences in the modes by which these groups utilised natural resources, there were 
also similar work-related features such as communal land ownership and subsistence 
production. The "traditional" societies began to change during the early nineteenth 
century owing to the influence of, among other things, traders, white hunters and 
missionaries in particular who introduced western culture (van Rooyen 1996: 106, 
108, 109, 112). 
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6.3.2 The period 1800 - 1890 
In 1884 the Imperial Gennan Government proclaimed South West Africa a Gennan 
protectorate. During the "Gennan colonial period", which lasted from 1884 to 1915, 
fundamental changes occurred involving significant developments with respect to 
infrastructural and administrative development. However, during this period great 
damage was also done to the political and the socio-economic structures of the various 
ethnic groups. Van Rooyen (1996: 115) and Hishongwa (1992: foreword) noted that, 
among other things, the institutionalisation of forced labour, the premeditated 
expropriation of land and stock, and the establishment of a strict migratory labour 
system occurred during this period. During the period of Gennan rule the individual 
labour contract was one of a strict master-servant relationship. Collective action was 
virtually non-existent and not tolerated by law, official policy or institutions. This was 
the "fonnal" start to the system of inequality that was to persist for the next century. 
6.3.3 The period 1890 - 1977 
Gennan rule in South West Africa ended with World War 1, when South Africa 
defeated the Gennans and took over power in the protectorate during 1915 (Bauer 
1994: 40). The then South African Government adopted the labour policies and 
practices introduced by Gennan colonialists. Most of the labour-related statutes that 
were promulgated during this time were aimed at controlling African workers and 
their families. These statutes included the various Masters and Servants Proclamations 
(1916, 1918, 1920), the Shop Hours Proclamation (1921), the Native Administration 
Proclamation (1922), and the Curfew Regulations Proclamation (1922) (van Rooyen 
1996: 131, 133). 
During the era of South African rule (1915-1990), but in particular between 1950 and 
1977, labour policies, practices and institutions in what was at the time still South-
West Africa were based on political considerations. Since the country was ruled as a 
fifth province of South Africa, labour relations in the two countries developed along 
similar lines. During this time the migrant labour system became a distinguishing 
feature of the labour market (van Rooyen 1996: 131, 133). 
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One important aspect of National Party policy was the idea of establishing self-
governing homelands. The recommendations of the Odendaal Commission of Enquiry 
of 1964, although also covering a wide range of other aspects, e.g. the building of 
hospitals and schools, included that of establishing "self-governing" homelands for 
the various ethnic groups in the country. This had far-reaching implications for the 
development oflabour resources in the country (van Rooyen 1996: 150). 
The struggle for political independence in what is today Namibia, was also renewed 
and intensified following the end of the Second World War, with political movements 
being established and going underground. Workers and unions were encouraged to 
act in a more militant manner towards their employers and the government of the day. 
Pressure from international organisations such as the United Nations, who assisted the 
resistance movements, also intensified during this time (van Rooyen 1996: 150). 
The following table (plus the three that follow) provide highlights of the labour laws 
promulgated since the early 1900's in the then South West Africa. The summary is 
based on an extensive overview of all the relevant legislation by van Rooyen (1996: 
131-140, 151-164, 183-192,227-235). Only those Acts considered relevant in the 
context of this study are mentioned, and only the aspects deemed as relevant are 
referred to here: 
Table 12: Labour-related legislation introduced between 1915 and 1977 
Name of Act Highlights of contents 
Master and Servants - Concerned breach of contract; corporal punishment repealed and 
Proclamation 1916 changed to fines / imprisonment / hard labour 
Master and Servants . - terminology change: "servant" to "native employ~e" 
Proclamation 1918 and master to "employer" 
- reintroduced corporal punishment 
Master and Servants - part of law dealt with collective employment relations, e.g. allowed 
Proclamation 1920 for a limited measure of freedom of association which entailed 
determining conditions of employment through collective agreements; 
negotiations only allowed up to the level of mutual consultation 
Control and Treatment - rights of mine supervisors over African employees extended 
of Natives on Mines & 
Works Proclamation 
1917 
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Name of Act Highlights of contents 
Vagrancy Proclamation - law covered trespassing, idleness and vagrancy of African workers; 
1920 persons convicted for the above could be sentenced to work on public 
works or for private person or municipality 
Half-Holiday - applied to shop assistants (only sales personnel); gave workers Y2 day 
Proclamation 1921 off work once a week; only applied to persons of European descent 
Half-Holiday - contents same, but 1;2 day off unifonnly given on Saturday afternoons 
Ordinance 1927 r 
Shop Hours - regulated maximum no~ of working hours per week for shop 
Proclamation 1921 assistants to 52 hours; maximum 9 hours per day 
- consolidated and extended previous law 
Shop Hours and Shop - previously African indirectly excluded; this law explicitly only gave 
Assistants Ordinance Europeans time off work 
1939 - also covered aspects such as child labour, night-work, annual leave 
and even minimum wages ( initially £ 3 p/month, after 1 year 
increased to £ 5 p/month, etc. 
Native Administrative - regulations included setting aside "native reserves" ; restricted white 
Proclamation 1922 fanners to employing max. of 10 African make workers per fann; 
restricted movements of African without valid passed. 
Curfew Regulations - placed times restriction on movements of Africans; not allowed in 
Proclamation 1922 public 21aces between 9pm-4am 
Extra-Territorial and - no unauthorized migratory workers/families allowed to enter police 
Northern Natives zones 
Control Proclamation 
1935 
Workmen's - employer by law obliged to pay compensation in event of work-
Compensation related circumstances resulting m death / incapacity of worker; 
Proclamation 1924 Africans were explicitly excluded 
Supervision of - covered occupational safety in tenns of handling of machinery only 
Machinery 
Proclamation 1929 
Apprenticeship - covered only Europeans, but even excluded agricultural and domestic 
Ordinance 1938 workers; idea of apprenticeship training programs introduced 
Natives (Urban Areas) - covered control over contracts of service; regulated movements of 
Proclamation 1951 Africans 
Wages and Industrial - combined the 1937 Wages Act and Industrial Conciliation Act of 
Conciliation Ordinance 1937; did not apply to fann workers or domestics; act consisted of 3 
1952 sections: 
1) Dealt with wage detennination by introducing wage boards to 
investigate wages and employment conditions 
2) Provided for registration and regulation of unions and employer 
organizations; dispute prevention / settlement; establishment and 
functioning of conciliation boards, mediation, arbitration 
3) miscellaneous matters e.g. collective agreements exemptions; 
prohibited strikes and lock-outs 
Factories, Machinery - still in force; covers health and safety at work 
and Building Work - "regulates" factory working conditions 
Ordinance 1952 
Societies of Employers - agreement to allow more migrant workers to work in fanns, instead 
of Contracted Natives of using most on the mines 
Ordinance 1952 
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Name of Act Highlights of contents 
Mines, Works and - covered prospecting and mining activities; also health and safety of 
Minerals Ordinance workers in mines; introduced limitations regarding age and sex, and 
1954 also covered wages, paid leave, working hours. 
Workmen's 
- established an accident fund to compensate for temporary / 
Compensation Act permanent disability; applied to all races, but for disability African 
1941, as amended by received a once-off lump-sum of money, while European and people 
the Workmen's of mixed race received monthly pensions for the rest of their lives 
Compensation 
Amendment Act 1956 
Validation of Native - covered contracts of service between mining companies and migrant 
Service Contracts workers who work for them on a long term basis 
Ordinance 1958 
Mines Works and - substance same as the 1954 Act which it replaced 
Minerals Ordinance 
1968 
Employment Bureaus 
- established employment bureaus to facilitate labour exchange 
Regulations process; those who wanted work in urban areas had to apply through 
Proclamation 1972 these bureaus; permission for placement could be refused if so decided 
Occupational Diseases - provided for compensation in case of contracting disease on mines; 
in Mines and Works separate provision for Africans, Europeans and people of mixed race 
Act 1973 
Proclamation R.69 of - established a "labour-promotion fund" to promote labour relations, 
1975 general labour market interests, training and education of native 
workers in Namibia; little success as the board who administered the 
fund and made investments did not include employee representatives 
Source: van Rooyen 1996: 131-140; 151-164. 
6.3.4 The period 1977 - 1990 
Following an increase in unrest in the so-called "reserves", and in the face of growing 
opposition to these policies relating to the treatment of labourers, it became more and 
more difficult to enforce many of the above-mentioned rules. The situation changed 
somewhat during the mid- to late seventies, when the then government undertook to 
relax influx control and repeal pass laws, and introduce the principle of equal 
remuneration for equal work. It also undertook to lift some of the restrictions 
previously used to keep certain groups out of residential areas, as well as keeping 
them from using certain public facilities, and grant black employees rights of freedom 
of association, etc. (van Rooyen 1996: 202). 
During the period 1977 - 1990 Namibia's administrative ties to South Africa were 
significantly reduced. Bowing under international pressure, particularly from the 
United Nations, the South African government thus allowed statutory changes to be 
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made in an attempt to restore fundamental human rights and remove discriminatory 
elements in legislation. Elements of international labour standards were gradually 
incorporated into existing legislation (van Rooyen 1996: 182). 
Table 13: Labour-related legislation introduced between 1977 and 1990: 
Name of Act 
General Law 
Amendment 
Proclamation 1977 
Executive Powers 
(Labour) Transfer 
Proclamation 1977 
Wage and Industrial 
Conciliation 
Amendment 
Proclamation 1978 
Labour Promotion Fund 
Amendment Act 1981 
SW A Legislative and 
Executive Authority 
Establishment 
Proclamation 1985 
National Labour 
Council Act 1986 
Conditions of 
Employment Act 1986 
Highlights of contents 
- repealed certain discriminatory laws as far back as 1920's; some of 
the powers of employment officers, i.e. ability to order removal of 
Africans from certain areas was taken away, thereby again increasing 
mobility of Africans. 
- legal transfer of power from the Minister of Labour of the Republic 
of South Africa to the Administrator-General of South West Africa; 
only one exception: the Workmen's Compensation Act continued to 
fall under the SA Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 
- concerned amended section on registration of unions and employers' 
organisation: neither were to affiliate with political parties, or receive 
or give financial support to political parties 
- Amended Proclamation R.69 of 1975; extended fund-objectives, 
changed constitution of control board of fund; fund not only to include 
Africans as previously but the training and education of all workers 
- constitutional matters re interim government in Namibia; included 
annexure on human rights which new National Assembly was not 
allowed to tamper with; law included giving statutory protection for 
the Right of Freedom of Association (implied right to join unions), 
also rights to security, liberty, privacy, etc. 
- provided for establishment of a tripartite forum to advise government 
on private sector training needs 
- applied to agricultural and domestic workers; covered annual leave, 
sick leave, payment, minimum employment age, dismissals, etc. Also 
referred to other conditions of employment e.g. overtime pay (1 Y2 
times normal rate, various calculations for wage calculation, max. no. 
of working hours, etc. but this did not apply to the above two 
categories, nor to the workers In managerial, professional 
administrative positions, or public workers; act also repealed the Shop 
Hours & Shop Assistants Ordinance of 1939, and Factories, Machinery 
& Building Work Ordinance 1952. 
The Act was criticised for the following: 
1. 46 hour work week longer than ILO standard of 40 hours 
2. did not explicitly mention need to avoid discrimination as regards 
remuneration 
3. instead of using international norm of minimum 3 weeks paid 
annual leave, act provided for minimum 2 weeks 
4. act did not cover aspect of "fairness" as regards termination of 
employment by employer 
5. no substantial coverage of maternity leave benefits 
6. act provided no guidelines on other areas such as minimum wages, 
severance pay and night work. 
Source: van Rooyen 1996: 181-192. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
159 
6.3.5 The period 1990 -1994 
During the first years following independence much happened with regard to the 
development of labour market institutions representative of all groups of society. The 
single piece of legislation with the most far-reaching effect on labour relations in 
general has been the 1992 Labour Act. This Act was based on ILO conventions and 
recommendations, while keeping in mind the unique economic, social and other 
circumstances prevailing in the country (van Rooyen 1996: 232). 
The 1992 Labour Act replaced the main piece of legislation which governed labour 
relations during the pre-independence era, namely the "Wage and Industrial 
Conciliation Ordinance of 1952", and is comprehensive in scope. It consolidates and 
repeals roughly 31 laws that had previously been in existence, some of which dated 
back as far as 1938. The Act covers all workers and employers except for those 
persons employed by the Namibian Defense Force and the Namibian Police Force. 
These persons are only covered when it comes to affirmative action and unfair 
discrimination or harassment (Bauer 1992: 3). 
Although comprehensive in its coverage, the provisions in the Labour Act do not 
supersede provisions regarding service conditions and remuneration, as stated in the 
Apprenticeship Ordinance no. 12 of 1938, or any of the laws relating to· government 
employees, such as the Public Service Act, unless the provisions stipulated by these 
laws are less favourable than that stated in the Labour Act (Hubbard and Corbett 
1993: 3). 
An important aspect of the Act, as noted by Van Rooyen (1996: 233), is that it 
overrides or changes aspects of the common law that have been considered 
detrimental to inequality in society in general. Whereas the common law previously 
determined various collective labour matters, the employment conditions of workers, 
and termination of contracts, this is now determined through the 1992 Act. 
The following brief overview of arguably the most important aspects of the new 1992 
Labour Act is based on the Labour Act itself, as well as comments from Bauer and 
Piltz (references to follow after table 14). 
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Table 14: Highlights of the 1992 Labour Act 
Important aspects 
of Act 
1) Specifies basic 
employment 
conditions 
2) Introduces new 
Enforcement 
Mechanisms 
Contents 
- Act sets minimum standards that may be improved upon through 
collective bargaining. Employees may In actual fact not work for 
conditions less favourable than the "basic conditions" mentioned in the 
Act. Basic conditions of employment, as well as those conditions 
pertaining to health and safety standards are covered in the new Act The 
following changes are perhaps some of the more noteworthy: 
• Maximum working hours per week has been reduced to 45 hours; 
• Increase in overtime pay from one and one-third times, to one and one-
halftime the "normal" wage; 
• For work on public holidays and Sundays, workers may now choose 
between double their "normal" wage, or one and one-half times the 
"normal" wage, plus the same amount of time off during the following 
week; 
• Persons under 18 years and pregnant women eight weeks before or 
after giving birth, are not allowed to work at night. All night workers 
under the new Act receive an additional 6% of their "normal" wages. 
In addition to these new regulations, Bauer, in her short 1992 review of 
the new Labour Act, also refers to the new provision that employees 
who stay on the premises of work, are entitled to put forward 
"reasonable requirements" as regards housing and sanitary facilities. 
Farm workers are entitled to housing for all their dependents. 
• Other conditions of service noted In the new Act include 24 
consecutive paid leave days per worker, per 12 months of work; 
• Following at least 12 months of continuous work, a female worker is 
entitled to 3 months of maternity leave. The employment of a woman 
on maternity leave may not be terminated during such time. Although 
the Act does not determine that a woman on maternity leave should be 
paid, a woman on maternity leave can receive an income through social 
security. 
• The new Act primarily aims at enforcing the establishment of "safe" 
systems of production and "safe" working environments for workers. It 
also makes provision for the establishment of "workplace safety 
representatives", as well as the establishment of "workplace safety 
committees" to ensure the above. Furthermore, it calls for employers to 
adhere to the regulations drawn up by the Labour Advisory Council in 
cooperation with the President, while concurrently calling on 
employees to cooperate with employers, and to care for their own 
health in as far as possible (Hubbard and Corbett 1993: 121). 
• (Higher) Labour Court: interpret 1992 Act; also hearings and appeals 
• District Courts: responsible for district level hearings 
• Labour Advisory Council: comprises representatives from 
government, employees and employers 
• Labour Commissioner: register collective agreements, establish 
conciliation boards, register trade unions, etc. 
• Labour Inspectors: enforce Act through routine calls and specific 
assistance if so required 
• Wages Commission: equal representation from government, 
employers and employees, may order a minimum wage after an in-
depth investigation 
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Important aspects 
of Act 
3) Provides 
Framework for 
collective bargaining 
4) Provides Dispute 
Resolution 
Mechanisms 
161 
Contents 
- The Act advocates collective bargaining and the principle of freedom of 
association, and presents statutory guidelines for both employers and 
employees to use in the bargaining process. 
- Outlines procedures for unions employers organisations to formally 
register. Once registered, they are accorded certain rights through the Act. 
These rights include to lodge complaints with any of the courts, to 
negotiate on collective agreements, etc. 
- Dispute resolution mechanisms have also been put in place. Collective 
dispute procedure in the new Act has incorporated a number of existing 
mechanisms (e.g. the conciliation boards, and the provision for arbitration) 
already introduced under the 1952 Wage and Industrial Conciliation 
Ordinance. 
- Act distinguishes between disputes of rights and that of interest: 
Disputes of rights: 
• Conciliation board established;, if unsuccessful, referred 0 labour 
court. Right to strike is withheld 
Dispute of interest: 
• Also conciliation board, but if unsuccessful, workers may apply force 
(i.e. strike or lockout) except for essential services which must go for 
arbitration 
Sources: Bauer 1992: 1-17; Hubbard and Corbett 1993: 121; Piitz 1996: 172 - 178; 
Government Gazette 1992: 33 - 69, 101 - 108. 
The 1992 Labour Act comprehensively deals with aspects such as basic conditions of 
employment, the tennination of employment contracts and unfair disciplinary action 
as well as more general matters which influence labour relations in considerably more 
detail than had previously been the case. At the same time it is less comprehensive on 
aspects such as the Labour Advisory Council and the Labour Courts as the idea was to 
intentionally leave room for the courts to use their own discretion in the above. 
Provision was, however, made for supplementary guidelines (van Rooyen 1996: 232). 
Table 15: Other labour-related legislation introduced between 1990 and 1994 
Name of Act Highlights of contents 
The Constitution of the - The following aspects of the constitution may be of particular 
Republic of Namibia 1990 importance in context of labour relations: the right to freedom of 
speech and expression; the right to freedom of association, the 
right to withhold labour. 
National Vocational Training - replaces Apprenticeship Ordinance of 1938 and Labour 
Act 1994 Promotion Fund laws of 1975 and 1981, and deals with 
vocational training 
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Name of Act Highlights of contents 
Social Security Act 1994 - aimed at establishing social security system covenng all 
workers and employers in the country 
- mandatory contributions by workers and employers to specific 
funds under administration of the Social Security Commission 
Employees Compensation - amended the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1941 
Amendment Act 1995 - administration of act transferred to Social Security Commission 
-changes included replacing the word "workmen" with 
"employees", including domestic workers, etc. 
Export Processing Zones Act - two important aspects include the stated aim of increasing 
1995 industrial employment and to encourage the development of skills 
among workers and to build managerial skills 
- this act stated that the Labour Act of 1992 would not apply in 
the EPZ **; Minister of Trade and Industry was given power to 
implement labour regulations based on consultations with the 
Minster of Labour and Human Resources Development, and the 
Offshore Development Company 
- act provides incentives for training local workers 
Source: van Rooyen 1996: 227-235. 
The above discussion has provided a background to the development of labour 
institutions and labour relations in Namibia. In the remainder of this chapter collective 
bargaining, the minimum wage and social security, all of which affect the cost of 
labour, either directly or in the form of non-wage costs, will be discussed in detail. 
6.4 Collective Bargaining 
6.4.1 Collective bargaining during the pre-independence era (with particular 
emphasis on the era of South African rule 1915 -1990) 
During the apartheid era, the main legislation pertaining to labour relations was that 
described in the Ordinance on Wages and Industrial Reconciliation no. 35 of 
1952. This was the first piece oflegislation that was concerned with collective labour 
action, although it was still "discriminatory in content". Most of the laws promulgated 
during this time, and related to labour, were designed to "reinforce and refine the 
existing system oflabour extraction" (van Rooyen 1996: 151). 
With the promulgation of the 1952 Ordinance, white employers and employees were 
given access to collective bargaining and dispute resolution mechanisms. This access 
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was denied to members of other ethnic groups. It was evident during this time that 
labour relations were developing along racial lines, and that relations subsequently 
were becoming more and more dualistic in nature. 
Van Rooyen (1996: 154, 155) notes that the Act was divided into three sections: 
(summarised below to only note the highlights): 
1) The first section covered wage determination by the wage boards in industries in 
which labour was not organised, i.e. cases where there were no collective 
bargaining structures, or where the latter was insufficient or ineffective. The wage 
fixing institution of a wage board was applicable to workers of all races. 
2) The second section covered the settlement of disputes, with industrial conciliation 
based on the voluntary system of collective bargaining. Provision was made for 
the registration of both employers and employee organisations, as well as for 
mechanisms such as industrial reconciliation councils, mediation and arbitration, 
which would assist in the resolution of conflict. Strikes and the planned prevention 
of necessary services were _forbidden unless, in the case of a strike, an application 
had been made to the reconciliation council and a specific period of time had 
passed, or, in the case of arbitration, a formal decision is pending. Parties were 
forced by means of the Ordinance to follow the formal collective bargaining 
procedures and the mechanisms of mediation or arbitration before they could 
resort to strikes or lockouts. 
3) The third section described the general administrative aspects of dispute handling 
and included aspects such as the appointment and authorities of labour inspectors, 
protection of the right of freedom of some employees, and the prohibition of 
strikes and lockouts in certain circumstances. 
This ordinance, and more specifically chapter 2 of it, dealt with the settlement of 
industrial disputes and provided the machinery for establishing conciliation channels, 
as well as the registration of trade unions. Blacks were allowed to form unions, but 
these unions were not allowed to register, nor were they allowed to apply for the 
establishment of a conciliation board to consider disputes between employers and 
workers. Such unions were not given any protection in the Act that related to 
negotiation, arbitration, conciliation, or the determination of disputes. Strikes by 
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workers engaged in "essential" servIces were prohibited, but white and coloured 
workers involved in non-essential services were allowed to strike (ILO 1977: 71, 72). 
As black workers had been excluded from the 1952 Ordinance, strikes by these 
workers were considered illegal and a criminal offense. Criminal charges were laid 
against many workers who participated in organised labour action, and many were 
held without trial. In spite of the fact that black workers were not entitled to organise 
themselves in unions, or to strike, such actions did occur during the 1970's, 
particularly in the mining and fishing industries. The most widespread and protracted 
of these strikes took place during 197111972, when contract labourers protested 
unsuccessfully against the system of contract labour. Some 13 000 workers 
participated in this strike which is now regarded as setting off a new era of violence in 
labour relations, which was set to continue up to independence in 1990 (Bauer 1994: 
39; Hishongwa 1992: 77, 80-82). 
An important mechanism introduced in the 1952 Wage and Industrial Conciliation 
Act was that of the conciliation board. During the period (roughly) 1978 to 1990 
some 42 conciliation boards were established, of which 30 were approved by cabinet. 
In 34 of the 40 cases the disputes were on wage issues and conditions of employment. 
About 90% of the wage boards successfully managed to negotiate outcomes 
acceptable to all parties involved (van Rooyen 1996: 205). 
The Ordinance on Wages and Industrial Reconciliation no. 35 of 1952 also provided 
for another mechanism, the wage board. Attempts during the late 1970's to utilise 
this mechanism in the hotel industry in particular appeared unsuccessful. This was 
later ascribed to the "lack of expertise in this specialised field" and the fact that local 
socio~eco-nomic conditions "were not conducive to the su.c-cessful functioning of 
wage-fixing machinery" (van Rooyen 1996: 206, 207). 
The Wage and Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1952 was amended in 1978 
by the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Amendment Proclamation. This 
proclamation allowed for the inclusion of black workers under the law, but it 
determined that unions or employers' organisations would not be allowed to foster 
ties with political parties, nor would they be allowed to provide financial assistance to 
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political parties or receive financial aid from such parties. This was in stark contrast to 
the principle of freedom of association. The second amendment pertained to the role 
of the conciliation boards in resolving disputes and allowed the disputing parties to 
involve a neutral outsider to chair the board. Van Rooyen (1996: 187) notes that the 
widespread use of this had played a large role in the success conciliation boards have 
achieved in dispute resolution. A third amendment entailed the removal of all 
reference to race in the law, and this in effect meant that through this law black 
workers were allowed to formally and legally organise themselves into unions. The 
legal freedom granted to workers to organise themselves led to a rapid increase in the 
number of unions and in union membership. During the period 1986 to 1989 some 21 
organised groups applied for trade union status, although only 13 of these were 
officially registered in the end. By the end of 1988 some 66 000 workers had already 
become union members in the country (Wiehahn Commission 1989: 200). 
In September 1987 a commission of enquiry, known as the Wiehann Commission (not 
to be confused with the commission with the same name and chairman that 
investigated South African labour relations a decade earlier), was appointed by the 
Transitional Government of National Unity (installed to power in the mid-1980's) to 
investigate prevailing labour market conditions in the country. 
6.4.1.1 The Wiehahn Commission: 
6.4.1.1.1 Findings and recommendations regarding collective bargaining 
Following a thorough investigation of prevailing labour issues during 1987 and 1988, 
the Wiehahn Commission declared itself strongly in support of the principle of 
freedom of association and the encouragement of collective bargaining at industrial 
level, although it noted that it opposed the duplication of organisations governing 
industrial relations. The Commission found that collective bargaining should be 
regarded as the foundation of the Namibian system of labour relations, and that it 
should therefore be developed and strengthened. Although a need for formalising 
collective bargaining structures was identified, the Commission also noted that 
collective bargaining structures should remain flexible in order to allow the 
establishment of bargaining forums at all levels (1989: 219). However, given 
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Namibia's state of development in terms of industrial relations at the time of their 
investigation, the Commission found that it would be too drastic a decision to force 
parties in Namibia by law to bargain collectively. Consequently it recommended the 
"natural" and free development of collective bargaining in the country, while at the 
same time strongly recommending that government should support the development 
of collective bargaining in Namibia. Furthermore, it advised that unions and employer 
organisations should realise the importance of collective bargaining and the 
responsibility that went with this. Deliberate refusal to bargain was to be regarded in a 
serious light. 
Following widespread consultation with relevant sources, the Commission (1989: 
248) arrived at the conclusion that multi-level bargaining should continue as before. 
Collective bargaining at all levels, ranging from national to factory level (i.e. 
decentralised collective bargaining) was considered to be the best option for Namibia. 
However, it is perhaps noteworthy that the Commission also pointed out that some of 
the people interviewed suggested collective bargaining in Namibia should follow a 
pattern of centralised development which would eventually result in collective 
bargaining based on industry. 
The Wiehahn Commission was unable to gather detailed information as to how much 
bargaining took place at the various levels in Namibia. However, it did find that 
bargaining in smaller enterprises was more informal in nature, while more formal and 
structured bargaining was beginning to become more popular within the larger 
enterprises during the latter part of the 1980's (Wiehahn Commission 1989: 253). 
6.4.1.1.2 Findings and recommendations on dispute resolution mechanisms 
As regards labour disputes and grievance procedures, the Commission found that the 
1952 Ordinance made provision for dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation, 
arbitration and conciliation. However, evidence suggested that employers and 
employees in Namibia lacked experience of using the institutionalised negotiation and 
the dispute resolution mechanisms. It is perhaps noteworthy that the Commission 
(1989: 310) also referred to the principle of "minimum government intervention" and, 
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based on this, advised that Government should only become involved in disputes once 
all other avenues leading to possible solutions had been exhausted. 
Mediation was identified as an important dispute resolution mechanism, the use of 
which should be encouraged. With respect to arbitration, the difference between free 
and mandatory arbitration was emphasised, and the Commission noted that employers 
and employees should be encouraged to make better use of voluntary arbitration. 
Ideally, labour disputes involving workers providing emergency services should be 
referred for mandatory arbitration. As regards conciliation, the Commission found 
that Conciliation Boards in Namibia had been fairly successful during the 1980's. The 
most notable problem regarding this was related to the time it normally took once the 
application for the formulation of a Conciliation Board had been made, to the 
approval of this by Cabinet. It was suggested that this problem could be solved if the 
Minister of Labour was allowed to directly appoint a Conciliation Board, based on 
advice from the (proposed) Labour Commissioner. The Commission did not advise a 
specific sequence with respect to the dispute resolution procedures, but did suggest 
that, before resorting to mediation or arbitration, parties should attempt to resolve the 
dispute amongst themselves (Wiehahn Commission 1989: 296, 307 - 309). 
The Wiehahn Commission found that, of all the conciliation mechanisms provided for 
by the Ordinance, the reconciliation councils appeared to be the one most popularly 
used in Namibia. Although only 3 reconciliation councils were formed during the 
period 1980-85, the number had risen to 17 by August 1988. Also, whereas only 3 
strikes had been recorded for the 1980-85 period, a total of 24 strikes had taken place 
by 1987 (Wiehahn Commission 1989: 200, 201). 
The Commission recommended the establishment of a Labour Court, as industrial 
disputes appeared to be on the increase and were becoming too complicated to handle 
in the "normal" courts. Some of the most important responsibilities of this Court were 
to include jUdging disputes by means of voluntary or mandatory arbitration; 
interpreting the conditions of the labour laws of the country, industrial agreements, 
wage determination, hearings of urgent applications; and judgement of alleged cases 
of "unfair" labour practices (Bauer 1994: 180; Wiehahn Commission 1989: 315, 
320). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
168 
The Wiehahn Commission made the following recommendations regarding grievance 
procedures and dispute resolution (1989: 259, 324): 
• The concept "unfair labour practice" should be accepted from a statutory point of 
view, and be used in future as basis for a complaint at the Labour Court; 
• The right of workers to strike should be considered as a "fundamental human 
right" and consequently strikes should be regulated, rather than forbidden. 
However, strikes and lock-outs will still be considered as "unlawful" ifthe correct 
procedure is not followed; 
• Government should keep the right of categorising certain services as "emergency 
services", and strikes and lockouts for workers providing such services should 
remain forbidden. Should a dispute in such a service arise, arbitration should be 
compulsory; 
• Government should be authorised to proceed with the necessary action required to 
solve labour disputes which could potentially hold national repercussions; 
• Workers should cast votes in order to determine whether a strike should be called; 
• Arbitration outcomes should remain binding, but in future non-compliance with 
such outcomes should not be deemed a criminal offence, but rather be judged by 
the proposed Labour Court; 
• A new position of Labour Commissioner should be created, who will then be 
awarded considerable executive powers. The Office of the Labour Commissioner 
should be responsible for keeping registers on unions, employer organisations, 
federations, etc.; it should also keep registers on labour disputes; should handle 
applications for conciliation; should be responsible for deciding who are 
appointed as mediators, arbitrators, etc.; advise the Department of Labour about 
labour issues; and handle complaints regarding labour issues, etc. 
• Introducing industrial councils. 
6.4.2 Collective bargaining since 1990 
In mid-1990 the Namibian cabinet approved a document entitled "National Policy on 
Labour and Manpower Development". The recommendations in this report were 
based on the findings of an ILO Commission of inquiry into labour relations in 
Namibia that took place in 1990, shortly after independence. In this report 
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government did not commit itself fully to all the Wiehahn recommendations but rather 
provided policy guidelines for future industrial action. The document did, however, 
highlight the importance of tripartism and collective bargaining. Other important 
aspects mentioned included "tentative support for. .. flexible and voluntary industrial 
councils, and ... a minimum wage in sectors in which it is most needed". The 
document also referred to other conditions of service and health and safety standards 
(Bauer 1994: 178, 179). 
Many of the recommendations which were included in this 1990 policy document and 
the subsequent 1992 Labour Act were already investigated and recommended by the 
Wiehahn Commission in their 1989 report. The Commission had advised that 
Namibia join the ILO, "ratify and adopt the relevant ILO Conventions and 
Recommendations and, as a rule, conform to international labour standards". 
Furthermore, the Commission had also highlighted the need for "protective conditions 
of employment legislation" and had advised the establishment of ad hoc Wage 
Commissions to set minimum wages in certain sectors of the economy (Bauer 1994: 
179). 
Virtually all of the labour policies and legislation enacted by government SInce 
independence have been aimed at improving labour relations, wages and conditions of 
service. In the National Development Plan 1 (1995: 129, 130) the aspects highlighted 
included the promotion of "sound labour relations and fair employment practices by 
encouraging freedom of association by way of ... the formation of trade unions to 
protect workers' rights and interests ... ". The new Labour Code accepted after 
independence embodies the ILO's idea oftripartism (Bauer 1994: 171, 172). 
Notwithstanding the mostly positive reaction to the- 1992 Labour ·Act, a number of 
unions and employers have voiced their dissatisfaction with its contents. The 
following have been (and remain) contentious issues (Bauer 1994: 182): 
• with respect to basic conditions of employment, the unions wanted a 40 hour work 
week instead of a 45 hour work week; 
• unions would like to see the implementation of the mInImUm wage (this has 
meanwhile taken place in the construction industry); 
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• with respect to the right to strike, the definition of what constitutes "essential 
services" remains unclear to the unions; 
• at the time, unions were also dissatisfied with the lack of paid maternity leave (this 
has also changed in the meantime, following the new Social Security Act of 1994). 
Concerns voiced by employers included the following (Bauer 1994: 182): 
• the expenses attached to the implementation of the provisions in the new 
legislation are high; 
• the legislation might be considered too "sophisticated" for Namibia, which is only 
a developing country; 
• there is too much emphasis on the rights of workers, and not sufficient emphasis on 
their duties and obligations. 
• During the parliamentary debate on the Labour Act in 1992 (Bauer 1992: 13, 14), 
some members of the National Assembly also noted similar concerns: 
- the standards set by the Act are too high for a "Third W orId" country; 
- the provisions of the new Act would be a burden on small employers; 
- the provisions of the Act would discourage foreign investment; 
- the new structures would come to "dominate government". 
6.4.2.1 Contents of the 1992 Labour Act 
The new Labour Act (no. 6 of 1992) makes provision for a Labour Commission'er, a 
thirteen member Labour Advisory Council, ad hoc Wage Commissions, as well as a 
Labour Court and District Labour Courts. In additions to this, it also lays down the 
basic conditions regarding the activities of unions and employers organisations, 
collective agreements and dispute handling. The following discussion highlights some 
-" .- -- - - - - - ~ - -> 
of the most noteworthy aspects of the 1992 Labour Act (Bauer 1994: 171, 172): 
6.4.2.1.1 Office of the Labour Commissioner 
The (newly established) Office of the Labour Commissioner has the responsibility of 
registering unions and employers' organisations, registering collective agreements and 
assisting with the settlement of disputes by means of conciliation boards. The Office 
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of the Labour Commissioner is divided into three sections: a) Mediation and 
conciliation, b) Collective agreements and registration, c) International Relations / 
Labour Advisory Council/Wages Commission. In an attempt not to duplicate the 
function of the existing Directorate of Labour, a decision was reached to make the 
Office of the Labour Commissioner responsible for handling all cases involving 
collective labour relations. The Directorate oversees the handling of all cases 
involving individuals (refer Annexure A: Mr. Kassen). 
6.4.2.1.2 The Labour Court and District Labour Courts 
The 1992 Labour Law has made provision for the establishment of a (Higher) Labour 
Court as well as District Labour Courts. Although both types of courts have the same 
function, the High Court has the added responsibility for interpreting the 1992 Labour 
Act. Whereas the (Higher) Labour Court in Windhoek mainly focuses on hearings 
involving collective action involving unions, the district Labour Courts rule on 
individual complaints (Bauer 1992: 4). 
Both types of courts are courts of first instance, (i.e. either may be approached directly 
- it is not necessary to first approach a District Labour Court before one may 
approach the (Higher) Labour Court in Windhoek). There has been a trend developing 
with unions normally opting to go directly to the Windhoek Labour Court, while 
individuals normally first go to the District Labour Courts. In the Labour Courts it is 
not required to use a lawyer. Any individual can go directly to the court, pay the 
registration fee of N$ 25 (R 25) and lodge a complaint. This has made the courts 
easily accessible to all persons (refer Annexure A: Messrs. Kassen and Mwanawina). 
The District Labour Courts are the equivalent of the Magistrate's Court. In practice, 
the Magistrate's Courts function as District Labour Courts - the only difference is that 
the -courts now have the added workload of handling all labour related cases. 
Unfortunately, as virtually none of the lawyers have received training in labour-
related matters, the courts are not perceived to be functioning as well as had been 
hoped. Problems mentioned confirmed the statement of Daniels (1995: 53) that 
"presiding officers are still inexperienced and this tends to cause delays ... ". 
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6.4.2.1.3 Collective action (unions and employer's organisations) 
The numbers of unions and employers' organisations registered have increased 
markedly since the inception of the new Labour Act. In the Report on Activities of the 
Labour Commissioner for March 1995 - March 1996 (1996: 18), it is stated that the 
Office of the Labour Commissioner is 
"alarmed by the high rate of registered trade unions in a country of only 1.6 
million people. This situation does not only saturate the labour front but also 
weakens the bargaining power of the workforce. It seems that applicants are 
exploiting the loophole in the Labour Act for it does not provide a minimum 
number of workers to form a trade union." 
By June 1999, a total of28 unions had been officially registered with the Office of the 
Labour Commissioner since November 1992 (refer Annexure A: Messrs. Kassen and 
Mwanawina). 
Namibia follows a system whereby it is possible for a umon or employer's 
organisation to be named as the "exclusive bargaining agent" for a specific industry. 
This would, for example, give one particular union the right to negotiate on behalf of 
all the employees in that bargaining unit, and to subsequently enter into a collective 
agreement (Government Gazette no 388 1992: 74 - 89; Hubbard and Corbett 1993: 
63, 71). The criteria for determining exclusive bargaining power is that a union must 
represent more than 50% of the total number of employees in the industry who are 
listed as union members in that industry (refer Annexure A: Mr. Kassen). 
Of the nearly thirty formally registered trade unions in Namibia, only two makes 
extensive use of the collective bargaining procedures as spelled out in the Labour Act. 
This is the Mineworkers Union of Namibia (MWUN) and· the Namibia Food and 
Allied Workers Union (NF A WU). Others also use it but to a much lesser extent (refer 
Annexure A: Mr. Kassen). 
6.4.2.1.4 Collective Agreements 
The Labour Act states that a collective agreement between an employer and a union 
(not an exclusive bargaining agent) is binding on the employer, all other employers 
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who belong to the employer organisation, or become members of it, as well as all 
workers who are members of that union, or who become a member of the union. 
Collective agreements such as this example are binding irrespective if whether they 
are registered. Should one of the parties involved in a "registered" collective 
agreement be a recognised exclusive bargaining unit, the agreement would be binding 
on the employer directly involved. It would also be binding on other employers who 
belong to the same organisation, and all workers in that bargaining unit, even those 
who are not members of that particular union (Hubbard and Corbett 1993: 83, 84). 
Although collective bargaining in Namibia takes place mostly at enterprise level, it is 
possible to extend an agreement reached at this level to industry level. The Minister of 
Labour and Manpower Development has the power to "extend any of the provisions 
of a registered collective agreement to other employers and employees in the 
particular industry to which the collective agreement relates". In such a case where a 
collective agreement has been extended, there is no right of appeal to the Office of the 
Labour Commissioner (Hubbard and Corbett 1993: 84). 
By 1999, the only collective agreement in Namibia that had been extended to cover an 
entire industry was that pertaining to the minimum wage in the construction industry. 
It was announced in the Government Gazette of Namibia in November 1996 that all 
registered collective agreements relating to the construction industry would 
henceforth be binding upon all employers and employees in that particular industry. 
However, this excludes employers and employees who are involved in labour based 
work-projects (Labour based projects are projects that that make use of labour based 
technology, or rather technology in which labour, supported by light equipment, is 
used as a cost effective method of providing and upgrading infrastructure. Such 
projects -often involve the construction or upgrading of physical-inrrastructure such as 
roads). (Government Gazette no 1444, 15 November 1996; Ministry of Works, 
Transport and Communications 1997: 6; refer Annexure A: Mr. Kassen). 
6.4.2.1.5 Conciliation and Dispute Resolution 
The new Labour Act has made it standard for recognition agreements to state 
procedures for dispute resolution (Daniels 1995: 55; Hubbard and Corbett 1993: 79). 
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The 1992 Labour Act also distinguishes between disputes of rights and disputes of 
interest. Whereas the fonner relates to the interpretation of the provisions of the Act, 
employment contracts, and agreements, recognition of a union as sole bargaining 
agent, or refusal to do so, or the existence of a contract or agreement, the latter covers 
all other aspects. The Labour Court has the right to decide whether a dispute is one of 
rights or one of interest (Hubbard and Corbett 1993: 87, 88). 
Options for resolving disputes (Daniels 1995: 54; Hubbard and Corbett 1993: 93): 
a) Dispute o(rights: 
the matter can be referred to the Labour Court 
on the basis of mutual agreement, parties may refer to arbitration 
(Parties involved in a dispute of rights are not allowed to resort to strikes or 
lock-out action before first having referred the issue to the Labour Court or, if 
mediation proves unsuccessful, arbitration). 
b) Dispute o(Interest: 
- the matter can be referred for mediation or arbitration (this is compulsory in the case 
of "essential services", also parties involved in a dispute may agree on private 
arbitration / mediation). 
- parties may resort to lock-outs or strikes, provided that the following has been 
adhered to: 48 hours notice was given, an "essential service" is not involved, and the 
issue has not been referred for arbitration. 
Arbitration in general is governed by the Arbitration Act no 42 of 1965, and an 
arbitrated outcome is final and binding. Although mediation and arbitration is 
provided for by law in Namibia, the use of these dispute resolution mechanisms has 
not been as extensive as it perhaps could have been. Reasons quoted for this include 
the high costs which are. nonnally attached to this kind of action, the inexperience of 
unions and employers as regards the procedures to be followed, and the lack of 
expertise to assist these processes (Daniels 1995: 54, 55; Hubbard and Corbett 1993: 
94,95). 
According to the Labour Act, disputes involving unfair disciplinary conditions and 
dismissals, as well as those pertaining to employment conditions, must be referred to a 
District Labour Court. Labour inspectors act not only as investigators, but also as 
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mediators / conciliators. However, evidence suggests that the labour inspectors are 
unpopular with the unions (which have accused them of accepting bribes and of not 
being impartial), and that it is consequently mostly non-union members who request 
investigations from the inspectors. Standard procedure is that inspectors must 
convene a meeting before a trial actually starts, in order to agree on some of the facts, 
and, to limit the issues (Daniels 1995: 54). 
The Office of the Labour Commissioner has the power to convene a Conciliation 
Board if it appears that all other possible ways of resolving a dispute between a union 
(unions) and an employer (employers' organisation) had failed. Conciliation Boards 
can therefore only be formed in a collective dispute. In Namibia, most of the union 
leaders are strongly in favour of the Conciliation Boards, as it is deemed as the fastest 
way to produce results. Although such boards are also fairly popular among 
employers, employers have criticised it for being time-consuming. Also, there appears 
to be a feeling that attempts to resolve issues internally should enjoy more attention, 
as unions sometimes seem uncommitted to this conciliation process (Daniels 1995: 
54). Hubbard and Corbett (1993: 91) identified a potential problem pertaining to the 
term of a Board - parties must agree on a set term for the Board, as the official term 
must expire before a strike may legally take place. 
Table 16: Official disputes registered between April 1995 and March 1999 
April 1995 - April 1996 - April 1997- April 1998 -
March 1996 March 1997 March 1998 March 1999 
- total no. of 26 34 35 38 
disputes 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development 1994a and 1995a ; 
refer Annexure A: Mr. Mwanawina. 
As stated earlier in this section, strikes and lockouts are only permitted in the case of a 
dispute of interest. Two further conditions for allowing a strike or lockout are that 
a) a conciliation board must have attempted to resolve the specific dispute and 
failed, and 
b) that neither of the two parties involved in the dispute are responsible for 
delivering an "essential service", i.e. services which, if not available, will 
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endanger the health, lives or personal safety of Namibians. The Minister of 
Labour and Manpower Development has the authority to request the Labour 
Commissioner to declare a particular service as "essential". Should a strike 
take place, it is not compulsory for employers to pay workers involved in the 
strike (Corbett and Hubbard 1993: 96). 
Table 17: Official industrial action (strikes and lock-outs) registered between 
April 1995 and March 1999 
April 1995 - April 1996- April 1997- April 1998 -
March 1996 March 1997 March 1998 March 1999 
Total number, of 12 n fa 20 6 
which 
- legal 5 3 2 
- illegal 7 17 4 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Human Resources Development 1994a and 1995a ; 
refer Annexure A: Mr. Mwanawina 
Although it is difficult to determine the efficiency of the dispute procedures as set out 
in the Labour Law, Daniels (1995: 55) deemed the mediation, arbitration, and 
Conciliation Boards to have been fairly successful during the first few years of its 
existence. Up to 1995 no appeals had been lodged against decisions reached through 
these processes. Similarly, few District Court decisions had been appealed against (in 
1994 only 11 appealed out of 322 cases). Daniels (1995: 56) did, however, note that 
there were important shortcomings with respect to human resources, and that these 
include the lack of skills required for administering, monitoring and participating in 
procedures. There appears to be a definite need for training, as well as procedural 
agreement streamlining in order to enhance the effective use of the Labour Act. 
6.4.2.2 Criticism against the 1992 Labour Act 
In November 1998 the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Economics organised 
an official meeting aimed at discussing the 1992 Labour Act. Please take note: The 
meeting was open to the public and attended by the' author of this study. Notes made 
during the deliberations therefore form the basis of the discussion in this section. 
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The Hon. B. Esau, MP and chairperson of the committee, in his opening speech and 
subsequent deliberations noted the following: 
• The system of collective bargaining has been hampered by the lack of goodwill 
from both employers and workers; 
• The situation of farm workers and domestic workers has not improved for the 
better since the new Labour Act came into effect; 
• The conditions of service and wages of workers in general are perceived to have 
not improved much since the introduction of the Labour Act. He did not, 
however, present any evidence in support of this statement. 
In addition to the above, Mr. Esau also acknowledged that although the Labour 
Advisory Council (LAC), consisting of representatives from government, employers 
and workers had started out well, it had deteriorated in terms of efficiency. No 
meetings had been held for an 18 month period prior to the public discussion, as it 
had proved very difficult to arrange for all parties to meet. Also, it was felt that the 
discussion lacked sufficient input, mainly because the second largest union in the 
country representing retail workers was also not represented in the LAC. 
With regard to the functioning of Labour Courts, Mr. Esau noted that the district 
labour courts appeared unable to bring finality to cases, nor appeared to have the 
ability to enforce their judgements. Appeals against judgements should according to 
the Labour Act be processed with 21 days, but in reality it takes longer than a year 
before such appeals are processed. The fact that it is up to the employee to prove 
his/her case has made it all the more difficult to punish employers. Also, employees 
are said to be intimidated by the threat of costs associated with going to court. He 
further noted that although many employers do comply with the conditions stipulated 
in the Act, there are still those who seek loophoies. For example, some employers 
allegedly only take employees on for 1 month periods, and let them sign new 
contracts on a monthly basis. 
At the time, the official representative of the Namibian Employers' Federation, Mr. 
C. Truebody, in turn noted that the federation was of the opinion that the Labour 
Advisory Council did not function independently nor particularly effectively, and that 
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the federation expected an improvement. He also noted that employers and workers 
still lacked commitment when entering into negotiation, and that both sides simply 
followed procedures in a perfunctory manner. The view of the federation was that 
workers preferred strikes and lock-outs to mediation and conciliation. He further 
noted that the federation was concerned about the feeling among unions that working 
hours should be reduced, as Namibia is already not considered to be competitive 
internationally and that such a move would have serious negative repercussions. The 
federation was also concerned about the issue of Aids in the workplace, as they were 
not quite sure how to deal with workers who could no longer work. Other issues 
highlighted by him on behalf of the federation included the following: 
• the language used in the Labour Act was found to be confusing and difficult to 
interpret; 
• managerial staff should not be granted overtime pay; 
• the federation wanted more flexibility in interpreting the Labour Act; 
• many conditions of service were forced upon employers. For example, each 
employer should be able to negotiate issues such as Sunday work and payment 
for such work with its staff, and not be forced by the Labour Act determinations. 
Union representatives at the meeting noted that they were in general unhappy about 
the lack of disclosure of information to unions by employers, for example they felt 
they were not given sufficient warning when employers intended to retrench workers, 
and that this was against the principle of good faith. 
A representative of the Namibia Building Workers Union noted a number of 
problems being experienced in the building industry. Among such problems was the 
fact that union workers perceived the probation period for workers to be too long. On 
-
behalf of the union; he als() criticised construction companies for allegedly making up 
their own policies that differed from what the Labour Act stipulated. It was also 
noted that the Labour Courts were not enforcing judgements made by themselves, in 
part because the police did not seem to understand what they were responsible for 
and hence was not of much use in assisting enforcement. In addition to the above, he 
confirmed Mr. Esau's statement that some employers deliberately continue to make 
workers sign 1 month contracts even after some of them had been working for that 
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particular employer for a number of years. It is believed that such companies do this 
to avoid the costs associated with medical aid, pension contributions, etc. Union 
members also perceived that health and safety procedures were neglected as they 
were considered to be too expensive by some employers. 
During the ensuing discussion it was also mentioned that only 25 labour inspectors are 
responsible for all the labour cases made throughout the entire country, both in the 
urban and rural areas. It is therefore clear that these inspectors are heavily 
overburdened. Also, inspectors are accused of interpreting the Labour Act incorrectly, 
in spite of receiving training at least twice per annum. In spite of this the position of 
labour inspectors remains crucial, as they represent an important link between 
employers and workers. 
Further to the above it was mentioned that the basic conditions of employment might 
undergo some changes to accommodate, for example, people of the Muslim faith who 
would prefer to work on Sundays and not on Fridays. 
6.4.2.3 Possible amendments to the 1992 Labour Act? 
The following three aspects regarding collective bargaining and dispute resolution, 
strike action and retrenchments are viewed by the Office of the Labour Commissioner 
as areas which may require amendments in future (refer Annexure A: Mr. Kassen). 
1) The dispute resolution system described in the 1992 Labour Act is under 
investigation, as it appears that the system of District Labour Courts does not 
function as efficiently as initially expected. This can be attributed to the fact that 
the overburdened District Magistrate Courts tend to give. priority to civil and 
criminal cases, something that has resulted in huge backlogs with regard to the 
processing of labour cases. At present the possibility of abolishing the use of these 
courts is being investigated. (The Higher Labour Court will, however, remain). 
The option would be to focus much more on arbitration, mediation and 
conciliation. Labour Inspectors, however, apparently feel that the system has not 
been used long enough to justify such a change. They are apparently also of the 
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opinion that the ability for workers to resort to judicial action as a last resort does 
prove effective in getting employers to co-operate. 
2) A second aspect that may be addressed in future concerns strike procedure and 
more specifically the right of employers to seek legal redress during strikes. As a 
result of such action, based on the principle of urgent interim relief, the 
effectiveness of strike action is said to be much less effective than what would 
otherwise have been the case. It should be added, though, that interdicts against 
striking workers are often not enforced as police have to keep a low profile in order 
for the strike to remain a "labour issue" and not a criminal one. 
3) A third aspect that may be amended in future concerns the retrenchment that often 
follows strike action. The right of employers to retrench is considered too strong, 
and in future changes may be introduced that will make it mandatory for employers 
to first convince government and workers that a business is actually in trouble, 
before it will be allowed to retrench workers. Directors who make themselves 
guilty of mismanaging companies which results in retrenchments may even be held 
liable through labour law in future. However, it could perhaps be argued that such 
action might be regarded as too drastic and perhaps umealistic if one takes into 
account the difficult economic circumstances prevailing in the country. In a 
country where unemployment is probably one of the biggest economic and social 
problems, such a move" could prove detrimental to economic activity as it would 
make employers and even prospective employers hesitant to launch new businesses 
or employ (more) workers. 
6.4.3 Labour relations in the Export Processing Zone 
No discussion regarding the 1992 Labour Act and collective bargaining would be 
comprehensive without referring to the situation prevailing in the Export Processing 
Zone. 
The EPZ program is regarded by many as perhaps one of the best opportunities for the 
country to attract foreign investment, thereby generating much needed employment. 
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In order to attract investors, generous tax concessions and subsidies regarding training 
to employees are offered. 
The situation and regulations regarding labour in an EPZ company is slightly different 
to that enforced in the rest of the country, and this met with strong union opposition 
during 1996. The Ministry of Trade and Industry had (allegedly) taken a decision on 
labour conditions in the EPZ without consulting the Ministry of Labour or the Office 
of the Labour Commissioner, determining that "strikes, go-slows and lockouts will 
not be permitted" in the EPZ. This resulted in three court cases during 1996 in which 
the unions took government to court. The issue was then taken up in parliament and it 
was decided that the 1992 Labour Act would apply in the EPZ. However, the right to 
withhold labour would only be taken away from workers for a period of five years, 
with the five year period commencing at the time of the parliamentary decision in 
1996. Should any employee be dismissed or be punished for striking before this five 
year period is over (in 2001), such a dismissal or penalty will be considered "fair and 
valid" as a result of an amendment made to the Labour Act. On the other hand, 
employers are not permitted to resort to lockouts if they face labour related problems. 
Furthermore, it was agreed that all disputes are to be referred to the Office of the 
Labour Commissioner, who in turn had to refer it to a conciliation board for 
arbitration. In the EPZ fact file (Ministry of Trade and Industry 1995: no page 
number) it is noted that "arbitration procedures will be strengthened to speed up 
dispute resolution", although it is not explicitly stated how this will be done. Should 
such a board prove unable to resolve the dispute, the EPZ employer will be allowed to 
obtain an interdict from the court restraining individuals or unions from striking 
(Ministry of Trade and Industry 1995: no page number; Ministry of Trade and 
Industry 1997: 19). Save for these conditions, all other conditions as determined by 
the 1992 Labour Act are applicable in the EPZ (refer Annexure A: Mr. Kassen). 
As part of the attempt to attract prospective companies to the EPZ and to make use of 
more labour intensive processes, the Namibian government is granting companies an 
additional income tax deduction of 25% for wages paid to workers who are directly 
involved in manufacturing, as well as for technical training provided to such workers 
(Ministry of Trade and Industry 1995: 3). 
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It is interesting to note the Investment Centre's (Ministry of Trade and Industry 1995: 
no page number) quotes of the average wage rates for the manufacturing sector in 
Walvis Bay as shown in Table 18 (take note N$1 = Rl). This is of interest as Walvis 
Bay forms the "nucleus" of the new Export Processing Zone. It has also been 
established that the going wage rate is of particular importance to prospective EPZ 
investors, who are reported to attach as much importance to prevailing labour costs as 
to other EPZ matters. From information conveyed by Mrs. U. Philander at the EPZ 
Management Company in June 1999, it became evident that these average wage rates 
have not changed much since 1995 when the initial EPZ fact sheet was produced 
(refer Annexure A: Mr. Visser and Mrs. Philander). 
Table 18: Average wage categories for Walvis Bay EPZ 
Wage rate per hour for labourers N$ 3.00 - 6.00 
Wage rate per hour for a welder N$ 40.00 - 60.00 
University Graduate salaries N$ 3000.00 + per month 
High school graduate salaries N$ 1 200.00 to 3 000.00 per month 
Unskilled office workers N$ 800.00 to 1 200.00 per month 
Equipment operators N$ 1 200.00 + per month 
Drivers Basic ofN$ 1 200.00 per month + trip allowance 
perkm. 
NB: Add-on costs for labour in respect of normal additional social costs range from 15% to 
20% of salaries or wages. 
6.4.4 Summary and comparison of union activity and collective bargaining in 
other developing countries 
Similarly to South Africa, Namibia has a history of suppressing labour organisations 
initiated by black people. Unions for black workers were only made legal in 1978, and 
even then the freedom of association principle was not adhered to as ties with political 
parties were forbidden. It is difficult to assess whether union power has actually been 
a strong force in raising wage levels in Namibia since the inception of the new Labour 
Law. It appears, however, that unionisation has succeeded in uniting members and 
presenting employers' federations with a stronger and more equal bargaining partner 
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in collective negotiations, and that it in that way may have contributed to negotiating. 
improved working conditions, although not necessarily significantly higher wages. 
The local system of collective bargaining not only provides a comprehensive set of 
rules for workers in negotiations, but also offers comprehensive dispute resolution 
mechanisms. This comprehensive system is in stark contrast to many of the Latin 
American countries that either do not have collective bargaining systems or have 
systems that have not been fully developed. It is, however, similar to countries such as 
Chile and Uruguay where well developed bargaining structures are said to have 
increased certainty and synchronisation in the labour market, thereby drawing 
investors. Also, the collective bargaining structures laid out in the 1992 Labour Act 
overrides other legislation. It is not subject to other laws as is the case in Brazil, where 
national wage policy supersedes bargained agreements, nor is it negotiated locally and 
enforced on a more centralised level. 
Before 1990, when workers had been restricted by legislation regarding dispute 
resolution, the conciliation board was a popular instrument (e.g. roughly 42 were 
established during the last 12 years of South African rule). Following the rights 
accorded to unions after 1990 and the reSUlting rise in their power, combined with the 
fact that many unions became more knowledgeable with regard to using mt;diation 
and arbitration, the number of conciliation boards established has declined 
significantly. 
Given the relatively short period since its introduction, it is difficult to state how 
successful collective procedures and all the related mechanisms have been in 
improving wage levels and working conditions of workers. Although some have 
expressed doubts about achieving these particular objectives, the general feeling has 
been one of optimism. 
The perceived success of the system of collective bargaining in Namibia should 
perhaps be seen in light of the fact that a large percentage of the population had no 
such system to tum to prior to Independence. It could be argued that the introduction 
of the mechanisms discussed in this section have empowered workers to change their 
own circumstances regarding wages and working conditions. 
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6.5 Minimum wages 
6.5.1 Minimum wages during the pre-independence era 
During the pre-independence era not only cash wages and salaries of non-white ethnic 
groups were in general much lower than that of whites, but also other conditions of 
service were provided along racial lines. 
As there was strict control over collective action, and in particular union activity 
which for a long time was forbidden by law, black workers did not have access to any 
mechanisms which could be used to negotiate better working circumstances. The ILO 
had for decades noted labour conditions in Namibia as a matter of concern, the first 
such official notification taking place in 1953 in a report compiled by a combined UN 
and ILO Committee on Forced Labour (ILO 1977: introduction). Before 
independence, the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance of 1952 (amended in 
1978) regulated wages and working conditions. Although this act in itself was not 
directly discriminatory, it excluded agricultural and domestic workers. Given that the 
vast majority of workers in these categories were not white, it constituted a 
discriminatory practice to exclude them. 
It should also be noted that, although all workers in other sectors were covered by 
this Ordinance, black workers were not allowed to make use of the provisions which 
related to strikes and dispute settlements. They were also not considered to be 
"employees" when it came to the right of an employer to change employment 
conditions as he wished. Employers had the right to decide upon any wage, as well as 
working conditions, for each of his workers, even though some workers were doing 
the same jobs (ILO 1977: 54). 
Although some of the enactments of the time (e.g. the 1952 Factories, Machinery and 
Building Work Ordinance) did provide for protection of workers against unhealthy or 
hazardous working conditions, these did not always apply (or at least applied to the 
same extent) to non-white workers. For example, the Factories, Machinery and 
Building Work Ordinance was not applicable to mines or farms where the greatest 
number of non-white workers worked. Consequently these workers did not benefit 
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from the provisions dealing with working time, overtime pay,. holidays, etc. Also 
excluded were domestic workers, employees in the hotel and restaurant trade, and 
workers in the construction industry. 
An employment survey that was conducted in 1981 among 296 enterprises in the 
formal sector in Windhoek indicated the presence of large inter-sectoral and intra-
sectoral differences with respect to wages and salaries: 
Table 19: Sectoral Wage and Salary Differentials in Namibia -1981 
Sector Skill Level Average Salary Salary Range Ratio highest to 
- R/rnonth - Rirnonth lowest in sector 
Manufacturing Unskilled 131 (670) 45-399 
Semi-skilled 650 (3325) 150-900 1 : 57.8 
Mid-management 1513 (7739) 720-2600 
Food Unskilled 136 (696) 54-247 
Processing Semi-skilled 525 (2685) 450-625 1 :36.2 
Mid-management 1278 (6537) 860-1955 
Commerce Unskilled 182 (931) 30-450 
Semi -skilled 478 (2445) 173-780 1 : 66.7 
Mid-management 1285 (6573) 550-2000 
Services Unskilled 117 (598) 65-179 
Semi-skilled 683 (3494) 300-900 1 :21.5 
Mid-management 1200 (6138) 1000-1400 
Banking, Unskilled 165 (844) 130-200 
Finance and Semi -skilled 504 (2578) 335-650 1 : 15.4 
Insurance Mid-management 1596 (8164) 1100-2000 
Source: Druggal 1989: 34. 
(Note: Rounded wage figures calculated in 1995 N$ values are highlighted in bold 
alongside original survey figures). 
Workers regularly complained about working conditions, and the fact that the profit 
levels of companies were not reflected in the benefits which accrued to them. Pressure 
to implement minimum wages in the mining and commercial agriculture sectors was 
persistent, although never successful (Bauer 1994: 41). 
, 
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Historically, subsistence and commercial agriculture has employed the greatest 
number of people in Namibia (DruggaI1989: 36). In spite of the fairly high income of 
"white" farmers, Druggal (1989: 38, 39) argue that the wages of "non-white" fann 
workers have shown little improvement during the past two decades. The annual cash 
plus non-cash wages of black fann workers were approximately R 250 to R 300 in 
1978 (at constant 1995 values: N$ 1871 - N$ 2246), i.e. at most R 25 (at constant 
1995 values: N$ 187) per month. In 1987, it was estimated that workers received 
approximately R 500 (at constant 1995 values: N$ 1268) per annum (R 42 (at constant 
1995 values: N$ 107) per month). During the late 1960's, black workers in the fishing 
industry were receiving annual wages of between R700 and R800 (at constant 1995 
values, approximately N$ 14000 to N$ 16000). On average, however, the annual 
valus of the contribution per worker was estimated at between R3000 and R4000 
(about N$ 60000 to N$ 80000) at the time. (Please note: the above constant figures 
are based on Namibian inflation rates, which has only been fonnally recorded since 
1974. Figures for years prior to this are therefore based on South African inflation 
rates). 
In 1976 the suggestion for a compulsory monthly minimum cash wage of R 54 (at 
constant 1995 values: N$ 503) in the commercial agricultural sector was rejected by 
the SWA Agricultural Employers' Union (Cronje and Cronje 1979: 47). Nevertheless, 
in the same year, delegates attending a conference on organised commerce and 
industry agreed to set a monthly minimum wage rate of R 54, with the added 
recommendation of lifting the minimum cash remuneration to R 106 (at constant 1995 
values: N$ 987) per month should benefits in kind not be included. It is interesting to 
note that the United Nations, at the end of 1975, had estimated the Poverty Datum 
Line for Windhoek to be approximately R 135 (at constant 1995 values: N$ 1406) per 
month. These recommendations were never fbnnally implemented (DruggaI1989: 41; 
ILO 1977: 63). 
In the "Working Paper on Labour Law and Labour Practice in South West Africa", 
produced by the Chamber of Mines in Namibia during 1980, it was very clearly stated 
that the implementation of a minimum wage in the mining industry was 
"undesirable". However, it was also stated that it might indeed be useful to pre-
detennine wages in cases where there was no existing collective agreement which 
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ensured basic conditions of employment between employers and employees (Bauer 
1994: 109). 
The Wiehahn Commission in 1989 declared itself in favour of setting minimum 
wages in certain sectors of the economy. The Commission suggested that this be done 
through an appointed Wages Commission. In a symposium held in Windhoek in 1989, 
most companies attending, save for two, appeared to regard minimum wages in a 
favourable light (Bauer 1994: 180). 
6.5.2 Minimum wages since 1990 
The following information on average monthly wages (by industry and occupation) 
was gathered during the 1991 Housing and Population survey in Namibia: 
Table 20: Average monthly wages in Namibia by industry and occupation -1991 
Senior Profes. Technical Clerical Services Plant / Basic 
Manage- / Sales Machine occup. 
ment operators 
Agriculture 4401 5454 1383 2060 580 2026 366 
Mining 10728 6719 5660 3345 2158 2931 1094 
Manufact. 4829 2070 3043 1749 1174 1209 789 
Electricity 5546 4178 4132 2607 1100 2101 870 
Gas/ Water 
Constructn. 4065 4313 2701 1323 425 1270 621 
Hotels 3693 2983 1932 1119 944 913 540 
Transport 4892 3599 4079 1845 2126 2120 904 
Finance ___ 5545 -4534 3706 f930 -- 1153 1055 791 
Services 6099 3284 3039 2154 1359 1337 638 
Source: MInIstry of Labour and Human Resources Development 1994b: 58. 
At the time of the introduction of the new Act in 1992, the then Minister of Manpower 
and Labour Development, Hendrik Witbooi, emphasised that the Act only provided 
minimum standards for the labour market, and that both employers and workers are 
free to reach more favourable conditions through bargaining (Bauer 1992: 1). 
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In spite of the inclusion of all workers under the new Labour Act, and the subsequent 
vast improvement of working conditions of most workers, there still appears to be 
some apprehension regarding the implementation of minimum wages in the various 
sectors of the economy. The 1992 Labour Act in itself does not provide for a 
minimum wage, but it does make provision for the establishment of Wage 
Commissions which are granted the power to investigate conditions of service and 
remuneration, and to subsequently issue wage orders (Government Gazette 1992: 114, 
118). These Commissions are governed by the Commissions Act No.8 of 1987. Each 
Commission consists of three persons (representative of government, the employers 
and the employees) who are jointly responsible for investigating wages in a particular 
sector of the economy and to make a recommendation for a minimum wage, based on 
their findings. In deciding upon the necessity of a wage order, a Commission takes 
into account, among other things, the following aspects (Hubbard and Corbett 1993: 
118; Government Gazette 1992: 118): 
• the ability of an employer to continue with its business activities (on a profitable 
basis) should a proposed wage order come into effect; 
• government policy relating to labour issues, as stated in the constitution; 
• what constitutes a living wage in Namibia; 
• equal pay for men and women; 
• the minimum subsistence level in the particular area of business; 
• the value of lodging or board or other payment in kind. 
Once the Wages Commission has forwarded its recommendation to the Minister, 
he/she is responsible for authorizing the issuing of a wage order (Government Gazette 
1992 no 388: 120). Should there be a decision against doing so, the matter as well as 
the reasons for not issuing the wage order must be discussed before the National 
Assembly in parliament. A Wages Commission may not be called for if a collective 
agreement has already been registered for that particular industry, nor if a wage order 
had been made during the 12 months preceding the application for the new order. 
Wage orders may be superceded by registered collective agreements (Government 
Gazette 1992 no 388: 119). 
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In Namibia the minimum wage is industry based. By 1998 the minimum wage had 
only been implemented in the construction industry in Namibia where it applies to all 
construction-related trades. It is determined according to category of work 
(Government Gazette 1997 no 1752). Notwithstanding the completion of an 
investigation by an appointed Wage Commission into the possibility of extending the 
minimum wage to agricultural and domestic workers, no public announcement to this 
effect has been made by June 1999. 
The original agreement on the mInImUm wage In the construction industry was 
negotiated between the Construction Industry Federation of Namibia (CIF) (which 
represented the employers in the construction industry) and the Metal and Allied 
Namibian Workers Union (MANWU), and is reviewed once per annum (Government 
Gazette of 15 November 1996, no 1444: 6). By September 1999, the original 
minimum wage schedule had officially been amended twice, the outcome of 
negotiations between government, the union and the federation representing the 
employers in the construction industry. On average, the minimum wage increases 
exceeded the average inflation rates recorded for the years under review. The 
amended wage rates are listed in the following table: 
Table 21: Minimum wage categories 
Job Title Wage per hour in Wage per hour in Wage per hour 
N$1996 N$1997 N$1999 
Labourers 3.08 3.80 4.32 
Artisan Painter 5.82 6.75 7.50 
Artisan Tiler / Carpet layer 6.66 7.73 8.43 
Artisan Plumber 7.51 8.71 9.50 
Artisan Bricklayer / 7.51 8.71 9.50 
Plasterer 
Artisan Electrician 7.90 9.16 9.98 
Artisan Carpenter 8.26 9.58 10.44 
Artisan Joiner 8.82 10.23 11.25 
Master Craftsman 9.82 11.39 12.41 
Leading Hand (incl. Fixer/ 11.31 13.12 14.30 
Welder !Plumber). 
in 
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Job Title Wage per hour in Wage per hour in Wage per hour 
N$1996 N$1997 N$1999 
Construction driver 3.42 3.97 4.40 
(dumper) 
Construction driver (light 5.21 6.04 6.70 
vehicle) 
Construction driver 6.17 7.16 7.95 
(medium vehicle) 
Construction driver (heavy 6.83 7.92 8.63 
vehicle) 
Construction plant operator 5.06 5.87 6.52 
(medium duty) 
Construction plant operator 6.93 8.04 8.76 
(heavy duty) 
Construction mechanic 6.90 8.00 8.72 
Storekeeper Grade 1 4.84 5.61 6.23 
S tore keeper Grade 2 3.44 3.99 4.43 
Timekeeper Grade 1 4.84 5.61 6.23 
Timekeeper Grade 2 4.15 4.81 5.34 
Sources: Government Gazette of 15 November 1996, no. 1444: 6; Government 
Gazette of 12 December 1997, no. 1752: 2; Government Gazette of 16 July 1999, no. 
2144: 2). 
It is important to note that the minimum wages listed here are subject to each worker 
maintaining a specified minimum productivity level. Failure to maintain such 
productivity levels can be addressed by additional training, or discipline and 
incapacity procedures. Also, workers need to be able to work under normal working 
conditions for the above wage rates to apply. Productivity standards are agreed upon 
separately between individual employees and employers, and for each trade union 
with each individual construction project (Government Gazette 1997 no. 1752: 3). 
in 
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6.5.3 Brief summary and comparison of minimum wage regulations with other 
developing countries 
From the discussion in chapter three it is evident that the minimum wage is perhaps 
not the ideal mechanism to raise income levels. At the same time, it would appear that 
a minimum wage could contribute to protecting incomes of poor workers in countries 
that have not yet developed comprehensive systems of collective bargaining. 
In Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil, Puerto Rico and Argentina where it 
has been imperative to combat the erosive effect of inflation, and where it has been 
enforced fairly strictly, as well as adjusted on a regular basis, it has proven of 
considerable value in protecting the income of those earning the lowest formal sector 
wages. 
In Namibia a minimum wage has only been introduced in the construction industry. 
The wage, the result of extensive negotiations between representatives of employers 
and employees of the construction industry, has already been adjusted twice 
(December 1997 and August 1999), and it said to be enforced fairly strictly (refer 
Annexure A: Mr. Kassen). Also, the wage remains coupled with certain specifications 
regarding productivity which are to be adhered to. The minimum wage introduced in 
the construction industry is the outcome of collective bargaining and therefore 
represents a collective agreement (reviewed once a year). Given that the minimum 
wage in the construction industry represents an outcome reached through the process 
of collective bargaining, it· may produce· better results in terms of protecting the 
income of the poorest workers than what may have been the case had it not been 
based on a negotiated outcome between employers and employees. 
Although there may be some scope for introducing a mIlllmum wage III the 
agricultural sector (farm workers are widely regarded as being among the poorest 
workers in the country), it will be extremely difficult to enforce with success. Also, 
any minimum wage would have to take into account benefits in kind (such as free 
food or lodging) commonly provided by farmers, which makes it more difficult to 
pinpoint an exact minimum. 
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6.6 Social Security 
6.6.1 Social security during the pre-independence era 
Prior to independence there was no comprehensive law governing social security in 
Namibia. The only form of income security offered by government to black persons 
was a monthly allowance paid to elderly persons aged sixty years and older, as well as 
to disabled people. 
Although there were a number of private sector initiatives related mainly to pensions 
and medical aid, these were offered only to those persons in formal employment. 
Given that whites occupied the management and more senior levels of most 
institutions, and that advantages were directly related to contributions which were in 
turn determined by salary scales, the level of benefits received by whites by far 
exceeded that of other ethnic groups. 
The main piece of legislation relating to income security during the pre-Independence 
period was the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 30 of 1941) which provided 
(only) for employees injured while on the job. Workers who had been disabled 
temporarily or permanently as a result of a work-related accident, an industrial disease 
or the mistake of a fellow employee, could qualify for compensation. This 
compensation could take the form of a single lump sum payment, settlement of all 
medical and related expenses, or, in the case of temporary disability, proportional 
income installments. Whereas black employees were normally compensated by way 
of a single lump sum, white and coloured workers with similar disabilities were given 
monthly pensions for the rest of their lives. These benefits were granted to dependents 
of a deceased worker and paid out in a similar way (van Rooyen 1996: 158). 
As mentioned in previous sections, domestic and farm workers were excluded from 
coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
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6.6.2 Social security since 1990 
Since 1990 the Namibian government has done much to address the plight of the poor 
and other marginalised groups by addressing the issue of income security. Today it is 
possible to distinguish between two types of government-initiated forms of social 
security in the country: social insurance which entails both employers and employees 
contributing proportionally to benefit funds (overseen by the Social Security 
Commission), and social assistance, mainly in the form of old-age pensions and 
disability benefits. 
The Namibian government provides a non-contributory universal state penSIOn 
financed entirely by government. Although the scheme was initially implemented 
during South African colonial rule in Namibia, it was changed significantly after 
independence. This scheme is of exceptional importance in the Namibian context, as 
it serves as the main safety net against extreme deprivation in rural (communal) areas. 
Prior to independence and until 1994, benefits paid out were still determined along 
racial lines, with whites receiving N$ 382 per month, coloured people N$ 192, and 
black people N$ 55. In May 1994, however, this monthly amount was changed to N$ 
135 for all race groups and it has remained at this level ever since. Surveys during 
1996 in two of the most populous regions of the country, namely the Oshana and 
Okavango regions (in the north of the country), found evidence that pensions 
represented the main household income source for 43% and 23% of households in 
these respective regions. Similar research in the communal areas in the eastern part of 
the country two years earlier had found that pensions was the main source of income 
to a staggering 64% of households sampled (UNDP 1996: 69). 
As regards coverage, forward projections for 1996, based on data gathered during the 
1991 Housing and Population survey (the most recent national survey providing 
information of this kind that has been made public) had indicated that nearly 80% of 
the elderly should have been included in pension coverage by 1996, but slightly less 
than 30% when it came to the disabled. Coverage was also found to vary considerably 
between the different regions of the country. This was evident from the fact that, at 
the time of the survey, only 30% of persons eligible in the Okavango region actually 
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received their pay-outs, while this figure amounted to approximately 80% in the 
former Ovamboland. This has, however, been ascribed to differences in administrative 
efficiency in the respective regions (UNDP 1996: 70). 
In the 1996 UNDP country report on human development in the country (UNDP 
1996: 70), it was stated that government intends to achieve 100% coverage of its 
pension scheme by the year 2000. At N$ 135 per month, it was estimated that the 
scheme represented an expense ofN$ 205 million per annum, at constant 1994 prices. 
It is interesting that the United Nations in 1975 noted the Poverty Datum Line for 
Namibia as being roughly N$ 135 at the time. At constant 1995 value, this would have 
amounted to approximately N$ 1406, which indicates that the N$ 135 falls far short. 
Unfortunately government contends it is not in a financial position to increase this 
amount. Had it not been for family and community transfers, many pensioners could 
arguably not have survived. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier in this study, it has 
been found that these small pensions constitute a large portion of monthly income to 
many households in communal areas. 
The efficiency of the way in which the state pension fund is conducted has been 
questioned, as the process of paying out pension money does not appear to work well. 
Days on which pay-outs are to be made are announced through the media (especially 
national radio service), upon which officials travel to rural areas to physically hand 
out payments. This, however, has resulted in logistical and administrative problems 
that have resulted in pay-outs being highly irregular. Government has announced 
plans to privatise the distribution of pension money in the hope that this will improve 
the efficiency of the process. 
Parliament established a Social Security Commission under the Secial Security Act 
in 1994 (Act 34 of 1994). This Commission carries responsibility for administering 
the 2 funds that have formally been established since 1994: the MSD Fund 
(Maternity / Sickness / Death, Disability) and the Employees Compensation (EC) 
Fund which is used to pay for all injuries obtained while on duty (i.e. the old 
workmen's compensation). 
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The Social Security Act stipulates that it is compulsory for employers and employees 
to register (separately) with the Social Security Commission. However, the law states 
that only employees younger than 65 years of age, or working two or more days a 
week for the same employer need to register. The employer (Government is formally 
included only in its capacity as employer) and employee contributes 50-50, each 
contributing 0.9% of an employee wage or salary. However, this amount may not be 
less than N$ 2,70 or exceed N$ 27,00 per month (Social Security Commission 1995: 1 
- 3; refer Annexure A: Mr. Balie). 
Although the Namibian Government's Social Security System is based on the Social 
Security model of the ILO, the Social Security Commission in Namibia has tried to 
adapt this model .to the particular circumstances of a developing country such as 
Namibia, i.e. by setting the limits for contributions fairly low. Two funds have been 
formally established while three more are being planned. 
In November 1995 the "MSD Fund" (Maternity/Sickness/Death) was introduced. This 
fund pays money to employees unable to work for more than 30 days, and provides a 
pay-out of N$ 2000 in the case of death. Death benefit money is not only paid out in 
the case of death of the member, but also when the member retires at the age of 65, or 
when the member becomes disabled for any reason. Although the intention is to 
include death benefits under the Pension Fund, it was provisionally included in the 
Maternity and Sick Leave Fund as it will still take some time to formally register the 
Pension Fund. For each of the three schemes currently in existence under the MSD 
fund, members can only start benefiting after the first six-month period of 
membership. Claims will be accepted provided that the employee's contribution is 
fully paid. Although it is compulsory that the employer's contribution is also fully 
paid, acJaimwill be settled-even ifthis is not the case. The behefinhatthe employee 
will receive is a percentage of his or her monthly salary. The latest information 
available with regard to claims against the MSD fund is for the financial year 
1998/1999. During this period 15 084 claims were processed, and a total amount of 
N$ 28 250 280.70 was paid out to members (refer Annexure A: Mr. Kasika). 
In the Social Security Commission: Employees' Rights and Obligations (1994: 8-11) 
the following guidelines regarding the benefits under the MSD fund have been set: 
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Maternity Leave: 
• The fund provides female members with the right to take 3 months maternity leave 
but does not yet provide for receiving money during this time. A female on 
maternity leave qualifies for 80% of her remuneration, with a N$ 240 minimum 
and a N$2 400 maximum; 
• Benefits will cover a period of 12 weeks; 
• Claims should be submitted at the very least 45 days prior to the expected birth 
date of the child. 
Sick Leave: 
• This benefit is only available once the employee has made use of all the sick leave 
days given under the Labour Act, or stated in the employment contract; 
• Benefit will amount to 60% of remuneration, with N$ 180 being the minimum and 
N$ 1 800 being the maximum. However, after the first 6 months, only 50% of the 
employee's remuneration will be paid. This will continue for another 18 months, in 
addition to the 6 months already paid for. 
Death, Disability and Retirement Benefits: 
• A single lump sum of N$ 2 000 will be paid out upon the death, retirement or 
permanent disability of the employee. 
The Employees Compensation Accident Fund (EC Fund) had been established 
already by the former government under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1956. 
On 1 February 1990' the Namibian government took over the administration of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Following the promUlgation of the Social Security Act in 1994, amendments were 
promulgated in January 1995. These amendments involved the transfer of the 
. responsibility for the administration of the Accident Fund to the Office of the 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, a subdivision of the Social Security 
Division in the Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Development. The 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner also acts as trustee of the statutory 
Accident Fund. The most important "amendment" made to the initial Accident Fund 
was the inclusion of all working persons, i.e. also domestic workers and farm workers 
who had previously been excluded from the Accident Fund. The Accident Fund today 
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provides compensation for workers injured by accidents at the workplace, industrial 
diseases, or death resulting from this. Both temporary and permanent disability, as 
well as death, are covered by the fund. During the 1998/1999 financial year a total 
amount of N$ 3 714 502.79 was paid to both general practitioners and hospitals for 
treatment of workers who were injured in the course of duty. A further N$ 1 316 025. 
85 was paid directly to workers. Of this amount, N$ 754 677.37 was paid to 992 
workers who were temporarily disabled as a result of work, and N$ 561 348.48 to 145 
workers who had become permanently disabled (Workmen's Compensation 
Commission 1994: 1, 2,; Social Security Commission 1996: 2; refer Annexure A: 
Messrs. Kandjele and Kasika). 
The Social Security Act of 1994 also makes provision for the establishment of new 
funds. In addition to the maternity leave, sick leave and death benefits already 
available to members of the Social Security Fund, a formal Medical Benefit Fund 
(which will in particular also provide benefits to domestic and farm workers) and a 
National Pension Fund are also being planned. As the Social Security Commission is 
already involved in final consultations regarding the pension fund (June 1999), it is 
likely that this will be the first of the new funds to be established. 
Studies with respect to what would be the best way to structure such a pension fund in 
Namibia have been conducted both by World Bank and ILO representatives. 
However, the ILO structure seems to be preferred to that of the World Bank, as it also 
addresses the vast problems of income inequality and poverty. It has been suggested 
that employers and employees all pay a monthly flat rate, which will then eventually 
be mUltiplied by the number of years the worker has been in service. A person will 
have to contribute at least 15 years before he/she may benefit from this fund. 
However,- for people already older than 50 at the time of the -launch of this fund (but 
still younger than 57), a special arrangement will be made. Other than this basic 
information, the representative of the Commission at the time of being interviewed 
understandably felt detailed information could not yet be made public, given that the 
final proposed structure was still under discussion. It will be mandatory for every 
member of the EC and MSD funds to belong to this Pension Fund. 
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The other fund that the Social Security Commission also intends to establish is a 
Development Fund. It is likely that the latter will be a non-contributory fund built on 
surplus funds generated through the other existing funds. This Development Fund will 
provide financial assistance for retrenched workers, for example, and for financing the 
re-training of such workers (refer Annexure A: Messrs. Angula and Kandjele). 
During interviews with representatives of the Social Security Commission (refer 
Annexure A: Messrs. Bali and Kandjele) during 1997 and 1998 respectively it became 
apparent that the establishment of an Unemployment Fund (common in industrialised 
countries) does not see1p. very likely within the foreseeable future. Unemployment in 
Namibia is too comprehensive a problem, and the number of people engaged in 
formal wage labour is too small to financially "support" the number of unemployed. 
(* Note: Official estimates by the Central Statistics Office - CSO - in Windhoek 
indicate that 20% of the economically active popUlation is unemployed, but unofficial 
estimates exceed 30%. It has to be kept in mind that the CSO combines 
unemployment and underemployment figures). 
At present, government provides no direct financial support to the Social Security 
System, except in its capacity as an employer. From a financial point of view, it 
would appear from information provided during personal interviews as if the system 
is being handled fairly well. In spite of its "social objectives" it is allegedly being run 
in accordance with business principles, which include very strict and regular audits. 
Government is encouraging this strict running of the "social security company" 
because it carries the ultimate responsibility of stepping in and providing financial 
assistance should anything go wrong. At present the existing funds are being run 
solely with money received from the compulsory contributions of registered 
employers and employees (government only contributes as an employer). In order to 
allow each fund some time to accumulate funds, members are normally only allowed 
to start submitting claims once a particular Fund has been in existence/formally 
registered for six months. All of the above existing funds are, however, now in a 
position to payout against claims (refer Annexure A: Messrs. Balie and Kandjele). 
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The above mentioned Social Security Funds are available to all workers working in 
the EPZ and contributions from all workers (both Namibians and foreign workers) are 
mandatory. 
Table 22: Number of officially registered employers and employees - July 1999. 
Number of registered employers 29 211 
Number of registered employees 287557 
Source: refer Annexure A: Mr. Bali. 
In addition to the above it should be noted that not only government, but also the 
private sector has contributed to providing income security for workers. 
Information collected during an Establishment Survey conducted during 199211993 
suggested the salary of a worker constitutes % of the total wage, with the remaining 14 
being cash and non-cash benefits (such as pension and medical aid). (Ministry of 
Labour and Human Resources Development 1994b: 56). It is common practice to 
offer formal sector workers in medium and large institutions in Namibia benefits such 
as membership to pension and medical aid schemes to which the employer then 
contributes a certain portion. As a percentage of the total labour cost associated with 
an employee, pension contributions from employers roughly average 11 - 13%, while 
that on medical aid amounts to an average of roughly 9%. Some of the large 
companies also offer vehicle and housing finance at rates below those prevailing in 
the market, but the number of such institutions is limited. On average, and based on 
rough calculations, it would appear that a medium to large firm in Namibia could 
spend roughly 20-22% of the total wage cost of a workers on fringe benefits such as 
pension, medical aid and social security. The cash wage represents roughly 80% of 
the total monthly income of the employee. In smaller firms and even some of the 
medium sized firms, workers do not receive any benefits in addition to cash wages, 
except for that associated with them belonging to the existing Social Security Funds. 
The contributions to these funds are obligatory (refer Annexure A: Mr. Wiedow). 
In addition to the important roles of government and the private sector, household and 
community structures also continue to playa role with regards to income security in 
Namibia. As in South Africa, apartheid was also enforced in Namibia, where it 
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resulted in the forced relocation of certain ethnic groups to "reservations" where there 
were no opportunities for formal employment. These people, although carrying out 
certain farming activities, became dependent on two particular sources of income: 
transfers from urban family members and old age pensions. The UNDP (1996: 19) has 
noted that rural households involved in subsistence agriculture on average receive 
only approximately a third of the income of households in urban areas, including 
income-in-kind through their agricultural activities. Hence urban workers are in a 
much better position to support rural households than the other way round. The 
situation regarding poverty in rural areas has to a large extent remained unchanged 
even after independence, although government has committed itself to the provision 
of education and health services to these areas, land reform, and food aid during 
periods of drought, etc. It will, however, take time to raise rural incomes to such an 
extent that the dependency on urban workers will be reduced significantly. 
6.6.3 Summary and comparison to social security in other developing countries 
Although most industrialised countries have extensive social safety nets, this is not the 
case in many developing countries. There are a few exceptions, though, such as 
Jamaica, which offer state social security benefits to all workers in both the formal 
and informal sectors. However, although coverage is extensive, benefits are often 
insufficient even when measured in relative income terms of the particular country. It 
can be argued that the low level of financial assistance in many developing countries 
results from the fact that systems in such countries do not have the financial capacity 
of the systems in industrialised countries. With much smaller GDP, and consequently 
less money available to be allocated to social services through their annual budgets, 
developing countries are normally not able to finance comprehensive schemes 
offering a high level· of benefits. In most developing countries the actual coverage 
provided seems less than sufficient, i.e. pensions are often only a fraction of what is 
required to maintain a certain standard of living after retirement. 
In addition to a social assistance measure such as the government pension, a number 
of funds have been established as part of the social insurance drive of government 
Contrary to the case in a country such as Brazil, but similar to a large number of 
African countries, Namibia does not have any fund that provides insurance against 
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unemployment. The Social Security Commission does not appear to have any plans to 
establish such a fund in the near future, not even for fonnal sector workers. Financial 
pressure on government is already high and increasing, and it is unlikely that 
contributions from the private sector and the formally employed population could 
sustain such a fund. 
It is interesting but somewhat disconcerting to note the intention of the Social Security 
Commission to specifically address the issue of income inequality in the proposed 
new Pension Fund. Although little detail with regard to the proposed fund is available, 
one cannot help but question the financial sustainability (and ability to remain 
financially independent from government) of a fund aimed at providing not only 
monthly pension pay-outs, but also at reducing inequality. Although the majority of 
workers will only be in a position to claim against this fund after having contributed 
for at least a 15 year period, pensioners will by implication receive greater financial 
benefits than what their contributions have been worth. As there will most likely be 
considerable financial pressure on such a fund, the monthly pension pay-out is 
unlikely to significantly reduce poverty among the elderly in particular. 
6.7 Conclusion regarding increased labour market intervention in 
Namibia 
Given the dismal situation pertaining to workers of some ethnic groups pnor to 
independence, most notably with respect to wages and working conditions, there was 
a definite need for government intervention in the labour market after 1990. In 
addition to setting policies aimed at improving the situation then pertaining to labour 
in the country, government promulgated legislation which today provides both. 
workers and employers with clear guidelines and directions as to their conditions of 
employment and remuneration. 
As regards the development of a system of industrial relations, and perhaps to a lesser 
extent labour market policy in general, Namibia has allowed itself to be guided 
extensively by the example set by the International Labour Office and the United 
Nations. Both these institutions have developed guidelines that focus on the principle 
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of human rights, something which the Namibian government, given SW APO's close 
ties with the United Nations during the apartheid decades, strongly advocates. Not 
only has Namibia become a formal member of the ILO, but it has ratified and adopted 
what it deems to be the relevant conventions and recommendations set out by the ILO, 
and in doing so has undertaken to conform to international labour standards. 
The ILO guidelines have to a large extent also formed the basis of the 
abovementioned two new Acts which at present provide the primary legal safeguard 
for workers in the country. Both these Acts provide fairly comprehensive coverage to 
all workers and have been designed to allow for maximum flexibility as regards 
interpretation, although there are also some disadvantages attached to this. However, 
notwithstanding the general perception that these Acts provide extensive coverage to 
formally disadvantaged groups, neither of the Acts has been in use for a lengthy 
period, and consequently there are some qualms as to the coverage provided by it, as 
well as its implementation and administration. For example, in spite of the fact that 
the new labour law is regarded as extremely representative and strong in terms of 
contents, it only covers workers in the formal sector of the economy, and is therefore 
of little use to workers in the so-called informal sector. Furthermore, organised labour 
is not yet fully using the new law to its advantage, as there is a "considerable lack of 
capacity" in terms of "organisation and administration, finances, leadership, research 
and policy" (Bauer 1994: 172). 
A significant number of problems identified with regard to the new Acts, the 
subsequent new system of labour relations, as well as labour policy implementation, is 
related to the human resource situation in the country. There is a lack of expertise in 
this field, as well as a general lack of experience, in dealing with labour related 
matters. These problems highlight the particular need for human resource 
development, most notably by means of training, as does the vast number of un- and 
underemployed persons (together about 60% of economically active population in the 
country). Although government is continually attempting to address the dire situation 
regarding unemployment, so far attempts at reducing the high unemployment level 
have not met with success. 
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Given the lack of available date with regards to changes in income levels since 1992, 
it is extremely difficult to comment on whether collective bargaining, the introduction 
of a minimum wage in the construction industry, or the establishment of social 
security funds have had a marked influence on wage levels and working conditions of 
formerly disadvantaged workers. One may, however, speculate that the post-1990 
legislation and labour policies have generally resulted in, or directly contributed to, an 
improvement in wages (and consequently living conditions) and working conditions 
of workers who had previously been excluded from coverage of these Acts, simply by 
virtue of the fact that they had not previously had access to most of these mechanisms. 
If regarded in this light, intervention has been overdue, and indeed produced positive 
results in terms of ensuring the humane treatment of workers. However, given the lack 
of available statistics, it is extremely difficult to assess what the effect of the costs 
relating to higher wages and "more expensive" job security measures have been on 
employment in general. Even though it may have resulted in employers being more 
cautious in employing workers, Namibia's socio-political history made it inevitable 
that government had to address the issues of wages and working conditions in the 
country after coming to power. The need for the type of intervention that has taken 
place on the part of government had been of particular importance, as organised 
labour (unions) had been the foundation from which the ruling party, SW APO, had 
built its follower/membership base. 
Having overseen the implementation of the abovementioned two Acts, and having 
ensured that certain policy directions have been set (i.e. with regard to affirmative 
action and training), government should arguably refrain from further overt 
involvement in these matters. Ideally it should continue to monitor that the guidelines 
which have been set are adhered to and continue to adjust policy to changing 
conditions in the Namibian labour market. It should, however, at the same time be 
mentioned that with respect to labour-related matters such as training, it would be 
extremely difficult if not impossible to withdraw completely and to wait for private 
market forces to remedy the situation of the formerly disadvantaged. Although most 
of the larger companies provide in-house training, costs have limited the ability of 
smaller and medium sized enterprises to do the same. In spite of problems such as 
this, one possibility could be to consider for government to encourage the 
development of workers by means of opting for providing better incentives to private 
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sector companies. If worthwhile incentives could be offered, it may go a long way 
towards encouraging companies to create more employment opportunities and to 
become more extensively involved in training. A good example of where government 
has done something to this effect is in the EPZ. Training and employment are being 
encouraged by means of providing employers with generous tax incentives and 
subsidies if they spend money on the training of workers. 
Total withdrawal from labour issues is obviously not possible for government and 
also not advisable, particularly in view of the fact that with respect to industrial 
relations, the principle of tripartism has been strongly advocated. Ideally, nearly a 
decade after independence, government should attempt to project itself as being 
committed to building a strong economy by looking after the interests of both 
employers and employees. However, remaining unbiased might be difficult over the 
medium to longer run: already there have been cases in which unions have criticised 
government for the legal system governing labour relations and industrial action: 
"Namibia's labour movement will rise up if the courts become instruments of 
oppression and those with money are allowed to rewrite the laws to suit their 
interests ... the NUNW would like to condemn the ... unholy alliance between 
private law practitioners, the custodians of our judiciary, and some elements 
within the office of the Attorney-General, who deliberately ... are trying to 
rewrite the Labour Act by wittingly misinterpreting the said Act ... " 
(National Union of Workers (NUNW) President Ponhele ya France, as quoted 
in The Namibian, 31 July 1997: 1). 
Notwithstanding these harsh words, the relationship between the UnIons and 
government appears to have remained close. Although the concept of tripartism had 
enjoyed much attention, possibly in part as a result of the influence of ILO policy 
advisors on government, it is unlikely that the relationship between government and 
the unions will become less close. The political history remains a strong binding 
factor, and organised labour one of the strong support groups for government. 
Although it is not an ideal situation to have two of the three tripartite parties closer to 
each other than to the third, it could be argued that this situation could remain so at 
least until affirmative action is perceived to have corrected the imbalance in economic 
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power, whereupon the unions would have achieved economic empowerment for their 
members, reportedly one of their main objectives. 
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7. Namibia: Case Studies 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter case studies relating to various labour market institutions in Namibia 
are reviewed. As information and basic statistics regarding the implementation and 
effectiveness of such institutions are either limited or non-existent, the following 
sections are based mainly on a combination of information obtained through media 
j 
articles, and personal and telephone interviews. Those persons willing to discuss the 
minimum wage in particular specified that they wished their names and the names of 
their companies to be withheld. 
7.2 The Case Studies: 
7.2.1 Labour Legislation 
7.2.1.1 Labour Legislation applicable to the EPZ 
From the outset, controversy surrounded not only the establishment of an EPZ in 
Namibia, but also the labour regulations that would apply to EPZ labour. 
Government made it clear that it was of vital importance to attract investors to the 
EPZ in order to get the EPZ off the ground and to achieve maximum job creation. 
Government felt it was important to "sell" the fact that Namibia could in fact provide 
labour at cheaper rates than many other countries focusing on manufacturing and 
production. For example, it was stated at the time (1995) that research had suggested 
that skilled labour in Namibia's was priced at $ 7.50 per day, compared to $ 12.86 in 
Malaysia. Unskilled labour was priced at $ 5.00 in Namibia and at $8.08 in Malaysia 
(The New Era, 2-8 November 1995: 1). 
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It was stressed that one of the most important factors investors were looking for was 
an institutional environment where labour problems would be eliminated as best as 
possible. Whereas government saw the EPZ as a prime opportunity to attract foreign 
investment to Namibia and to create employment, the Unions contended that EPZ's 
were sweatshops in which workers were exploited. Government however pressed 
ahead with plans, "marketing" the EPZ concept by advocating the success achieved 
elsewhere (in particular in Ireland and Mauritius), in terms of job creation and foreign 
exchange income generated. The President in 1995 declared that Government was 
aware of the need to ensure that good labour relations were maintained in the EPZ, 
and that issues such as basic conditions of employment, termination of employment, 
disciplinary actions, and the health, safety and welfare of workers were of importance 
to EPZ workers as it was to workers outside of the EPZ. Compromise, however, was 
necessary to reach the broader goal of job creation (The Namibian, 30 May 1995: 1). 
Once the EPZ was given the final go-ahead, the issue of determining the regulations 
that would apply to labour matters within the zone came under the spotlight. As 
regards this, there were again two opposing points of view: one in favour of applying 
the entire Labour Act of 1992, and the other in favour of only applying the 1992 law 
selectively. 
Initially, it was proposed that the labour legislation that would apply in the EPZ would 
exclUde the section of the Labour Act stating that strikes and lock-outs are allowed 
and would be considered legitimate action when all negotiations fail. In the EPZ, 
lock-outs and strikes were to be strictly prohibited. If lockouts did take place, 
company certificates would be withdrawn. Striking workers could be dismissed 
immediately (Die Republikein, 1 March 1996: 1). 
The non-applicability of a section of the Labour Act was proposed out of fear that 
would-be investors could be frightened off if strikes were allowed. In spite of the fact 
that the labour Act would not be implemented in full, Government (through the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry) contended that the rights of workers would in no way 
be compromised. 
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The National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) learned about the suggested 
exclusion of part of the Labour Act in the EPZ only during the beginning of March 
1995, and strongly opposed the suggested clause in the EPZ Act that banned strikes 
and lockouts. Following consultations with its members, the NUNW decided on court 
action to contest the establishment of an EPZ without applying the 1992 Labour Act 
in full. Workers were reported to have felt that, although they are in favour of 
employment creation, wanted protection, and they considered the 1992 Labour Act as 
their only security against exploitation (The Namibian, 16 June 1995: 5). 
The official point of view of the union was that the suggested clause would be 
unconstitutional as it contravened and violated an essential part of the Labour Act as 
well as certain ILO conventions. The Unions contended that the right to strike is a 
fundamental and inalienable right. Should this be taken away, they vowed to 
discourage Namibian workers from working in the EPZ (The Namibian, 1 March 
1996: 1). During the disagreement surrounding the implementation of the full Labour 
Act, the example of Zimbabwe was referred to, where government had initially 
wanted to exclude Unions from a proposed Free Trade Zone. This decision had later 
been reversed following a realisation that organised labour can in fact help to maintain 
required productivity standards. 
Government and the NUNW in 1996 eventually reached a compromise by agreeing 
that strikes and lock-outs would only be prohibited for 5 years, starting from the date 
on which the agreement was reached. Companies are restricted in that their licenses 
will be revoked should they revert to lock out action. Similarly, workers could lose 
their jobs for striking. It is also forbidden for any workers or Union representatives to 
try to convince non-striking workers to strike. Today the EPZ Act 9 of 1995 prohibits 
workers from striking btit also stipulates that workers' complaints have to be 
negotiated and resolved through a factory grievance committee. The Act states that 
the EPZ Management Company is to act as mediator in cases of labour disputes and 
deadlocks between EPZ companies and workers (refer Annexure A: Mr. Visser). It 
was agreed that the special clause in the Act would be relaxed after a 5 year period if 
the labour situation appears to be calm and there appears to be no serious threat of 
strikes. The Minister of Trade and Industry agreed that, should this be the case, the 
Labour Act would fully apply from then onwards. However, should the labour 
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situation appear volatile, Government will have the option of extending the 5-year 
period. In addition to this, it was also agreed to partially relax the section of the EPZ 
Act that denied an employee the right to a fair disciplinary hearing (The Namibian, 10 
May 1996: 1, 14 May 1996: 1, and 17 May 1996: 1). 
Controversy agam followed this agreement as some umon members afterwards 
claimed that the Union had only formally agreed to the compromise because 
government was affiliated to the NUNW (The Namibian, 17 May 1996: 1). The reply 
of the NUNW president to these allegations was that the EPZ in fact constituted an 
"essential service" and that employees should not strike for this reason. He at the time 
also stated that the agreement was an important achievement as EPZ workers would 
still have the right to negotiate, apply for the establishment of conciliation boards, 
seek arbitration and take their cases to the labour court (The Namibian, 24 August 
1995: 1). The Minister of Trade and Industry denied that the process of collective 
bargaining was ever threatened. It was said that the only deviation from the Labour 
Act in the EPZ was that the dispute resolution was to be speeded up in the EPZ in 
order to avoid costly losses in production as a result of stoppages (The Windhoek 
Advertiser, 29 February 1996: 2). 
7.2.1.1.1 Situation following the introduction of the EPZ Act of 1995 
According to the Manager of the EPZ Management Company, experience during 
recent years has shown that prospective EPZ investors do in fact attach great 
importance to the labour situation prevailing in the EPZ, and that this is a major 
consideration when deciding to invest. As result of a decline in the real exchange rate 
of the Namibian dollar against the hard currencies such as the US Dollar, local labour 
has -become-comparatively cheap. However, the threat- of-competition from other 
developing countries that also boast comparatively cheap labour is set to intensify in 
future. Although it is important to ensure that workers are treated fairly, it is arguably 
just as important, if not more so, to attract investors by way of implementing 
regulatory controls that will to a large extent eliminate the possibility of labour unrest. 
By the end of 1998 three labour disputes had taken place within the EPZ, all of which 
were related to wages, and all of which were resolved through negotiations with the 
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umons. The reasons behind this are somewhat difficult to understand, given that 
average wages in the EPZ are reported to already be roughly 10-15% higher than in 
the rest of the country in similar industries. Wages are even higher than that being 
paid in the fishing industry which has the reputation of being one of the best paid 
industries in the country. During the first years of its existence the EPZ has attracted a 
number of companies involved in the textile industry and high technology. A formally 
recognised union represents each of the industries. Of all the industries, the companies 
involved in the production of high technology products pay the highest wages (refer 
Annexure A: Mr. Visser). 
EPZ workers receIve wages together with penSIOn and medical benefits. Social 
security contributions are deducted from wages. Of the 13 EPZ companies which had 
been granted EPZ status by mid-1998, only 5 had been fully functional at the time. A 
total of 550 workers had been employed, of which roughly 60% were women. 
Projections indicated that a significant number of jobs could still be generated through 
EPZ activities - during mid-1998 the goal was to have 4500 to 5000 people working 
within the EPZ by the end of 1999, although this figure appears inflated (refer 
Annexure A: Mr. Visser). 
7.2.1.2 Labour Legislation: The Minimum Wage 
7.2.1.2.1 The introduction of a minimum wage in the construction industry 
A number of small strikes in the construction industry and ongoing accusations by 
workers against Chinese construction firms operating in Namibia led to the 
introduction of a minimum wage in Namibia during the mid-1990's. Workers working 
.. 
for Chinese construction companies felt they were underpaid and that their employers 
did not adhere to the local labour law - they received no overtime money, and were 
paid normal rates for work conducted on Sundays and public holidays. At the time of 
the strike at a site of one of these companies in Windhoek during May 1996, the going 
rate for general labourers was N$ 2.50 per hour, N$ 5.60 an hour for bricklayers and 
N$ 20 per day for a driver. During 1995 a case by workers against another of the 
Chinese companies, China Complant Group IV, a minimum scale of N$ 3.23 was 
agreed to in conjunction with productivity agreements, following legal action. The 
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productivity scales were, however, also adjusted - for example, while workers 
previously had to complete 25 sq. meters of plaster per day, the new scale had it cut to 
only 10 sq. meters per day (New Era, 14 September 1995: 1; The Namibian, 14 May 
1996: 1). 
The breakthrough agreement on the introduction of a mIrumum wage III the 
construction industry in Namibia, the first of this nature, was the culmination of 
ongoing opposition to the wages paid and the working conditions being adhered to by 
the large Chinese construction companies operating in Namibian. The aim with the 
minimum wage agreed to between the Construction Industries Federation of Namibia 
(CIF) and MANWU was to level the playing field in the building industry. The 
minimum wage is binding on all construction companies irrespective of whether they 
are affiliated to the CIF or not. At the time the minimum wage for non-qualified 
workers was set at N$ 3.08 per worker, and to keep up with inflation it will be 
regularly adjusted. The agreement excludes labour intensive projects. In addition to 
the wage minimum, agreement was also reached that provision would be made for 
workmen's compensation, social security and pension contributions. Prior to this 
agreement companies affiliated to the CIF had decided on a minimum wage, but they 
argued that this had resulted in unfair competition as those companies that were not 
CIF members paid much lower wages. CIF companies had thus been disadvantaged 
when they tendered for projects. (In a typical construction job about 40% of costs are 
labour related). Chinese firms were accused of paying even less than N$ 2.50 per 
hour, which enabled them to submit substantially lower tenders. Chinese companies 
were also accused of being subsidised by their government, thus boosting their 
advantage in the tender procedure even further (The Namibian, 15 January 1997: 1). 
7.2.1.2.2 Experience with the mIrumum wage 
Except for the information discussed in chapter, no information has been publicised 
with regard to the actual implementation of the minimum wage in the construction 
industry. Given the lack of available data, a small telephone survey was conducted 
among ten construction companies in Windhoek, ranging from small to large, for the 
purpose of gaining a general impression as regards to the way employers perceived 
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the wage. Those persons willing to discuss the issue limited themselves to general 
answers rather than providing detailed information, and asked to remain anonymous. 
There appears to be general consensus on the fact that the compames willing to 
discuss the issue did not consider the minimum wage as a negative factor affecting the 
labour market. Most companies consulted considered the establishment of a minimum 
wage as a good guideline for them when it comes to determining wages. It did, 
however, become apparent that, although the companies surveyed all claimed to 
adhere to the minimum wage, there were no attempts from the side of government to 
actually monitor the implementation and enforce the law. In the largest construction 
companies, however, the unions are said to keep the wage levels in check. Two of the 
large companies stated that the introduction of a minimum wage had not significantly 
affected the number of people they employ. Many workers appear to be employed on 
a contract basis anyway, with the number of workers still being determined by the size 
of the project, the amount of work having to be done, and the timeframe, and not, 
according to the persons interviewed, so much by the wage. 
7.2.2 Union Activity and Strikes 
7.2.2.1 The TCL CTsumeb Corporation Limited) Strike of 1996 
, 7.2.2.1.1 General background of the two main parties involved 
Gold Fields Namibia is an independent mining house, and a subsidiary company of 
the larger Gold Fields Group that also carries out mining activities in South Africa. 
The primary source of income to the company in Namibia is obtained from its wholly 
owned subsidiary Tsumeb Corp()ration Limited, better known locally as TCL. TCL 
operates gold mines at Kombat and Khusib springs and a copper and lead smelter and 
refinery at Tsumeb (all located in the north of the country). TeL also manages the 
Otjihase mine in the Tsumeb area in which it holds a 70% interest (Gold Fields 
Namibia Annual Report 1996: 2). 
The MUN (Mineworkers Union of Namibia) has become a powerful union since its 
formal inception in 1986. In 1988 the MUN signed a recognition agreement with 
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CDM (the largest diamond mining company in the country) which provided for all 
aspects of collective bargaining and employment relationships. The MUN then 
continued to strengthen its stronghold on mining companies by negotiating 
recognition agreements with the two other largest companies in the country - Rossing 
Uranium and TCL. By 1997 MUN had signed recognition agreement with all mines in 
the country (Addition to The Namibian, November 1996: 2). 
The MUN has ,complained publicly that labour relations in Namibia still have a long 
way to go: "Labour relations in Namibia are far from being perfect. Racial 
discrimination, unfair labour practices, mass dismissals and even sheer exploitation 
are quite common in various mining companies." (Addition to The Namibian, 
November 1996: 2). 
One of the longest and most costly strikes in Namibia this century took place at the 
TCL mines and smelter complex from 22 August 1996 to 5 October 1996. 
7.2.2.1.2 Background to the 1996 strike 
Earlier, during April 1996, TCL determined that the minerals at Tsumeb's De Wet 
shaft had been exploited to its full potential, and that about 400 workers would have 
to be retrenched as a result of this. Only the copper smelter was to remain functional. 
At the same time negotiations on the salaries of the remaining 2600 workers started. 
The company offered wage increases of only 7%, contending that the very bad copper 
price at the time made it impossible to give the workers higher increases. This annual 
review between the company and the Mineworkers Unions of Namibia ended in 
deadlock about wages and other conditions of employment after mediation failed. 
Even the establishment of a Conciliation Board did not contribute to resolving the 
problem (refer Annexure A: Mr. Groenewald). 
TCL then attempted to break the deadlock by offering workers medical aid as most 
workers did not have that, but the MUN allegedly was not interested. There were 
some feelings voiced that the MUN from its side was only going through the process 
of mediation in order to eventually be able to call a legal strike. One of the big 
problems with the issue of wage increases was the fact that TCL was in fact being run 
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from Johannesburg, and that the local managers had limited power when it came to 
deciding on the wage increases. (Rumour had it that the local General Manager had in 
fact been willing to raise the company's offer from 7% to 10% from the outset). 
7.2.2.1.3 The Strike itself 
On 7 August 1996, a Conciliation Board had been established to resolve the wage 
increment issue. TCL was offering 7% while the MUN insisted on 25%. On 15 
August the Conciliation Board met and a deadlock was formally declared. On 22 
August, earlier than notified to TCL, mineworkers at TCL downed tools demanding a 
13.5% wage increase. Approximately 1341 workers were involved in the strike, 1313 
of whom were union members. One of the workers noted that they considered the 
strike as an opportunity to "effect change at TCL, and to break the chains of slavery". 
The then Minister of Labour at the time allegedly also said "TCL is like a snake 
whose head must be crashed"(The Namibian, November 1996 special edition: 3). The 
workers picketed and took control over 3 mines - Tsumeb, Kombat and Otjihase. 
These three mines were the main base metal producers in Namibia (refer Annexure A: 
Mr. Kassen). 
Striking workers ordered non-striking workers and management away from the 
operations and off the premises, and prevented them from gaining access thereafter. 
Some non-striking employees were assaulted. In response to the striking workers TCL 
immediately obtained an urgent interim court order. The fact that a court order was 
issued without the union having been given an opportunity to present its case 
contributed to the MUN's opinion that the labour courts were biased towards the 
employer (Addition to The Namibian, November 1996: 8) 
The urgent court interdict in the labour court to have the strike declared illegal was an 
effort by the company to regain access to the mines as time was of the essence: the 
company was pressed for time as flooding was an immediate threat to the mine 
chambers. The Kombat mine started flooding at a rate of 700 cubic metres an hour 
within the first day of the strike. Flooding also occurred at the De Wet shaft in 
Tsumeb. (During 1988 when the Kombat mine was flooded it took about 15 months to 
remove the water from the mine, and cost N$ 25 million). In addition to the problem 
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of flooding, the copper section of the Otjihase mine was cooling down. If the copper 
smelter were to reach a temperature low enough to allow for the molten copper to 
settle and become hard, the furnaces would be of no further use and would have to be 
replaced at a cost of more than N$ 20 million. 
Workers were aware of the high cost associated with having to de-water the mines, as 
well as the replacement costs of damaged equipment, and contended that it would in 
fact be cheaper to pay them the 13.5% increase they wanted. However, TeL's 
management contended that the company could not afford 13.5% increases as the 
copper market crashed in June 1996, resulting in a steep price decline from US$ 2500 
a ton to just over US$ 1800 per ton. The company had not been doing well even 
before this - since 1989 no dividends have been paid out to the shareholders of Gold 
Fields Namibia. The union did not accept this official stance of the company. The 
union was of the opinion that TeL had been mining in Namibia for nearly 100 years 
at the time, and claimed that it knew TeL had built up financial reserves prior to the 
price crash and could thus afford the increases. The MUN therefore stated that it still 
felt they had to negotiate a wage increase. 
The MUN responded to the above interdict by fighting it in court, and successfully 
managed to have it suspended until the issue of the legality of the strike could be 
settled. The MUN also alleged that TeL had attempted to have the MUN leadership 
arrested for refusing to comply with the initial court order. The court however ruled 
that it would not hear the case before the court proceedings regarding the legality of 
the strike had been finalised, something the union regarded as a victory (Addition to 
The Namibian, November 1996: 6). 
Workers considered the strike not only as action to achieve better increases, but also 
as an opportunity to change the entire existing system - they claimed labour and 
working conditions were appalling. One of the major concerns were however the issue 
of wages - apparently senior workers with as much as 34 years working experience 
for the mine were being paid N$ 541 per month (Addition to The Namibian, 
November 1996: 8) . 
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Following the declaration of the strike on 22 August, the Labour Commissioner was 
called in to mediate on 23 August, but with no effect. On the 2ih of August this was 
followed by an attempt from the Deputy Ministers of Labour and Home Affairs to 
mediate (on instruction of the Prime Minister). Again, however, no solution could be 
negotiated. Two independent mediators, one from TCL and one from the MUN, were 
called in to assist during September 1996, but again no agreement was reached (refer 
Annexure A: Mr. Kassen). Mediation talks failed apparently because of mistrust 
between TCL and the MUN, and the fact that each party came with its own agenda. 
The official union position was that the strike could have been avoided if TCL had 
come to the negotiation table in good faith and with a more flexible stance. Contrary 
to the union officials who declared that their mandate was negotiable (hence their 
willingness to lower the 25% demand to 13.5%), TeL allegedly came with a fixed 
proposition. 
The MUN suspected TCL' s attempts at mediation as a delaying tactic. While the 
Union said it wanted to focus on solving the wage dispute, TCL first wanted one 
week's access to their mines to assess the damage. This was agreed to. Following an 
assessment, TCL allegedly informed the MUN that the company was withdrawing its 
7% offer, and instead was willing to payout a lump sum of money that could be 
divided among the workers 
As the strike continued workers brought old grievances to the fore. Amongst these 
issues was that regarding a Smelter Safety Manual that allegedly contained racial 
references. TCL denied the existence of such a manual and allegedly contended that 
the workers referred to an old manual that was probably issued in the 1960's or 
1970's when TCL had different owners and when apartheid legislation still provided 
for job 'reservation. The management contented that the old" manual was not used by 
them and had been replaced by a new one, an argument that MUN rejected. The 
recognition agreement between TCL and the MUN apparently states that TeL and the 
MUN must negotiate manuals. A further complaint from the union was that there 
were no black people in managerial positions at TCL. (Addition to The Namibian, 
November 1996: 7). 
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The workers also accused the company of not wanting to negotiate in good faith and 
called on Gold Fields Namibia to leave the country, as well as government not to 
renew the mining licenses of TeL. The mine management was accused of arrogance 
and of being unwilling to disclose financial information during the process of 
collective bargaining. The MUN negotiators felt they had not been given the correct 
information and that this sabotaged the bargaining process. A culture of mutual trust 
appeared lacking between the negotiating parties. In spite of the action called for by 
the union, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines and Energy at the time 
stated that government did not intend to take the drastic step of revoking mining 
licenses. It was believed that such a move would have far reaching effects on the 
workers and the economy of the entire country. TeL responded to union demands of 
withdrawal by stressing that it had invested N$ 45 million in 2 major metallurgical 
projects in the country and that they intended to make good on their investment 
(Addition to The Namibian, November 1996: 3). 
In an effort to prevent the strike from continuing further, TeL stopped all water and 
food supplies to the TeL hostels. However, the MUN was the first union to formally 
establish a strike fund (called the National Strike Fund) in 1994. The purpose of this 
fund was to sustain members and their families financially during strikes. When TeL 
cut off water and food supplies an amount ofN$ 0.5 million was paid out and divided 
among the workers for exactly this purpose (Addition to The Namibian, November 
1996: 3). 
When the strike entered its fourth week with no apparent solution to the dead-lock, 
government authorised the Prime Minister to intervene directly by acting as mediator. 
It was only when the Prime Minister became personally involved in the process of 
mediation that a settlement- was concluded on the 5th of OCtober 1996. The final 
agreement determined that workers would receive a 10.5% wage increase, backdated 
to 15 July of that year. The MUN agreed to the company's offer of a minimum wage 
ofN$ 500 dollars for such categories as grade 14 workers (unskilled) and an 8% wage 
increase for every worker earning more than the basic wage. The agreement also 
determined that a new wage curve would be implemented which would automatically 
correct wage adjustments in future. Further to the wage increases, it was agreed that a 
number of workers would still be retrenched in accordance to what had been decided -
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even before the advent of the strike. The acting president of the MUN claimed that 
TCL had initially not been willing to compensate retrenched workers, and that the 
appeal to the labour court to declare the strike illegal had been a ploy to allow TCL to 
dismiss workers without giving them retrenchment packages. Although the 
retrenchments would go ahead, the union was of the opinion that they had won the 
battle in this respect as the agreement concluded that workers would indeed receive 
some form of compensation. Roughly 1000 retrenched employees would be 
transported to their homes at the company's cost (about N$ 100 000). It was 
determined at the time that the mines would only be fully operational again by 
January 1997. (Addition to The Namibian, November 1996: 4, 6; Gold Fields 
Namibia Annual Report 1996: 5). 
7.2.2.1.4 After the strike 
The TCL strike lasted 6 weeks. As a direct result of the strike considerable damage 
was done to the copper furnace and some of the mine chambers flooded. It took 
roughly 2 months to repair the badly damaged copper furnace, with production only 
commencing in December 1996. 1996's after tax profit figures for the company was 
N$ 12,4 million, down from N$ 25 million in 1995. TCL's operating loss ofN$ 44,2 
million was however offset by an insurance pay-out of N$ 25 million. The De Wet-
shaft of the Tsumeb mine was closed in June 1996, several months before the strike, 
and the open pit and upper levels ofTsumeb was not re-opened after the strike. 
A total of 16 weeks of production was lost as result of the strike. This 4 month loss 
contributed to total ore milled declining by 23%, compared to what it had been in 
1995. Copper recovered in concentrates decreased by 32% to 17910 tons, whilst lead 
recovered in concentrates decreased by 29% to 7 153 tons. The collapse of the copper 
price and the strikes contributed to the rasionalisation that resulted in the permanent 
closure of the open pit and upper level mining operations. These mining operations 
had previously been scheduled for closure in December 1996 and mid 1997 
respectively. As a result of the freezing of the furnace during the strike period, the 
production of blister copper was halted. The furnace was rebuilt during October and 
November of 1996 and was re-commissioned in December 1996, but blister copper 
production fell by 31 % to 20 705 tons. The lead sinter plant and blast furnace were 
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not re-commissioned after the strike and resources were concentrated on completing 
the new lead smelter. Refined lead production for the year fell by 30% to 18 845 tons 
(Gold Fields Namibia Annual Report 1996: 3,4). 
On 18 April 1998 all TCL operations were closed down following an application for a 
preliminary liquidation. The Company had been making an operating loss for the 15 
month period preceding the liquidation application. Monthly operating losses were 
quoted to have been roughly N$ 5 million per month, while the monthly wage bill in 
itself amounted to more than N$ 7 million. The main reasons for the poor financial 
performance of TCL was given as the slump in copper prices and flooding of the 
Kombat mine. On final liquidation all mineral rights will revert back to the state (Die 
Republikein, 30 April 1998: 2). 
In mid-1998, during the liquidation process of TCL, a local newspaper quoted an 
amount of N$ 38 million having been paid over to the 1935 (retrenched) former 
employees of TCL, plus an additional N$ 7,9 million for salaries for April 1998 (Die 
Republikein, 1 June 1998: 1). Although a number of companies put in offers to buy 
TCL, the frontrunner was quoted in the press during February 1999 as being an 
Australian mining company which offered to buy TCL as a going concern. By June 
1999 a newspaper article appeared in which it was hinted that what was left of TCL 
would be sold for a paltry N$ 76 million to a newly formed Namibian mining 
company, but that the deal had not been finalised (Die Republikein, 6 July 1999: 1). 
7.2.2.2 The Meatco Strike of 1997 
7.2.2.2.1 Background to the strike 
In September 1997 some 800 workers at Meatco (The Meat Corporation of Namibia) 
went on strike at the company's premises in Windhoek and Okahandja following a 
wage dispute over annual adjustments. This was only a month after labour unrest had 
flared up regarding the same issue. Workers insisted on an average wage increase of 
N$ 100 per worker. This amounted to an additional 8% wage increase over and above 
the 7% already granted earlier, and they wanted the increases backdated to the 1 st of 
March 1997. For persons receiving wages that exceeded N$ 1 500 per month the 
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union demanded wage increases of 4%. Further to the above, the top management of 
Meatco was to be replaced and nine workers who had allegedly been dismissed 
unfairly were to be reinstated. 
Meatco today contends that it followed internal procedures as well as those prescribed 
by the Labour Act to the letter. In the opinion of Meatco management the strike was 
illegal as it did not commence after 48 hours of giving notice, but only after 5 days. 
The case was however thrown out in court, as the court was of the opinion that 
workers only had to give notice within 48 hours, but not necessarily act on this. An 
application of appeal has, however, been granted to the company (refer Annexure A: 
Mr. Nanub). 
At the time, however, Meatco considered the strike as illegal, and subsequently 
threatened workers with immediate dismissal. Non-striking workers were prevented 
from entering the factory in which slaughtered cattle were still hanging on the 
slaughtering line in the cool rooms. Meatco applied for and was granted an urgent 
interdict in the High Court that determined that striking workers would not be allowed 
to intimidate non-striking workers or to prohibit them from entering the premises. The 
union was formally instructed not to intervene in any way in the normal working 
functions of the company and members were not to be present on the premises of 
Meatco for any reason other than the execution of daily duties (Die Republikein, 4 
September 1997: 1). 
Following ongoing negotIatIons between the umon representatives and company 
officials, the union formally ended the strike on the 12th of September 1997. 
Controversy, however, continued to surround the settlement as union leader Aloysius 
Yon at the time contended that Meatco had a bank account in London with N$ 235 
million which could have been used to pay workers' increases. He also stated that 
Meatco had decided beforehand that it wanted to close certain factories, and therefore 
had only been looking for reasons to dismiss workers. (Die Republikein, 4 September 
1997: 1, 12 September 1997: 1). 
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7.2.2.2.2 After the strike 
As a result of striking workers preventing people from entering the premises, the 
carcasses that had been hanging on the slaughtering line for the duration of the strike 
(twelve days) had become rotten and had to be removed and burned. The value of 
meat lost owing to the rotting of carcasses only was estimated at a N$ 100000. Much 
more importantly, however, as a direct result of this strike, Meatco lost its European 
Union approval and had to re-apply for the status of an EU meat exporter. This re-
assessment stage took several weeks to complete and resulted in Meatco losing 
substantial amounts of money owing to the fact that all slaughtering operations had 
ceased during this period, and thus also meat exports to the EU (Die Republikein, 12 
September 1997: 1). 
Another interesting development is that, following the retrenchment of a significant 
number of workers during difficult financial times experienced in the mid-1990's, 
Meatco now only takes on additional workers during seasonal upturns. Such workers 
(about 300 normally) are given monthly contracts and receive only a cash wage, but 
no other fringe benefits. As work is so scarce this has not resulted in a shortage of 
persons seeking employment (refer Annexure A: Mr. Nanub). 
7.2.2.3 The Hartlief Strike 
During September 1995 a 12 day strike took place at Hartliefs, one of the largest meat 
processing factories in Windhoek. Some 244 workers resorted to illegal strike action 
on the 9th of September when it appeared negotiations regarding wage increases had 
reached a dead end. The strike was marred by violence against non-striking workers 
from the outset. Hartliefs immediately turned to the labour court for an interdict to 
force striking workers to refrain from intimidating non-strikers. Following a threat by 
the company to dismiss all striking workers, most turned up and signed on for work, 
but in effect just stood around and did nothing. 
During the negotiations a salary adjustment of N$ 90 was offered, although annual 
bonuses would not be paid out. The union, however, wanted a N$ 115 increase across 
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the board as well as have an agreement drawn up to force the company to refer certain 
terms of employment for arbitration (Die Republikein, 20 September 1995: 1). 
Striking workers were also accused of holding hostage 22 non-striking employees for 
5 hours on the premises. Striking workers in tum claimed the police treated them 
violently in what should have remained only a labour dispute. Rubber bullets and 
teargas were fired. A spokesperson for the Namibian Food and Allied Workers Union 
(NAP AU) alleged that workers were picketing peacefully when they were attacked by 
the police. The union accused the police of acting unlawfully as the strike was legal. 
The union gave the company 48 hours notice of the strike. Hartlief in its defense 
noted at the time that striking workers were receiving N$ 700 a month as wages, 
transport to and from work, two meals per day and pension contributions, totaling a 
package of about N$ 1075 (The Namibian, 11 September 1995: 1). 
A Conciliation Board that was established to resolve the dispute was dissolved 
following two meetings during which negotiators failed to reach an agreement. In 
spite of this, parties were eventually able to reach a final agreement. This entailed that 
workers signed away their right to annual bonuses, and lowered their demand of a N$ 
115 per month wage increase to N$ 100 per person per month (Die Republikein, 24 
September 1995: 1). 
7.3 Conclusion 
The case studies point to a number of important aspects concerning intervention in the 
labour market. 
Press clippings· and personal interviews with knowledgeable parties suggest that 
government and the private sector acknowledge the important role of unions in a 
democracy, even though they could be considered to represent economic costs. A 
number of organised strikes have. taken place since the introduction of the 1992 
Labour Act, hailed by workers and employers alike as a comprehensive framework 
for measuring and protecting their rights and responsibilities. From the number of 
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strikes that have taken place and the publicity that has surrounded this, one could 
perhaps draw the following general conclusions: 
a) Given the history of labour in this country, and the important role politics have 
played, there are close historical ties between the unions and the SW APO 
government. This has at times put government in a difficult position, as it now 
needs to act in an unbiased matter towards both workers and employers. While 
private sector employment creation is of extreme importance, government has a 
responsibility to assist in eradicating disparities in the labour market and to see to 
it that human rights are not infringed. Although attempting to remain in the 
background, pressure has come from both sides: government has been accused of 
according unions more power than was granted to them through the 1992 Labour 
Act, while unions have blamed government for not doing enough to improve the 
situation of workers. Government has, however, at times deemed it necessary to 
act in the overall interest of the country, as is evident from the efforts to draw 
foreign investment to the EPZ. It has, however, attempted to strike a balance 
between the need to create new jobs and the demands of labour, which considered 
the EPZ's as "sweatshops" where labour is abused. 
b) In spite of attempts to intervene as little as possible in labour disputes, this has 
proven difficult. Arguably the best example of the "negotiating power" of 
government has been the TCL strike where a solution was only agreed to once the 
Prime Minister formally mediated and allegedly flexed some political muscle. 
Although the procedures prescribed in the Labour Act are adhered to, there have 
been some complaints concerning the fact that parties often act in bad faith as they 
participate in "in-house" negotiations and even formal procedures such as 
Conciliation Bo-ard negotiations as prescribed by the Labour Act, while their 
ultimate goal is to go through the formal process in order to be able to declare a 
legal strike. Hence government's intervention by way of instituting the Labour Act 
is made less effective by misuse and loopholes which still need to be addressed and 
amended. 
There remains a high degree of mistrust and miscommunication between employers 
and workers. Workers have accused employers of not sharing financial information 
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with them, while employers have in tum blamed workers for not having realistic 
wage demands, given the prevailing economic situation in the country. This is 
likely to continue for some time to come, as many union members do not have 
formal education, and perhaps have too little insight into economic and financial 
matters. To solve this problem it is imperative that management shares information 
and include workers to a larger extent in decision making processes. 
c) By the beginning of 1999, more than two-thirds of strikes that have taken place in 
Namibia have in some way been wage related. This is perhaps understandable 
given the high income inequality between different ethnic groups. It appears that 
workers are highly dependent on a cash income, hence greater importance is being 
attached to the issue of wages than aspects such as working conditions. The focus 
on wage issues could also indicate that there is a lack of knowledge regarding 
fringe benefits. 
d) Cause for concern is the occurrence of militant and violent action during strikes. 
In a number of the strikes that have taken place since 1990, non-striking workers 
have been intimidated and in some cases even physically prevented from working. 
This is neither in line with democratic practice nor with the prescriptions of the 
Labour Act, and again points to the fact that although government may have good 
intentions regarding intervening through the Labour Act, such intervention is not 
always respected by all parties. 
As regards the issue of,the Export Processing Zone, it should be kept in mind that 
government has an obligation to "intervene" in the normal workings of the labour 
market by encouraging the creation of employment opportunities, and in doing so by 
reducing inequality. Economic development has for decades been heavily influenced 
by pre-Independence political and social factors, and this has given government a 
moral obligation to intervene. Furthermore, in a country such as Namibia where the 
job creating potential of most of the primary sector activities has been saturated, 
government has had little option but to focus on developing the manufacturing sector 
and encouraging exports. At the same time it has an obligation to put a regulatory 
framework in place to ensure that parties are treated fairly and that consideration is 
given to aspects such as occupational health and safety. 
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The minimum wage is likely to remain a contentious issue in Namibia. As the issue of 
the minimum wage is seldom raised by the press, public debate on this subject has 
been limited. There have been calls from certain union representatives for a minimum 
wage in sectors such as agriculture and retailing, but other representatives and labour 
leaders have at the same time dismissed such a move as virtually impossible to 
monitor. Generally, there appears to be a widespread perception that by implementing 
it in the agricultural sector, where cash wages are reported to be extremely low, it 
could result in large scale lay-offs of workers who have little hope of finding 
alternative employment in a country where unemployment is already rife. It is 
therefore considered a politically sensitive issues and will in all likelihood remain so 
in the foreseeable future. 
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8. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study has been to review factors affecting the cost of labour and 
ultimately employment, with a particular emphasis on the effect of labour standards 
and labour market institutions. It has been argued that labour market institutions are 
the result of a combination of economic, social and political forces. The type of 
instruments introduced, the timing of their introduction and the manner in which they 
are applied to a large extent reflect government's perception of the needs and 
expectations of society - not only economic, but also political and social needs. As 
government is responsible for addressing certain important issues (e.g. the fair and 
humane treatment of workers), the effect of such institutions should not always be 
judged on economic merit only. It has been argued that Namibia is an excellent 
example of a country where this is precisely the case. 
A great number of economic theories have been pos~ted in order to explain how 
wages are determined. Theories such as the marginal productivity theory based on the 
idea that wages reflect productivity, bargaining theories based on the power of parties 
to negotiate wage levels, as well as supply and demand forces have remained popular 
in explaining the above, albeit only in pa,rt. What is evident is that a combination of 
factors, including those factors explained by way of the abovementioned theories, 
may influence wage levels and also levels of employment. As market forces function 
within a social setting, institutional forces, including ones "artificially" created by 
government can have ~ significant impact on wages and employment. 
Arguably, the welfare state is one of the best examples of how governments during 
the past century have -attempted to reconcile-economic, social and political- interests. 
The social security system and the income support it provides have often been 
regarded as the foundation stone of the welfare state. With the institutionalism of the 
welfare state, governments have increasingly become involved in providing 
marginalised groups both with social insurance and social assistance. Although the 
modem welfare state was designed mainly to take care of persons incapable of 
working, the problem of jobless economic growth has also impacted on welfare state 
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policies and has led to the respective institutions representing the labour market and 
social policy becoming increasingly interwoven. 
Government intervention in the economy remams a controversial topic, with 
opposing viewpoints as to how government should intervene and the extent to which 
it should intervene, although there appears to be some common ground in that there is 
agreement that intervention to ensure very basic standards seems justifiable. One of 
the most common ways for any government to intervene in the labour market is by 
way of introducing regulations aimed at protecting the rights of workers. By 
determining certain basic standards with regard to, for example, working conditions, 
governments deliberately intervene with the natural working of the market 
mechanism. 
Economic literature often refers to labour standards as representing rigidities or 
distortions that impede the functioning of the market. Excessive protection of the 
workforce is believed by many to only benefit a selected group, while damaging the 
long term prospects for employment creation. Others have, however, pointed out a 
more positive role for labour standards in creating trust between employers and 
employees. 
In both industrialised and developing countries labour market institutions and the 
regulatory frameworks associated with them have been attacked by those advocating 
more flexibility. World Bank economists in particular have been critical of labour 
legislation and regulations in certain countries, as they see it as inhibiting the capacity 
of labour markets to adjust to changing circumstances. 
Neoclassicists contend that employment and wage matters should be left to the 
working of market forces as policy interventions will over the longer term only result 
in inefficiency. Neoclassical economists in developing countries have argued that 
enforcing "first world" labour standards in developing countries will contribute to 
protectionism and will markedly reduce export opportunities for these countries. Their 
main argument is that policy should rather focus on outcomes than on procedures, a~d 
that the market mechanism offers the optimal outcome. 
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Converse to the general World Bank viewpoint, the ILO argues that by 
acknowledging human rights, social justice and better economic outcomes are 
ensured. They contend that labour standards are required, provided that the level and 
kind of regulation that will not impair the functioning of the labour market. 
This study has put evidence forward regarding the introduction and impact of 
collective bargaining, the minimum wage and social security in both industrialised 
and developing countries. Whereas the former may directly affect the price of labour, 
the latter has a more indirect effect in that contribution to social security represents 
additional non-wage labour costs to the employer. 
Collective bargaining is viewed by many as one of the core labour standards, based 
on a moral imperative. Different views have been presented with regard to the effect 
of collective bargaining, namely that centralised bargaining does not exacerbate the 
unemployment problem, that the hump-shaped solution of both centralised and 
decentralised bargaining are advantageous to employment levels (Calmfors and 
Driffil, as cited in Soskice), or that neither centralisation nor decentralisation but 
rather the level of coordination is what matters most. 
Unfortunately most studies investigating the effect of collective bargaining structures 
on employment and wages have been conducted in industrialised countries, and not in 
developing countries where statistical information remains lacking. In industrialised 
countries evidence has suggested that labour market institutions are in the process of 
adjusting to the changing global economic conditions. Centralised bargaining 
structures have to a certain extent been decentralised. Although there are advantages 
associated with decentralised bargaining, in practice this decentralisation of 
bargaining could result in lower wage increases for unionised workers and less 
headway with regard to the improvement of working conditions. Measures such as 
temporary and short term work contracts have become popular in industrialised 
countries during recent years, and all form part of a trend to lower wage costs by 
limiting fringe benefit payments, and reducing job security, thereby increasing 
flexibility in the labour market. 
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In Europe institutional arrangements have been blamed for creating rigidities that 
have reduced the flexibility of the labour market apd have made it slower to adjust to 
economic shocks. Measures to enhance flexibility have included dropping 
employment security measures (for example by way of taking on only temporary 
workers), as well as encouraging decentralised bargaining. This has resulted in 
savings for firms in terms of the non-wage costs associated with employing a worker 
on a fixed, indefinite term basis, and is credited for allowing firms to shed workers 
more easily during periods of economic downturn. 
In general, the development of collective bargaining structures in developing 
countries has been hindered by the fact that governments have extensively intervened 
in the labour markets, and that unions have had limited bargaining power. In Asian 
countries such as Malaysia and Korea, governments have deliberately controlled 
union power in order to keep wage levels low, thereby enhancing the competitive 
pricing of export products. In Latin American countries unions have generally been 
stronger and better organised than in Asia. However, even here the effect of 
negotiated settlements has been watered down by the fact that in many countries such 
as Columbia and Ecuador formal legislation was never introduced to back up the 
negotiation process, or guide the process itself. For example, employers are not 
obliged by law to negotiate. What has been found, however, is that although there is 
also a trend towards decentralisation, collective bargaining has had one big advantage 
in that it has raised certainty in the labour market. In Africa, government intervention 
in economic and labour issues has traditionally been high. Unions have historically 
not been very strong, but have rather cut across tribal lines and in doing so helped the 
workforce to present a united front when it came to labour issues. There is a 
perception that union membership in many African countries grew less than expected 
once countries were taken over by democratically elected governments. This loss of 
interest in joining unions has to a large extent been attributed to the limited power 
unions have had to negotiate better wages and working conditions for their members. 
Ironically, in many countries, the retrenchments and decline in formal sector 
employment have been attributed to structural adjustment programs and other external 
economic factors over which unions could have had little control. Another factor has 
been that, as the result of democratisation, workers have lost their common objective, 
namely to present political opposition to colonial forces. 
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With regards to its stance towards the development of labour market institutions, it 
seems apparent that the Namibian government, although respecting free market 
principles, has deemed it necessary to intervene both by way of introducing new 
labour market institutions and by adapting those that already existed at the time of 
Independence. 
Most of the labour policies and legislation enacted by the Namibian government since 
1990, and in particular the collective bargaining structures introduced, has been aimed 
at promoting sound labour relations, the fair and equal treatment of all workers, and, 
in order to wipe out the significant inequality with regard to income, the wage levels 
of workers belonging to formerly disadvantaged groups. This has been in response to 
the fact that, during the decades running up to Independence, labour relations and 
virtually all aspects of the labour relationship were governed by institutional forces 
reflecting apartheid policy. These forces in many instances overrode all other factors 
influencing the labour relationship. Attempts have in general been aimed at drawing 
formerly disadvantaged and marginalised groups into the mainstream of the economy. 
Although no data is publicly available specifically with regard to the impact of 
collective bargaining on wage levels and employment in Namibia, the general 
impression is that, similar to the case in countries such as Chile and Uruguay, the 
legal collective bargaining framework introduced through the 1992 Labour Act has 
contributed to certainty and greater coordination in the labour market. Collective 
bargaining, the fact that unions have been legalised, and the fact that membership is 
open to all workers, have put workers in a position where they have been accorded 
collective power and can theoretically negotiate better outcomes as regards wages and 
working conditions than had previously been the case. Given the fact that they did not 
have access to such mechanisms prior to Independence, the negotiated wage 
settlements since 1992 may have been lower. without workers having access to this 
mechanism. Although the tripartite concept has not yet been implemented fully, 
arguably because of the fact that the ruling party and unions are as a result of their 
close historical ties perhaps still more sympathetic towards each other's causes, 
Namibia appears to be on the right track. Notwithstanding the fact that some of the 
aspects relating to collective bargaining and the Labour Act may not carry favour with 
all interest groups, it is unlikely that government will allow controversial changes 
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which could result in "bad publicity" internationally. Government has never made a 
secret of the fact that it understands how important foreign investment is for future 
economic growth. 
Minimum wages have not proved particularly popular in industrialised countries, 
arguably because collective bargaining structures are well developed and present a 
more "sophisticated" means of determining wages and working conditions. Generally, 
in developing countries where collective bargaining has not been well developed, the 
minimum wage has been treated as an inferior form of collective bargaining. It has 
been found in many of these countries that the "minimum" as soon as it is introduced 
in fact becomes the "maximum" wage paid. 
The influence of minimum wages has been negligible in many of the industrialised 
countries, in part some have argued, because it had only been introduced in certain 
sectors of economies. Nevertheless, one of the industrialised countries where 
minimum wages have been introduced sectorally is the United States, and even here 
research has found that the effect of minimum wages has been contradictory. Surveys 
have generally suggested that it has had little to no impact on employment, while 
empirical analysis has suggested that it has in fact had a negative effect on 
employment. 
In developing countries there has been a perception that introducing sectoral 
minimum wages would be the best way to achieve economic stability and reduce 
inequality. In Africa in particular the minimum wage has proven popular as a means 
of reducing inequality. It has, however, also been introduced in order to achieve other 
objectives, as in the case of Botswana where the initial aim was to lift urban wages to 
the same level as that of rural farmers so as to discourage rural-urban migration. 
Studies in Botswana suggested that the minimum wage did not present as much of a 
drawback to economic growth and employment as did other problems such as the 
transport of produce to markets, etc. With regard to the South African labour market, 
it was suggested by Standing and Sender in 1996, in a controversial ILO country 
study, rather to focus on the issue of a social wage, although they also did 
acknowledge that there were some advantages to introducing a minimum wage. The 
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idea of focusing on a social wage entails detennining a socially acceptable subsistence 
level of income, rather than a fixed minimum cash wage. 
In general, the mInImUm wage appears to have had little impact on reducing 
inequalities in Africa and Asia, or on reducing employment. It could be argued that 
one of the most important reasons for this has been that it had not been the right 
instrument to achieve the initial objectives of the respective governments. Also, the 
minimum wage has often been set at such low levels that it could have no significant 
impact. In Latin American, where the minimum wage has been very popular, its main 
objective has been to combat the effect of high inflation. However, this has 
necessitated regular adjustments which have often not taken place. Even in countries 
where it has been adjusted as often as once or even twice per annum (for example 
Brazil, Argentina and Chile), the effect of it has been negligible, the reason being that 
legislation and administration have not been in step. Again, in countries such as 
Puerto Rico where it has been adjusted regularly and enforced, it has impacted 
negatively on employment. 
It is difficult to detennine the effect of the mmimum wage on employment in 
Namibia. Since the introduction of the minimum wage in the construction industry in 
1996 in Namibia it has been adjusted twice. As inflation has not had such a significant 
effect on wages as has been the case in Latin America, these two adjustments seem 
reasonable. In a telephone survey conducted among construction companies in 
Windhoek (refer chapter seven) it came to light that most medium-sized and larger 
companies did not have a problem paying the minimum wage. Most of the companies 
interviewed employ workers mainly on a contractual/part time basis, and noted that 
they have continued to take on the number of workers necessitated by the building 
contracts they have been given, even after the minimum rates were introduced. The 
different minimum wages for the respective categories of workers was agreed to 
following a process of tripartite negotiation, hence it comes as no surprise that 
employers did not feel that wages were unduly high. Also, the construction industry 
has been hard hit by the high interest rates and the slowdown in economic growth in 
Namibia during recent years. Hence one could perhaps argue that during negotiations, 
government, employers and workers have all been aware that employers would not be 
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in a position to pay unrealistically high wages, and have to a certain extent taken this 
into account. 
In most industrialised countries governments provide extensive social security 
coverage to citizens, including insurance against unemployment. As a large 
percentage of the population is formally employed and hence able to contribute 
regularly also to private social insurance funds, income security appears to be much 
less of a problem than in developing countries. The latter group generally find 
themselves not in the financial position to afford high levels of social assistance, nor 
can they provide extensive social insurance benefits. 
As is the case in many other developing countries, introducing social security systems 
modeled on those found in industrialised nations would be an inappropriate choice for 
Namibia. The reasons for this include that, compared to most industrialised nations, 
poverty and unemployment is much more common in developing countries, insurance 
and credit markets are generally not well developed (although this cannot be said for 
Namibia, where as a result of the country's strong ties to South Africa these markets 
have developed well), and rural administration is hindered by logistical problems. 
Efforts by the Namibian government to address the wrongs of apartheid have included 
raising social expenditure on health, education and housing, as well as introducing 
new and adjusting existing social insurance and social assistance. In order to assist 
marginalised groups, and as part of its commitment to encourage the development of 
financially independent institutions assisting with income security, government 
promulgated a Social Security Act in 1994, the application of which is overseen by a 
Social Security Commission. It is mandatory for all workers and employers to belong 
to the funds that have been launched by the Social Security Commission. Such funds 
have been introduced mainly in order to provide an inexpensive option for the poorest 
group of workers, most of whom would not qualify for the private sector pension 
funds and medical aid offered by most of the larger private sector institutions in 
Namibia. Notwithstanding attempts to improve the income security of marginalised 
groups in Namibia, poverty remains one of the greatest problems facing the country. 
Generally, the coverage of labour market regulations in developing countries has 
remained a problem, given the high degree of segmentation in the labour markets. 
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Namibia is a prime example of such a highly segmented economy, with coverage 
limited to the relatively small percentage of the population formally employed. As 
job opportunities in the formal sector in general have been growing at a much slower 
pace than the number of persons entering the labour market, informal sector activities 
has grown significantly. However, most labour regulations do not apply to informal 
sector workers: they are not organised in unions, nor are they protected by regulations 
pertaining to wage bargaining. Working conditions are not determined according to 
work contracts, workers are not protected from unfair dismissal, nor do they have any 
power to improve the health and safety conditions of their working environment, no 
minimum wage apply and workers younger than 60 years of age have no access to the 
income security provided by the state, to name but a few examples. 
In many developing countries, and in particular Namibia, politics has arguably been 
the leading factor affecting the development of labour market institutions. A great 
number of countries in which labour had been exploited prior to new regimes taking 
over political control, have focused efforts and money on trying to compensate for 
such exploitation by way of introducing extensive labour market regulations. This 
holds true for countries such as Namibia and Malaysia where governments have 
focused on eradicating labour exploitation allowed under previous rule. Although the 
heavy regulation in some developing countries is associated with high costs, it is very 
much a moral and political issue, hence the fact that the high costs are often viewed as 
of secondary importance, should the initial objectives behind the introduction of such 
instruments be achieved. 
All-in-all it appears that although there is merit in intervention on the side of 
government, such intervention is often not successful as a result of a number of 
factors. There are not only physical, but also psychological, social, political and 
economic elements involved when it comes to labour and this makes it all the more 
difficult to intervene in a way which will be acceptable to society at large. People 
need to buy into any changes brought on by government. Furthermore, intervention in 
the labour market is complicated by the fact that there is a financial and monitoring or 
"policing" aspect to processes, and that without either of these aspects no form of 
intervention is likely to be fully successful. This appears to be the case in Namibia at 
present. Although government has tried to accommodate these parties, but in 
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particular workers, through a new Labour Act, minimum wage legislation and social 
security coverage, neither employers nor workers have been fully convinced of the 
merits of tripartism. 
One could argue that the fairly high degree of intervention during most the 1990's is 
acceptable as Namibia is to a large extent still in a "transitional" phase with regard to 
many political and socio-economic aspects. However, over the medium to longer term 
it will be imperative to establish a balance between accommodating the needs of 
workers and the need to ensure sustainable economic growth that would facilitate the 
creation of more jobs. 
It appears that up to the present labour market flexibility has not been very high on the 
official agenda. During most of the 1990' s government has sought to introduce labour 
market institutions that would address the issues of the humane and fair treatment of 
all workers, as well the high income inequality. This has to a certain extent taken 
priority over issues such as the need to increase flexibility in order to adjust to the 
changing international economy. The first sign of government "acknowledging" the 
extreme importance of foreign trade and the development of the export sector could 
perhaps be considered to have been through the introduction of the Export Processing 
Zone regime. 
As noted in chapter three, the initial objectives with introducing labour standards are 
of great importance. One cannot help but reflect on the statement by Fields (as cited in 
Plant 1994: 79), albeit also highly controversial, that the lack of labour standards in 
the Far East has facilitated econorpic growth, which has in tum created a vast number 
of new jobs in highly populous regions. In this example a high level of employment 
appears to have weighed heavier in the eyes of the respective governments than the 
rights of workers. It could however be argued that workers might be willing to tolerate 
a certain measure of suppression for as long as they perceive the economic benefits 
arising from this as being to their advantage. Nevertheless, even if one agrees that a 
strict stance such as that suggested by Fields has produced the desired results, it will 
be difficult to apply to Namibia, the reason being that many workers have not only 
been deprived of their political rights under apartheid, but have also been deprived 
economically. Government has built a strong support base by undertaking not only to 
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ensure democratic rights and to eradicate human rights abuses and worker 
exploitation, but also to improve the economic situation, i.e. mainly the standard of 
living, of members of formerly disadvantaged groups. It will become increasingly 
difficult to support a political democracy if, as a result of a lack of economic growth, 
the burden of financially supporting marginalised groups on government, the private 
sector and even private household units continues to grow heavier. 
It appears that, except for reflecting government's commitment to improving the 
future of all groups in society, and for the standard setting value, the economic impact 
of the labour market institutions reviewed in this study has, from a purely economic 
point of view, been less severe on employment levels than could have been expected, 
although it seems reasonable to assume that they have contributed to pushing both 
wage rates and non-wage labour costs upwards. It is, however, not possible to prove 
empirically that an increase in wage levels has been the main cause of the continued 
high level of unemployment, as there are numerous other economic factors that have 
also impacted negatively on employment, and as it is difficult if not impossible to 
isolate the impact of this on wages. This is an area that requires extensive further 
research. 
As difficult to judge is the issue of whether government has introduced the wrong 
instruments, given the needs of both society and workers, or whether the instruments 
have simply not been applied effectively. It should, however, be taken into account 
that, as the Labour Act was only introduced in 1992, the new Social Security funds in 
1994 and afterwards, and the minimum wage in 1996 only, these instruments have at 
the time of writing been applied for a relatively short period of time: in another 
decade or two it should be much easier to assess the impact of labour regulations on 
the Namibian economy. However, by· that time international economic forces are 
likely to have impacted much more severely on the local economy than is the case at 
present. With some 42% of the Namibian population at present being younger than 
fourteen years of age, pressure on government to address the issue of unemployment 
will continue to mount during the next decade. If Namibia's economy is to prosper 
and generate news jobs by way of developing the service industries and through 
expanding exports (which seems like the most feasible option at this point in time), it 
leaves little choice other than adapting the domestic product- and labour markets to fit 
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into the new economic mould being created through the globalisation of the world 
economy. 
It seems certain that labour market institutions in Namibia will continue to be shaped 
not only by external and internal economic forces, but also in accordance to 
government's perception of the needs of Namibian society. In view of this 
combination, it will remain important to regularly review labour market policies and 
practices and to effect the necessary changes in order for such policies, regulations 
and instruments to remain effective. 
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9. Annexure A : Interviews 
Social Security Commission of Namibia: June 1999. 
Social Security Commission of Namibia: August 1998 
and June 1999. 
Tsumeb Corporation Limited (TCL): October 1998. 
Social Security Commission of Namibia: June 1999. 
Social Security Commission of Namibia: April 1997. 
Office of the Labour Commissioner, Ministry of 
Labour: April 1997, March 1998, August 1998, July 
1999. 
Office of the Labour Commissioner, Ministry of 
Labour: June 1999. 
Meat Corporation of Namibia (Meatco): January 1999. 
Export Processing Zone Management Company: June 
1999. 
Export Processing Zone Management Company: June 
1998. 
The Commercial Bank of Namibia Limited: June 1999. 
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